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ABSTRACT PAGE

Between the founding of the French post of Detroit in 1701 and the end of Pontiac's War in 1766,
several native American peoples settled in distinct clusters around the French (and later British
post) near current-day Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario. Focusing on the interactions
among these communities, this dissertation makes two interrelated arguments. It first argues
that, although these peoples had been challenged and changed by the forces of colonialism
during the seventeenth century, they nonetheless emerged from that century as discrete ethnic,
social, and political entities, rather than shattered or disintegrated refugees. A set of
interconnected, mutually constituting, and consistent relationships between these separate and
autonomous peoples, secondly, shaped affairs in the region just as much as the relationship
between Europeans and native peoples. That colonial relationship, in fact, was embedded within
and reciprocally tied to the web of relationships between native peoples. Only by understanding
both exchanges between French and native peoples as well as modes of interaction between
different indigenous peoples can scholars make sense of events at Detroit.
To demonstrate both the survival of these native groups as discrete peoples and the
consequences of that survival, each of the first four chapters explores one of the salient
relationships between native peoples at Detroit, while the final charts how these relationships
shaped one event, Pontiac's War. The first chapter charts the way in which the Huron man,
Cheanonvouzon, sought to compensate for his peoples' weakness by forming a "southern
alliance" with two powerful groups in the region, the Miamis and Five Nations, or Iroquois. The
second chapter investigates how the closely related Anishinaabe peoples-the Ottawas, Ojibwas,
and Potawatomis-cooperated to meet the challenge posed by the southern alliance. The
emergence of these two rival blocs led to conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738, and
the third chapter places that violence within a longer pattern of competition between these
peoples. Chapter Four uses a controversy among the Hurons in the 1740s and 1750s to
understand the bonds which held that community together. Finally, the fifth chapter demonstrates
how all of these patterns shaped one event, the Anglo-Indian conflict frequently called Pontiac's
War, and situates that conflict within a local context. As scholars investigate how these
relationships mutually constituted not only one another but also the colonial relationship,
intercultural relations at Detroit, as well as the rest of the New World, become at once more
complicated and more comprehensible.
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INTRODUCTION
The Same Body
In a December 1701 conference, Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac,

commandant of a new post on the Detroit River, invited the Hurons to come live at
Detroit. Settled alongside the other native nations that were sure to come, Cadillac
assured the Hurons, they would find cheap trading goods and security from enemies such
as the Dakotas. Cadillac further promised the Hurons that he would "embrace [them] and
enclose you between [his] arms," and that they would form "the same body" with the
French and other natives settled at the fort. 1 The following year he told the Miamis,
through the Huron headman Cheanonvouzon, that "if they [the Miamis] come close to
me, we will be the same body." 2
The analogy of a single, integrated body perfectly captured the sort of alliance
that Cadillac and the French hoped to build among the peoples of the Great Lakes
Region, or pays d'en haut. 3 As the governor of New France, Hector de Calliere, had
articulated it earlier that year, this alliance would unite all of France's allies in the region
into a collective military and commercial entity-a "new nation." To ensure harmony

1

"je pourray vous embrasser et vous renfermer entre mes bras," "Conseil des Hurons tenu dans le fort du
Detroit, le 4 Decembre 1701," in MDE 5:261. When the original French is supplied in the notes, the
translation is that of the author. I have not corrected misspellings or inserted missing accent marks except
when their absence makes the word unrecognizable. The translations are generally try to capture the sense
of the quotation rather than a literal translation.
2
"Paroles de quatre Hurons ... ," 17 Feb. 1702, in ibid., 266. For other uses of this idiom, see Antoine
Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac, capitaine en pied, ayant une
compagnie de la Marine, en Canada, ci-devant Commandant de Missilimakinak et autres postes dans les
pays eloignes, ou il a ete pendant trois annees," in ibid., 118; "Words of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the
Savages Who Came down from the Upper Country, [1711], MPHSCR, 33:503.
3
The French universally referred to the Great Lakes Region as the "pays d'en haut" or "upper country" to
differentiate it from the St. Lawrence Valley-the "pays d'en bas" or "lower country." The pays d'en haut
included a wide swath ofland reaching west from the St. Lawrence Valley to the Plains, even including, in
some formulations, the Ohio River Valley and Illinois Country.

1

among these peoples, the governor of New France would mediate disputes among the
nations and thus maintain peace among these people. 4 As Calliere reminded to the
Ottawas the following year, "if you have any quarrel between your people and theirs [the
Iroquois'] do not Avenge it but Come here and inform me of it," so he could reconcile the
two peoples." 5 The French cast this alliance in familial terms: the nations of the region,
"Onontio's children," would cooperate with one another and would acknowledge French
mediation between them. 6
Accepting Cadillac's promise and invitation, the Hurons and other groups who
eventually settled at Detroit in the early eighteenth century-the Ottawas, the Ojibwas,
and Potawatomis-certainly appeared to embrace this French vision of a unified regional
alliance. 7 They explicitly used the language of alliance. During the peace negotiations in
August 1701, for example, the Ottawa leader Ontontagon, whom the French called Jean
le Blanc, noted that, although they frequently disagreed, the Hurons and Ottawas
"nevertheless form only one body together." Cheanonvouzon likewise noted that the

4

Maxime Gohier describes "mediation" as the "French imperial policy" and lauds the "genius" of such
diplomacy. Gohier is more comfortable describing the way that mediation was meant to work than
assessing the extent to which it did work (Gohier, Onontio le mediateur: La gestion des conflits
amerindiens en Nouvelle-France, 1603-1717 [Sillery: Septentrion, 2008], 23, 39).
5
"s'il arrivoit quelque desmele entre quelqu'uns de vos [les Outaouaois] gens et les leurs [les Iroquois] de
n'en pas Vanger mais de Venir m'en donner avis affin que je accommode touts chose comme je l'ay
preserver [?] dans cette paix" ("Parolles des outaotiaes arrivez a Montreal Le Cinq juillet 1702," in Moreau
St.-Mery Collection, serie F3, Centre des archives d'outre mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, vol. 8, fol. 310.
6
"il vouloit etre le seul Arbitte de leurs differends ... qu'ils rernissent tous leurs interets entre ses mains,"
"Tous applaudirent avec de grandes acclamations, dont I' air retentit bien loin," Pierre-Fran~ois-Xavier
Charlevoix, Histoire et description generale de la Nouvelle France, 6 vols (Paris: Didot, 1744), 3:415, 418.
See also, Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal : French-native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth
Century. trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Ithaca: McGill-Queens University Press), 2001; White,
The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 142; Havard, Empire et metissages: Indiens et Franr;ais dans le pays
d'en haut, 1660-1715 (Quebec: Septentrion and Presses de l'Universite Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 215.
7
I use "Detroit" to designate the settlement during the French regime, from 1701 until1760, and "Detroit"
to refer to the post and region in the British period (after 1760).

2

Hurons and the Miamis shared "one Body," and the Miami leader Chichikatalo
confirmed that his people had "the same will as the Huron[s'] with whom we make only
one body." Fifty years later, the native peoples living at Detroit used nearly identical
terms to describe their alliance with one another, claiming to have "the same Heart, and
the same Body." 8 In 1760, the Hurons once again proclaimed, now to the British troops
who had just taken possession of Detroit, that "All the Indians in this Country are Allies
to each other and as one People" and "form one heart and one body together." 9
These proclamations of unity were more than simply words. On a daily basis, the
peoples of Detroit lived in close proximity, traded with one another and with French
merchants, competed in lacrosse and footraces with one another, and, in some cases loved
and married one another. They sometimes appealed to the French to help them settle
disputes and to keep the peace as well. These peoples also formed a powerful military
coalition which had warred with the Iroquois in the seventeenth century and fought
against the Catawbas, Foxes, Chickasaws, British, and other common enemies during the
eighteenth. This cooperation suggests that the peoples of the region had indeed formed a
single, integrated body under the auspices of Onontio. As one prominent historian of the
region phrases it, the nations had joined a "collective identity." The peoples of Detroit
cooperated so closely that they appeared to form a single "Indian community at Detroit,"

8

"vous ne faites plus qu'un meme Cceur, et qu'un meme Corps," "Conseil des hurons en presence des
outaotiais, et pouteouatarnis [et Sauteux] et reponse, Mai 1753, in CAOM, C11A, vol. 99, fol. 76v.
9
George Croghan, "Journal," 1760-1761, in Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels: Travel to the
Interior of North America, 1748-!856, 32 vols (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1904-1907) 1:118; "Minutes of
the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bart with the Indians on his Way to, and at the Detroit in 1761," in
WSJ, 2:497.

3

Figure 1: Detail from Antoine Laumet
de Lamothe Cadillac, "Carte du
Detroit," 1702. Service historique de Ia
Marine, Chateau de Vincennes, France).
Tlus map shows the ongmal three native
settlements closest to Fort Pontchartram m
therr ongmal configuration From top to
bottom, they are the Ottawa settlement, the
short-hved Loup, or Molucan, commumty,
and, below Fort Pontchartram, the Huron
village

and easily mteracted "across boundaries that were too often and too casually described as
tnbal." 10
Yet a 1702 map of DetrOit presents a different perspective of that alliance (see
figure 1). Drawn by Cadillac, the map shows that each of the groups then settled at
Detroit-the French, Hurons, Ottawas, and Mohicans (Loups)-had Its own separate
village, walled off from their neighbors. Far from forming one cozy commumty or an
integrated "body," DetrOit consisted of a collectiOn of distinct ethnic enclaves positioned
miles apart from one another. 11 Cadillac mdicated that each of these native commumties
erected defensive palisades around their villages. Such walls served not only to defend
these nations from external enemies, particularly the Iroquois Confederacy, or Five
Nations with whom they had recently made a tentative and fragile peace, but as physical
mamfestat10ns of the psychological distance which separated these communities from

10

Jon Parmenter, "Pontiac's War Forgmg New Lmks m the Anglo-Iroqums Covenant Cham, 1758-1766,"
Ethnohzstory 44 4 (Fall, 1997), 633, Gregory Dowd, War under Heaven Pontzac, the lndzan Natwns, &
the Brztzsh Empzre (Baltimore Johns Hopkins Umversity Press, 2002), 62
11
Cadillac au rmmstre, 25 sept 1702, mMPHSCR, 33 137-38

4

one another. 12 These representations suggest that, contrary to what the French wanted to
believe or the natives were willing to say, the peoples of the pays d' en haut had not
abandoned their discrete identities to embrace a single, common identity or form the
"same body." Indeed the peoples of Detroit demonstrated repeatedly in the coming
decades that, although willing to cooperate with one another, they continued to be
separate peoples with separate agendas and goals. Indeed, as the Jesuit polymath PierreFran<;ois-Xavier Charlevoix observed, the pays d'en haut was home to a melange of
peoples. At "first glance," he admitted in 1721, "there is much resemblance in the
character of the wit, morals, and customs of the savages of Canada." Yet his extensive
research and his own observations in the region convinced him that these apparent
similarities obscured a more profound "diversity" that separated the nations. 13 To the
consternation of Cadillac, his successors, and countless other colonial officials, the native
peoples never formed a single body under French supervision. "Onontio's children"
refused to melt into a common, undifferentiated whole.

t
This dissertation takes its cue from Lamothe Cadillac's 1702 map, rather than his
1701 rhetoric. Focusing on the native peoples who settled at Detroit between the
establishment of the French post there in 1701 and the conclusion of the Anglo-Indian
conflict called Pontiac's War in 1766, I make two interrelated claims. First, I argue that

12

William Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance" (PhD. diss. Dept. of History,
University of Toronto, 1995), 248.
13
"Il est vrai que malgre cette diversite, qui ne se remarque pas du premier coup d'reil, il y a bien de la
ressemblance dans la caractere d' esprit, les mreurs, & les cofitumes de to us les Sauvages du Canada."
Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un Voyage, ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols (Montreal: Les
Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744], 1994), 1:452.

5

although the peoples who settled at Detroit faced considerable disruptions in the
seventeenth century they nonetheless survived as discrete and autonomous groups.
During the seventeenth century these peoples had encountered new diseases which
ravaged some communities, encountered a wide range of new technology and new ideas,
and engaged in a series of devastating wars with the Five Nations Iroquois. Some,
especially the Hurons and Kiskakon Ottawas, had been forced to flee their homes when
the Iroquois defeated them in the 1640s and again when the Dakotas did so in the 1660s.
Yet the peoples of the region adapted to these changes and survived the seventeenth
century as independent and autonomous social, political, and cultural entities. The pays
d' en haut, therefore, was peopled by a host of discrete native peoples.
In arguing that these peoples identified themselves as distinct and autonomous, I
do not mean to suggest that these identities operated as static, abstracted self-definitions
like "citizenship." Rather than a fixed, self-conscious explanation of what it meant to be
"Huron," or "Potawatomi," I understand identity to be a dynamic mode of acting which
reflected loyalty to and membership in an exclusive and distinct community of fictively
and literally related people (by which I mean a circumscribed and politically unified,
though not necessarily centralized, entity). Thus identity was a way of living, not a mode
of thinking. Native people demonstrated this identity, for example, when leaders sought
to accomplish the best interest of their communities, when warriors fought to defend one
another, and when they made alliances with other nations. Moreover, this identity could
change over time as circumstances required. What persisted through these changes,
however, was a consistent tendency to act in ways that affirmed membership in a larger

6

community.
My second argument flows from the first. If the peoples of Detroit did not form
"one body," and instead acted as coherent and discrete peoples, then scholars must pay
attention not only to how Europeans interacted with native peoples, but with how native
peoples acted with one another. Specifically, I argue that a set of interconnected,
mutually constituting, and consistent relationships between the native people at Detroit
shaped affairs in the region just as much as the relationship between the French and
native peoples did. That colonial relationship, in fact, was embedded within and
reciprocally tied to the web of relationships between native peoples. Only by
understanding both exchanges between French and native peoples as well as modes of
interaction between different indigenous peoples can we make sense of events at Detroit.
Intercultural relations at Detroit, in other words, did not constitute a two-way dialogue
·between the French and the natives, but a multi-sided conversation among many groups
including the French. As scholars eavesdrop on this conversation, and fully listen to each
of the participants, the cultural encounter becomes at once more complicated and more
comprehensible.
Home to many native groups living in such intimate proximity, Detroit offers the
ideal laboratory for eavesdropping on this conversation. 14 From the beginning, the post
attracted a large and diverse population of natives. The settled native population,
consisting of a variety of cultural groups, generally did not dip much below 2,000 and
approached 2,500 at times. In addition to the permanently settled groups-the Hurons,

14

Following the contemporary French usage, I define Detroit expansively to include not only the location
of the modem-day city, but also the entire "strait" from Lake Huron to Lake Erie.

7

Ottawas, Mahicans, Ojibwas, and later Potawatomies-a number of others frequented the
post to trade, carry out diplomacy, and rest during long journeys. A constant stream of
Miamis, Iroquois, Foxes, lllinois, and other groups spent time at the post. These natives
found at Detroit a cosmopolis of sorts, a mixture of tongues, cultures, dress, and religious
beliefs. These differences led to myriad encounters and exchanges, ranging from the
prosaic to the profound. Here, more than in the rest of the pays d' en haut, and indeed
more than most of eastern North America, natives of different groups encountered one
another on a daily basis, playing, trading, loving, and living in a dynamic new world.

15

To demonstrate both the survival of these native groups as discrete peoples and
the consequences of that survival, each of the first four chapters explores one of the
salient relationships between native peoples at Detroit, and the final chapter charts how
these relationships shaped one event, Pontiac's War. Together, these chapters form a
single narrative arc. Focusing on roughly the first decade of settlement at Detroit, the
first chapter explains how Cheanonvouzon, sought to compensate for his peoples'
numerical weakness and diplomatic isolation by forming a "southern alliance" with two
powerful groups in the region, the Miamis and Five Nations, or Iroquois. The second
chapter investigates how the closely related Anishinaabe peoples-the Ottawas, Ojibwas,
and Potawatomis-cooperated to meet the challenge posed by the southern alliance. The
15

Until recently Detroit has received little scholarly attention. Older narrative histories such as George
Pare (The Catholic Church in Detroit, 1951) and Clarence M. Burton ("Cadillac's Village," 1896) focused
on the French community, referring to natives only incidentally. In recent years, however, a number of
scholars have begun investigating the post more fully. These have focused more on Europeans in the
region, with the exception of Karen Marrero, who is interested in metissage among European and native
peoples. Lina Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit, 1701-1765," (PhD. diss., Dept. of History,
Universite Laval, 2002);Catherine Cangany, "Frontier Seaport: Detroit's Transformation into an Atlantic
Entrepot, 1701-1837 ," (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, University of Michigan, 2009); Guillaume Teasdale,
"The French of Orchard Country : Territory, Landscape, and Ethnicity in the Detroit River Region, 1680s1810s," (PhD. diss., Dept. ofHistory, York University, 2011).

8

emergence of two rival blocs led to conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738,
and the third chapter places that violence within a longer pattern of competition between
these peoples. Chapter Four uses a controversy within the Huron community, prompted
by violence between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738, to understand the bonds which
held that community together. Finally, the fifth chapter demonstrates how all of these
patterns shaped one event, the Anglo-Indian conflict frequently called Pontiac's War, and
situates that conflict within a local context.
Although I have attempted to understand and analyze the dynamics of these
relationships separately, they were clearly interwoven and mutually contingent. The
Hurons' close association with the Iroquois and Miamis in the early eighteenth century,
for example, had much to do with the Hurons' resentment of the Ottawas, their close
neighbors and allies. And this Huron resentment came, in large part, from the Ottawas'
dominance in the region, which itself derived from the Ottawas' connections to other
Anishinaabe people in the region. It is therefore difficult to tell one story without telling
all the stories, and to define where one ends and another begins. I have nonetheless
sought to reduce repetition as much as possible and to supply only as much information
as necessary to explain the current relationship while including cross-references to other
chapters.

t
My work participates in an ongoing reappraisal of intercultural interaction in the
pays d'en haut. For nearly three decades, that literature has been dominated by the
perspective offered by Richard White in his brilliant and magisterial The Middle Ground.

9

In that book, White suggests that the forces unleashed by the colonial encounterdisease, more frequent and more deadly warfare, dislocation, and dependence upon
European goods-proved too powerful for native societies to handle. Overwhelmed by
these challenges, native societies splintered into feeble fragments. In order to survive,
these shards gathered themselves to form new mosaics, heterogeneous new constellations
that could cope with the forces of colonialism. In New France, colonial officials
fashioned these scattered remnants into a new political and cultural configuration-a
"common identity." As White phrases it, "[w]ar, famine, and disease, ... had been the
executioners of the older, familiar world of the Algonquians, ... [and] the gruesome
midwives attending the birth of the new world of the pays d' en haut." In a sense, they
became French Indians or "Algonquians," dependent upon Onontio for support, for
guidance, and, crucially, for mediation and crisis-management. Only Onontio's careful
mediation of disputes kept the alliance from crumbling. Under the governor's watchful
eye, his brood fused into one more-or-less integrated collective. Dependent upon the
French, these peoples embraced Onontio's interests as their own. In order to serve their
mutual interests, they created an accommodative "middle ground" in which they created
compromise through "creative misunderstandings." 16
As the number of studies citing "the middle ground" suggests, White's thesis
looms large in the historiography both of the Great Lakes Region and of North American
more generally. 17 White so thoroughly defined the region, in fact, that even many of his
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Richard White, The Middle Ground, xi. ix, 2, 16, 33, 142.
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critics accept his basic conceptual framework. Gilles Havard, for example, argues that
White misapprehended the meaning of the "middle ground." What appeared to be
accommodative practices based on mutual regard, Havard argues, were actually infused
with French imperial ambitions. Through "mixing," the French hoped ultimately to
establish their suzerainty in the region, and to accomplish "colonization without a
population." Disagree though he might about White's description of the European-Indian
interaction, however, Havard nonetheless accepts that the cultural encounter was a twosided affair, an "entre-deux dynamique." He echoes White, concluding that the French
formed a "new nation" in the pays d' en haut, and arguing that they "conferred a common
identity to their Amerindian allies." 18
My work, however, diverges from White in two critical respects-one
methodological and the other philosophical-and thereby participates in larger debates
about intercultural interaction in the Great Lakes Region and beyond. First, while White
attempted to survey a large geographical region over a long span, my work focuses
specifically on one small, albeit important, corner of that region. Surveying a region that
stretched from the outskirts of Montreal to the Great Plains and from the seventeenth
century until the War of 1812, White offers an abstracted aerial view of the Great Lakes
Region. At such a remove, the texture of social relations and lines between peoples
become blurry. From this perspective, the peoples of the region did in fact look as
though they formed a grand alliance which, except for a few exceptions, functioned as a
"common identity." Conflict and tension among natives likewise appear only
2005); Kathleen Du Val, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
18
Havard, Empire et metissages, 44, 205.
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occasionally as aberrations to the overall pattern. When scholars narrow that perspective,
however, and study specific people, groups, places, or events, the social landscape of the
region changes profoundly. Distinct peoples with their own goals and identities emerge
from the undifferentiated "Algonquian" masses. Quarrels which otherwise seem
innocuous and exceptional begin to demonstrate larger patterns and dynamics between
peoples. When meticulously tracked on a local level, the behavior of local communities
demonstrates a consistency over time and patterns of interactions between these peoples
become clear. The Hurons acted in a certain way over time, for example, and they
interacted with the Ottawas according to a consistent logic during that time. This
behavior and consistency suggest that these peoples acted as separate communities over
the longue duree. When viewed microscopically at Detroit, in other words, the Great
Lakes Region begins to look significantly different than it did to White.
In focusing specifically on Detroit to understand the larger dynamics of the
region, I follow other researchers who have explored specific periods, incidents, peoples,
or places, and developed a very different view of the region from White's. Specifically,
these works have questioned the degree to which the Iroquois Wars "shattered" the
people of the region, and, consequently the extent to which these people acted like
"Algonquians" beholden to the French. William Newbigging, for instance, focuses
specifically on one people, the Ottawas. Intensively reconstructing Ottawa diplomatic
affairs during the French period, Newbigging points out that, far from being shattered, the
Ottawas survived the Iroquois Wars of the seventeenth century largely intact. He further
argues that the Ottawas did not ally themselves with the French because they were a
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shattered people in need of a French father, as White suggests, but because they were a
healthy people who saw an alliance with the French as an opportunity to advance their
own interests and consolidate their influence among other native nations. As Newbigging
suggests, the pays d' en haut is better understood not by viewing the whole region
abstractly, but by understanding "individual nations ... one community at a time." 19
Focusing on one culture group in a part of the pays d' en haut, Heidi Bohak:er likewise
contends that the Anishinaabe people identified themselves not as "Algonquians," but as
members of kinship groupings, or "nindoodemag. " 20 Referring specifically to White,
George Ironstack, who focuses on the Miami settlement of Pickiwillany, points out that
the "lack of localized studies" of the region has led to "the construction of overly broad
generalizations that fail to take into account the diversity that existed ... among the
indigenous peoples of the pays d'en haut.'m This attention to local history reflects a
larger trend in the literature of native American history. 22
Although scholars have increasingly questioned White's argument that the
peoples of the pays d'en haut formed a regional "identity" based on their alliance with the
French, they have disagreed about how identity actually functioned in the region. While
some argue that the various "nations" or "tribal" groups that the French described
maintained separate identities, others reject such designations as imperial impositions on
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Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," 2, 27, 248-29, 410.
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Toronto, 2006), 40-41.
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Dept. of History, Miami University, 2006), 5.
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peoples that would not have identified themselves as "Ottawas" or "Ojibwas." 23 These
names, they argue, imply fixity of membership and political organization alien to the
peoples of the pays d' en haut. Such scholars are certainly correct to suggest that these
peoples did not operate like "nations" or "tribes" as we understand those terms. Yet their
lived experience suggests that these designations meant something, even if they do not
mean everything that contemporary or modem observers might assume they do. If these
"national" or "tribal" categories meant nothing, why did different natives choose to live
in different villages which included people of multiple lineages? Why did they speak as
one people at councils? How could they even consider going to war with one another, if
there was not some meaning to these "national" designations? As a Huron word list from
around 1747 attests, even native peoples classified their neighbors by these supposedly
artificial "national" names. 24
If I have adopted a different approach from White's, I have also asked different
questions of my sources. White, and other scholars of his historiographic moment, asked
a new and important question: how did native people interact with European newcomers
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Claiming that the "differences between these nations are vital," Newbigging suggests that "individual
nations must be studied one community at a time." Newbigging, "The History of the French-Ottawa
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to shape the Great Lakes Region? The answers to this question greatly illuminated not
only native American history but early American history more generally. For the first
time, scholars really understood the role played by native agents in the new world. Yet
the question itself dictates the answer. By its very terms it assumes the locus of those
interactions to be between Europeans and native people. I have asked, instead, a more
basic question: which relationships shaped the Great Lakes Region? By searching for
patterns of interaction not only between Europeans and native peoples but among native
peoples themselves, I found that the interaction between Europeans and natives,
accommodative or otherwise, did not dictate events in the pays d' en haut. Instead, a
whole set of longstanding and dynamic relationships among native peoples shaped the
social reality of the region, some of which had precious little to do with the French or
British. The colonial relationship, though certainly consequential, was also embedded in
a larger matrix of relationships. Those relationships both molded and circumscribed the
colonial relationship, and were in tum molded and circumscribed by it. Scholars cannot
therefore understand the colonial relationship, abstracted from those other entangled
relationships.
This study therefore belongs to a longer tradition which has appreciated the
importance of understanding interactions among native peoples. Many of these
historians, tellingly, wrote before the publication of The Middle Ground in 1991. In
1983, for example, Michael McConnell argues that native peoples of the Great Lakes and
Ohio Valley did not act as "cultural monoliths" following the fall of New France, but as
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distinct and heterogeneous peoples?5 In his dissertation, Peter MacLeod also denied that
"European-Amerindian relations were the most important phenomena in the west," and
argues that native groups were connected in "network[s] of relationships" with other
native groups?6 More recently, Brett Rushforth has observed that the Ottawas and other
groups demanded that the French wage war against other purported "Algonquians," like
the Foxes. Such behavior, Rushforth suggests, renders White's "binary" representation
of "Euro-Americans on one side, Indians on the other" unconvincing. 27 Historians of
other regions, especially those focusing on Iroquoia, have also explored interactions
among native peoples as well. 28 Together these works suggest the complexity of
intercultural interaction in the new world.

t
I use both an ethnohistorical and a microhistorical approach to understand
interactions among native peoples at Detroit. It is based on a close reading of Frenchproduced documents, such as official and ecclesiastical correspondence, maps, notarial
records, and native-language lexicons. Although such documents are clearly filtered and
shaped by the prejudices of their authors, they nonetheless offer a wealth of useful
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information about the peoples of Detroit. No matter how ethnocentric they may have
been, French officials, priests, and traders had a vested interest in understanding how
conceptions of membership and loyalty worked in their communities. They lived with
native people every day and their livelihoods and sometimes their lives depended upon an
accurate understanding of the political and social structures of natives. In fact, some had
even married native women and others were the offspring of such marriages. These
people, therefore, understood native peoples and societies deeply, despite their
ethnocentric baggage. More importantly, French and metis correspondents left a clear
record of how native people behaved in certain contexts and how they reacted to crisis.
Piecing together these patterns of behavior, scholars can uncover the goals, attitudes, and
perspectives of these peoples, even if French writers sometimes misapprehended them or
misrepresented them.
I have also adjusted for the distortions presented in the documents by measuring
them against other epistemological tools. Anthropological evidence from sites in Ontario
and Michigan, for example, allows us to contextualize native behavior and motivations in
ways that contemporary French people could not. Such data, for example, suggest that
significant cultural differences might have led to conflict between the Hurons and
Ottawas. I also compensate for the lack of archaeological data with a thorough
investigation of Detroit cartography. Maps reveal the spatial relationships between native
villages and hence testify to the social and political proximity between native groups.
Besides geography, maps often communicate a wealth of useful ethnographic detailfrom the layout of the natives' forts to the size of the populations. Finally, I have
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addressed these biases and prejudices by reading the documents closely and by
comparing them with other accounts of similar events. Although two colonial officials
might represent events very differently, their conflicting accounts give important clues.
For example, the rancorous disputes between Cadillac and the Jesuits or the marquis de
Vaudreuil (or for that matter anybody who crossed Cadillac) reveal important facts about
the Huron leader Cheanonvouzon and the role that Mississauga-Miami animosity played
in the Miami-Ottawa conflict of 1706.

t
Beginning in the 1690s, several French officials, led by Cadillac, had advocated
the establishment of a French trading post along the waterways that connected Lakes Erie
and Huron. As Cadillac articulated the plan, the post would be the site both of an
intensive European agricultural outpost and a large native American settlement,
composed of native peoples from throughout the region whom the French invited to
relocate there. 29 Such an establishment, Cadillac argued, would address two pressing
concerns that New France confronted at the tum of the eighteenth century. Cadillac and
others promised, first, that the post would blunt Anglo-American commercial incursions
into the Great Lakes. 30 Engaged in fierce competition with the English for control of
North America, French officials sought to dominate the sometimes lucrative beaver-fur
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trade in the Great Lakes Region. 31 In the 1680s and 1690s, British and Dutch traders
operating out of the post of Albany in New York had, in fact, sent large trading convoys
into Lakes Erie and Huron-an area that the French claimed as part of New France-and
traded with peoples whom the French considered their allies. 32 These incursions worried
French officials not only because they threatened the fur trade, the basis of the colonial
economy, but also because they fretted that, if the English established trading relations
with the peoples of the region, the French would lose their native allies. As the French
understood acutely, the natives of the region would happily form commercial and
military alliances with the English intruders if English traders provided them with better
and cheaper goods. If such incursions continued unchecked, they worried, England (and
later Great Britain) might establish a beachhead in the Great Lakes.
Cadillac also claimed that this settlement would maintain the newly established
peace reached with the Five Nations, or Iroquois Confederacy, New France, and the
natives of the pays d' en haut, and would keep the Iroquois in check. 33 Since the 1630s,
New France and its native allies throughout the Great Lakes had intermittently been at a
war with the powerful Iroquois, who were allied with the English. These conflicts had
taken a considerable toll on the French and their allies. In 1649, the Iroquois had finally
31
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defeated New France's chief native allies, the confederated Huron nations settled to the
east and south of Lake Huron, and forced the Hurons to flee the region. Iroquois armies
had also threatened French settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley and even the Ojibwas
and Ottawas as far away as Michilimackinac on the straits between the Upper and Lower
Peninsulas of modern-day Michigan. 34 In the last years of the seventeenth century,
however, the Iroquois, French, and peoples of the pays d'en haut had decided, for various
reasons, to make peace. They therefore began a process of negotiations which
culminated in the Great Peace of Montreal in August 1701. In this treaty, the parties
agreed to mutual non-aggression and vowed that, if troubles did arise, the parties would
seek mediation from the French governor-whom they called Onontio. 35 Situated to the
west of the Iroquois homeland and in the midst of France's allies in the west, Detroit
promised to maintain this fragile new peace by intimidating the Iroquois and projecting
French military power and diplomatic might into the region. Accordingly, the French
gave Cadillac orders to establish a post between Lakes Erie and Huron and dispatched
him along with one hundred French soldiers and civilians in the summer of 1701.
Arriving on 24 July, before the final settlement of the peace treaty in August, the
French began building a fort and Cadillac issued invitations to the peoples of the region
to settle at the new post. 36 Several groups accepted the captain's promise to form a
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single, integrated body and soon formed a native cosmopolis at Detroit. Their
interactions would reshape the region in profound ways.
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PROLOGUE
Exploring the Detroit River with Father Charlevoix, ca. 1721
When the Jesuit Pierre-Fran<;ois-Xavier Charlevoix and his escorts left Lake Erie
to ascend the Detroit River on 5 June 1721, they entered a profoundly native social space
(see figure 4). 37 As the canoes made their way up the river, the missionary marveled, as
did many visitors to the region, at the beauty of the marshes, meadows, and "orchards" of
wild fruit trees lining the river in their full spring splendor. He found the region "the
most beautiful place in Canada. " 38 Yet Charlevoix, one of the first historians of New
France and a learned ethnographer, found the human inhabitants even more interesting.
As they neared the French stockade, Fort Pontchartrain, Charlevoix and his escorts saw
the first evidence of the posts' human inhabitants. Using Charlevoix's description of his
journey up the river as a guide, this prologue surveys the physical and social geography
of Detroit in 1721.
Ascending the river, Charlevoix first encountered the palisaded Huron village on
the left-hand or eastern side of river 650 yards from the French fort, as well as the
immaculate fields of com, beans, squash, and even French peas and wheat which
surrounded the fort. 39 Prior to the Great Peace of Montreal, the Hurons had lived at two
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(Left) Figure 2: Detail,
[Henri-Louis Boishebert],
"Carte du Detroit et Partie
du Lac Erie, et du Lac Ste.
Claire," 1731, Centre des
archives de'outre mer,
Aix-en-Province, France.

(Below) Figure 3: The Major
Peoples and Places of the Pays
d'en haut, 1701-1766.

The Great
Lakes
Region, 1701
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Figure 4: Boishebert, Carte du detroit Erie remontent jusqu'au Lac
Huron, 1731. Service historique de Ia Marine, Chateau de Vincennes,
France.

locations, one on the St. Joseph River southeast of Lake Michigan, and the other at
Michilimackinac, at the southern tip of Michigan's Upper Peninsula. Responding to
French invitations, they had arrived at Detroit by 1704. 40 As Charlevoix, who wrote a
history of New France, knew, these people were the remnants of a once impressive native
political entity, the Hurons Confederacy. The Hurons, and the related northern Iroquoian
40

"Memorandum ofM. de la Mothe Cadillac Concerning the Establishment of Detroit," 19 Nov. 1704, in
MPHSCR, 33:235.
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Figure 5: Population of Natives Permanently Settled at Detroit, 1703-1761
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Source: Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, inMPHSCR, 33:205.
Source: Cadillac au ministre, 10, 15 Sept., 1 Oct. 1707, in ibid., 340.
c Sources: The estimate ofWendats comes from an official report issued in 1710, while the
estimates of the Ottawas and others comes from a 1711 map. Antoine Denys Raudot, and
Antoine Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle (annees 1709 et 171 0), ed.
Camille de Rochemonteix (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, editeurs, 1904), 131. Jean-Baptiste de
Couagne, "Carte du Canada sur un tres grand nombre de memoires des plus recents ... " [1711],
photostatic reproduction, in the Louis C. Karpinski Map Collection, Map Photo France ASH
124-1-2, Newberry Library, Chicago.
ct Note: All estimates, except those in bold font, are projections based on the number of
"warriors." The French almost universally gave their estimates in terms of effective warriors, or
"men at arms" rather than of the entire population. I follow Franvois Clairambault d' Aigremont's
ratio of one warrior to four members of the general population. Clairambault au ministre, 14
Nov. 1708, inMPHSCR, 33:436; Cadillac, "Memoire," 19 Nov. 1704, in ibid., 205.
e Source: Jacques-Charles de Sabrevois, "Memoire de Sabrevois sur diverses tribus de
l'Ouest,"1718, in DRCHNY, 9:888.
f Source: Vaudreuil and Begon au Conseil de Marine, 4 Nov. 1721, inMPHSCR, 33:680-81.
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Source: Minutes of the Proceedings of Sir William Johnson Bart with the Indians on his Way to,
and at the Detroit in 1761, in WJP, 3:501.
m Note: This is the first estimate provided by the British and suggests a fifty percent increase
among the peoples of Detroit, which is unlikely. The discrepancy-especially as regards the
Ojibwas-probably suggests that the British counted not only the Ojibwas living at on Lake St.
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peoples, the Tionontates, or Petun peoples, and Neutrals, had been situated in the region
immediately to the east and south of Lake Huron. In 1649, the Hurons, who were allied
to the French, finally succumbed to the onslaught ofthe Dutch-allied Iroquois
Confederacy, or Five Nations, and abandoned the region. In the ensuing diaspora, some
Hurons fled east and formed a community near Quebec. Others fled west, finding shelter
with their allies in the region, particularly the Ottawas, first at Michilimackinac on the
Mackinaw Straits, then at Chequamegon Bay. By the time they returned to
Michilimackinac in the 1670s, these Huron refugees had formed a new composite group,
referred to usually as the Hurons, and sometimes as the Tionontates and, later,
"Wyandots."41 Buffeted by disease, war, and dislocation, these people numbered around
500 people in 1721 (see figure 5). 42
The next group that Charlevoix encountered where the last to have arrived at
Detroit. Potawatomi settlers had only moved to Detroit around 1711 and 1712, perhaps
in response to the growing hostility between the Foxes of Green Bay near their settlement
on the St. Joseph River. At the time Charlevoix encountered them, the Potawatomis still
lived in a temporary camp adjacent to the French fort, although they later formed separate
villages further south on the eastern shore of the river, a little over a mile from the French
41
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"Tionontate" here denotes that nation before the fall ofHuronia. See Trigger, Children ofAataentsic: A
History of the Huron People to 1660. 2 vols (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 824-25;
Charles Garrad and Conrad E. Heidenreich, "Khionontateronon (Petun)," in Bruce Trigger, The Northeast,
vol. 15 of HNAI, 394-97; James A. Clifton, Hurons of the West: Migrations and Adaptations of the
Ontario Iroquoians, 165 0-1704 (Research Report, Canadian Ethnology Service, Ottawa, National Museum
of Man, 1977). For names, see "Donation des Hurons au Pere Potier," 22 Dec. 1780, in Ernest J.
Lajeunesse, ed., Windsor Border Region (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1960), 281.
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Gilles Havard, Empire et metissages: Indiens et Fran9ais dans le Pays d 'en Haut, 1660-1715 (Sillery
(Quebec): Septentrion, 2003), 134.
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fort. 43 Had he arrived in February, and not June, Charlevoix might have noticed, as
another observers a few years before, that the Potawatomis wore heavy bison-skin cloaks
in cold weather. Their attire attests to the Potawatomis' geographic ties to the west.
With settlements not only at Detroit but also on the St. Joseph River and Green Bay, the
Potawatomis had access to bison hides coming from the tall grass prairies of Illinois and
Wisconsin. 44 The Potawatomis living at Detroit maintained close ties to other
Potawatomi communities, particularly the one at St. Joseph, as a series of exchanges
between the communities in 1763 demonstrates. In June, according to British reports, a
group ofPotawatomis settled at Detroit visited their "Relations" at St. Joseph and invited
them to attack the British garrison at the post. 45 The St. Joseph contingent complied and
soon came "to join the Potawatomis of Detroit" in their siege of the British fort. 46 When
the Detroit Potawatomis decided to abandon the siege in July, they pledged that they
would work to convince "the rest of their Nation at St. Josephs" to do so as we11. 47 After
Potawatomis from St. Joseph killed British people in 1764, moreover, Detroit
Potawatomi leaders interceded to resolve the crisis. 48 Not only did the two groups of
Potawatomis easily move back and forth, they continued to constitute a single, coherent
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For their original position, see [Fram;ois La Forest], Memoir on Detroit, 1 Oct. 1714; [Sabrevois],
Memoir on the Indians between Lake Erie and the Mississippi, l7l8m in DRCHNY, 9:887. For their later
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1755-57," ed. Beverley Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 13 (1926-1927): 58-81 at 75-76.
44
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(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977); R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis: Keepers of the
Fire (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978).
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the Forts Sandusky, St. Joseph, Miamis & Presquill," 6 July 1763, in CCCOP, 425
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[Robert Navarre], "Journal of Pontiac's Conspiracy," in Milton Quaife, ed., The Siege ofDetroit in 1763:
The Journal ofPontiac's Conspiracy and John Rutherford's Narrative of a Captivity (Chicago, 1958), 130.
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[Jehu Hay], "Diary of the Siege of Detroit," in Diary of the Siege ofDetroit, ed. Franklin Hough (Albany,
NY: J. Munsell, 1865), 42.
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ibid., 114; Indian Proceedings, 26 Jan. 1765, WJP, 11:547-50.
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political community which conferred on matters of importance. The Detroit Potawatomis
saw the St. Joseph Potawatomis, not as a separate entity, but as the "rest of their Nation."
The combined populations at Detroit (ca. 600) and the St. Joseph River (400) represented
a powerful people stretched over a considerable territory. 49
Located near where Lake St. Clair drains into the Detroit River, the French
stockade stood adjacent to the Potawatomi camp-Potawatomi structures incorporated
the walls of the French fort. Fort Pontchartrain, named after minister of the marine
Jerome Phelypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain, the senior French official overseeing
colonial affairs, housed all of the posts' French population. This population, which
numbered fewer than two hundred French people following a period of official neglect
and indifferent administration, consisted mainly of people involved in the fur trade and a
few lackluster French Marines. After tracing the occupations of the habitants, Lina
Gouger notes the "essentially commercial nature" of Detroit during the French period. 5°
The colonial official, Fran<;ois Clariambault d' Aigremont, sent to evaluate the state of the
post in 1708, counted only sixty heads ofhousehold, the majority of which engaged in
trade and neglected to grow crops. 51
Looking across the river from Fort Pontchartrain, Charlevoix could see the
Ottawa village perched on the western shore, where the Ottawas had resettled after
having abandoned their former village on the eastern shore in the aftermath of a conflict
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"Enumeration of the Indian Tribes connected with the Government of Canada, 1736" in DRCHNY,
9:1056.
50
Lina Gouger, "Le peuplement colonisateur de Detroit, 170 1-1765" (PhD. diss., Dept. of History,
Universite Laval, 2002), 53, 87-93.
51
"Letter from Sr. d' Aigremont Denouncing Cadillac Methods," 14 Nov. 1708, in MPHSCR, 33:425-26.
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with the Miamis and Hurons. 52 The Ottawas at Detroit belonged to a powerful native
alliance of four constituent nations: the Kiskakons (les Queues coupees), Sinagos,
Kamigas (la Nation du Sable), and Nassaukuetons (la Nation de laFourche). Although
these groups retained separate identities, they also identified themselves as part of the
larger group. As Cadillac put it, the four nations were "well united together, living in
good intelligence." 53 In addition to speaking the same language, they lived together in
the same the villages at Chequamegon Bay, Michilimackinac, and Detroit. 54 According
to the Ottawa speaker Kiscouaky, Kiskakons, Sinagos, and the Kamigas had settled at
Detroit by 1703, presumably in the single village indicated on French maps of the area. 5 5
Later evidence indicates that both Kiskakon and Sinago contingents remained at the post
(see figure 6). 56 They also frequently spoke through one "Ottawa" spokesman rather than
through different representatives for each nation. 57 The Ottawas relied upon their
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Figure 6: [Henri-Louis Boishebert], "Plan du Village Des Sauvages Outaouas du
Detroit," 1732. Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris.
Tlus plan of the Ottawa village portrays a bifurcated layout, which may mdicate that the
Kiskakons and Smagos observed residential segregatiOn

superior numbers and settlement at strategic locations in the region to deploy what
William Newbigging calls the "gateway strategy." The four constituent Ottawa nations
controlled the crucial entry points into western Lake Huron and thus into Lakes Superior
and Michigan-Manitoulin Island, Michilimackianc, and Detroit. Using the waterways
that connected them, they easily and frequently moved between these settlements to
trade, visit kin, and confer on strategic and diplomatic issues that affected them all. So
positioned, they thereby mediated commerce within the region, supplied the French with
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many of their furs, and exerted a powerful influence over their neighbors. 58 Numbering
some 520 people and around 700 more at Michilimackinac and 320 at Saginaw Bay, the
Ottawas served as the "elder brothers" of the peoples of Detroit (see figure 5). 59
After remaining at Detroit for three weeks, Father Charlevoix and his company
moved up the strait late in the evening of June 24 and soon reached the Ojibwa on
Walpole Island near where the St. Clair River flows into Lake St. Clair. Although the
settlement was much farther from Fort Pontchartrain than the Huron and Ottawa
villages-some 36 miles and a half-day's journey by canoe-the French nonetheless
reckoned the Ojibwa settlement part of Detroit. As the baron de Longueuil, commandant
at Detroit, put it when he addressed the Ojibwas in 1744, although they were "far from
me .. .I know that your Heart has never been Separate" from the French. 60 This settlement
included a number of different Ojibwa groups who had "united and incorporated with one
another" in a single village: the Mississaugas (who came from the river of that name
which flows into Lake Huron from the north), the Sauteur (those originally from the Sault
Ste.-Marie) and the Amicoues. 61 Like the Ottawas and Potawatomis, the Ojibwas were
also connected to other communities spread throughout the region, including at SaultSte.-Marie, Saginaw Bay, Toronto, and Detroit. Although they lived in more dispersed
settlements and had less cohesion or centralization than the Ottawa nations enjoyed, these
peoples nonetheless frequently cooperated with other Ojibawas and traveled between
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Newbigging, "History of the French-Ottawa Alliance," viii, 87.
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59

31

settlements throughout the region. In particular, the Ojibwas settled around the northern
end of Lake St. Clair around Walpole Island, usually identified as Mississaugas but
occasionally as Sauteux, maintained connections with the Mississaugas living near
Toronto and elsewhere along the northern shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario. 62
Mississaugas traveling from Lake St. Clair could ascend the Thames river which the
French, portage to the Grand and continue down to the vicinity ofToronto. 63 This
geographic arrangement allowed the Mississaugas to carry goods easily between Niagara
and Detroit, including British trade goods and rum. By 1718, some 240 to 320 Ojibwa
peoples lived at the settlement and a French census-taker counted some 400 on the island
in 1737 (see figure 5).
During his three week stay at Detroit, Charlevoix carefully observed and
described the natives he met there. For example, he watched the natives of Detroit play a
dice game, which he called the "Dish game, or jacks." Charlevoix noted that that
"sometimes one Village ... play[ ed] against another." In these cases, each village chose a
champion who played in the name of the entire community, which eagerly cheered on its
representative. To ensure their victory, each village "invoke[d] its spirit [Genie]." 64
Charlevoix's observations tell us a great deal about the peoples that he encountered at
Detroit. These peoples interacted as friendly neighbors, but as distinct communities who
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competed with one another and venerated separate gods. The interactions between this
distinct peoples form the content of the next five chapters.
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CHAPTER ONE
Lyons and Foxes: Cheanonvouzon and the Southern Alliance
"[The Hurons] were formerly the most powerful, strongest, and numerous nation, but the
Iroquois destroyed it and chased it from its lands, so that it is at present reduced to a very
small number, and ... their sword is cut too short ... " 1
Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, ca. 1694
"all the Savages [of Detroit] are guided exclusively by the sentiment of the Hurons." 2
Pierre-Jacques de Payan de Noyan, 1730

By all accounts, the Hurons should have been decimated by the time they limped
to Detr<?it in 1701. The northern Iroquoian peoples who made up the composite Huron
community-the constituent nations of the Huron Confederacy as well as the
Tionnontates and Neutrals-had borne the brunt of colonialism in the seventeenth
century. Because they had closer contacts with French missionaries and fur traders than
other nations in the region, they suffered more acutely from the epidemic diseases
brought by the Frenchmen. Experiencing "catastrophic depopulation," northern
Iroquoian peoples lost nearly two thirds of their population between 1634 and 1640. 3
Situated close to the Iroquois Confederacy, they also suffered disproportionately during
the wars, not only from deaths but also from captive raiding. 4 Pressure from the Iroquois

1

"C'estoit autrefois la nation la plus puissante, la plus forte et mesme la plus nombreuse, mais !'Iroquois,
I' a destruite et I' a chassee de ses terres, en sorte qu'elle est a present reduite a un fort petit nombre, et il est
bon pour nous qu'elle le soit ainsi, car ce sont des hommes malins, intrigans, malintentionnez et capables
de grandes entreprises, mais par bonheur leur epee est tro courte," Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac,
"Relation du Sieur de Lamothe Cadillac," MDE, 5 :80.
2
"tousles Sauvages qui ne Se conduissent que par l'Esprit du huron," Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et de
Chavoy, "Memoire," [1730], COAM, CllA, vol. 52, fol. 279v.
3
Gary Warrick, A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 222-36 at 245.
4
Jose Brandao, "Your fyre shall bum no more:" Iroquois Policy toward New France and its Native Allies
to 1701. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia,
1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), esp. chap. 3; Garry Warrick, A
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had finally forced these peoples to flee the region and begin a long sojourn throughout
the Great Lakes Region, where they encountered still more trouble with the Sioux. This
demographic decline and dislocation severely weakened the Hurons. Unlike the Ottawas
who had extensive ties to communities in Saginaw Bay, Michilimackinac, and elsewhere,
they lacked the kinds of regional connections which would allow them to command much
respect in the region. With an earthiness which did nothing to endear himself to his
Jesuit rivals, Cadillac noted that the Hurons' "sword" had been cut "too short" to wield
much influence. The once powerful "lyons" were now mew ling kittens. 5 Father PierreFranc;ois-Xavier Charlevoix, a Jesuit missionary and historian who visited Detroit in
1721, marveled that the Hurons, once the "most numerous" nation in the pays d'en haut,
had "almost entirely disappeared in a few years." 6
Despite the brutal battering they had received, however, the Hurons emerged from
the seventeenth century not only as a proud and autonomous people, but as a powerful
force in regional diplomacy. Forming a new social and political fabric and replicating
cultural practices based on historical precedents, the new Huron community zealously
maintained the borders of its community and chose a separate path from their close
neighbors and allies, the Ottawas. In 1708 Cadillac proclaimed the Hurons the "elder
brother" among the nations at Detroit." 7 Charlevoix found that the Ottawas,

Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
240.
5
"Relations de Memoire de Lamothe Cadillac," [ca. 1696], MDE, 5:80.
6
"On a vfi avec etonnement une Nation des plus nombreuses, & des plus guerrieres de ce Continent, & la
plus estimee de touts pour sa sagesse & pour son esprit disparoitre presque entirement en assez peu
d'annees," Pierre-Franc;:ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d"un Voyage, ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744], 1994), 1:457.
7
"il est vrai qu'autrefois L'outauois etoit mon fils aisne; mais puis qu'il a leve son feu d'ici, ... , il sera
avenir mon enfans cadets, et vous hurons rentez vous aujourd'huy que par6tre obeissance, nous avez pris
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Potawatomis, and Ojibwas accorded the Hurons "the honor of speaking for all" the
natives at Detroit. 8 Recognizing the Hurons importance in 1728, the Marquis de
Beauharnois, newly appointed as the governor of New France, acceded to the Hurons'
demands that he relieve Alphonse de Tonty, the commandant at Detroit, because the
Hurons' "resentment was to be feared." 9 In 1730, Capt. Pierre-Jacques de Payan de
Noyan noted that "All the Savages" of Detroit "are guided exclusively by the sentiments
of the Hurons." 10 He confirmed this observation a decade later when, as commandant of
Detroit, he declared that the Hurons were "a nation [which was] not to be neglected." 11
Noting that the Hurons were "restless" in 1754, the French officer and cartographer,
Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery, hyperbolically observed that if the Hurons decided
they wanted to, they and their allies could "force the English of Virginia, Carolina and
Georgia to abandon this country and take refuge in Europe." 12 In 1779 an AngloAmerican colonel informed George Washington that the Hurons "are respected by the

dans mon C~ur et dans mes bien fait Le place de votre aisne," "Proces-verbaux des conseils tenus a
Detroit," Aug. 1707, CAOM, CllA, vol. 26, fol. 123v.
8
"l'honneur de parler pour tous est ordinairement defere aux Hurons [Wendats], quand il s'en trouve dans
un Conseil." Charlevoix, Journal, 1:539.
9
"la necessite de conserver une nations dont le ressentment estoit a craindre," Beauharnois au ministre, 27
Sept. 1727, COAM, CllA, vol. 49, fols. 109-112v at llOv.
10
"tousles Sauvages qui ne Se conduissent que par !'Esprit du huron," Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et
de Chavoy, "Memoire," [1730], COAM, C11A, vol. 52, fol. 279v.
11
"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201. Other officials agreed that the
"Although the hurons are not numerous, it nonetheless would appear important to conserve them"
("Quoique les hurons ne soient pas bien nobreux, il paroit neanmoins interessant de les Conserver,)."
"Resume de depeches du Canada concernant les Indiens," CAOM, CllA, 80:361; "Memoire concernant
diverses nations indiennes," 1742, ibid., 77:390 ; "Resume de lettres du Canada avec commentaies des
autorites metropolitaines," 1740, ibid., 74:232-36v.
12
"ils forceront les Anglais de la Virginie, Caroline et de la Georgie d'abandonrier cette countree et de se
refugier en Europe," Joseph-Gaaspard de Chaussegros de Lery, "Journal de Joseph-Gaspard de
Chaussegros de Lery, Lieutenant des Troupes, 1754-1755," in RAQ, 8 :410.
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western Indian nations as much as the six nations [Iroquois] are by the Northern." 13
Although they never commanded more than a couple hundred warriors, the Hurons
nonetheless commanded fear and deference among their neighbors.
The Hurons were ultimately able to exercise an influence so disproportionate to
their numbers by creating a network of allies and situating themselves in a new
diplomatic configuration. In particular the Huron leader Cheanonvouzon, the purported
"chief of all his tribe" following the death of Kondiaronk in 1701, formed three alliances
which this chapter examines separately. 14 They first exploited their cultural and kinship
ties with the Five Nation Iroquois (especially the Senecas) to create an alliance which
both guaranteed them military backing and access to the Iroquois' British allies. At the
same time, they formed a new relationship with the Miamis, a group of people living
south and southwest of Lake Michigan, to strike against the Hurons' Ottawa rivals.
Finally, based on these two relationships, the Hurons forged a tripartite "southern
alliance" which involved both the Iroquois and Miami. While the first two alliances
compensated for the Hurons' comparative weakness and allowed them to act with an
13

Col. Daniel Brodhead to Gen. George Washingtonh, 6 May 1779, Louise Kellogg, The Frontier Advance
on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779. Collections of the Wisconsin Historical Society, Vol. 21. Draper Series,
vol. 2. (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1916), 311.
14
Cheanonvouzon, who was forty-five when he died in 1707, was already a senior elder and led the Huron
contingent then living at the Miami settlement on the St. Joseph River. "Paroles de quatre Hurons," MDE,
5:266. Cadillac au ministre, 31 Aug. 1703, MPHSCR, 33:165-66; "Bapteme de Louis-Antoine
Cheanonvouzon," Registre paroisse de Detroit, 1:19, 26. After the death of Kondiaronk, whom the French
called the "first mover" among the Hurons and even Ottawas, in 1701, Cheanonvouzon apparently became
the most powerful Huron leader until his death in 1707 (Kondiaronk "etoit le premier mobile de sa Nation
& de tousles Outaouaks"). Claude-Charles Bacqueville de Potherie, Histoire de !'Amerique, 4 vols
(Paris: Jean-Luc Nion ... et Franc;ois Didot, 1722), 4:222-23; J.J. Marest to Cadillac, 23 July 1702,
MPHSCR, 33:127; Charlevoix, Histoire, 14, 145-48. According to the 1694 Dictionnaire de L'Academie
fram;;aise, a "premier mobile," or "first mover," was a someone who initiated affairs and offered an
example for others to follow ("premier mobile, Un homme qui donne le bransle, le mouvement a une
affaire, aune compagnie"; "Donner le bransle, pour dire, Commencer une affaire, & par son exemple
obliger les autres a suivre.Jl a donne un grand bransle a cette affaire"). Dictionnaire de L'Academie
fram;;aise, 1st. ed. (Paris: J.B. Coignard, 1694), 98, 126.
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autonomy they would not have otherwise enjoyed, the third allowed the Hurons to
operate as a regional leader. In short, these alliances allowed the Hurons to envision a
world in which they regained a measure of the prestige they had enjoyed before the fall of
Huronia. Commenting on the Hurons' use of diplomacy and alliances to compensate for
their small numbers, Cadillac proclaimed that the erstwhile "lyons" had now become
wily "foxes" who exerted a soft power in order to refashion the region in ways which
would have otherwise been impossible. 15
That the Hurons both survived the beating they endured in the seventeenth
century as a discrete community and charted their own course in the new world suggests
that they were not orphaned refugees but an integrated and coherent community.
Disease, defeat, and dislocation had all taken their toll on the Hurons and had broken the
political and economic structures of the various northern Iroquoian peoples. Yet these
peoples quickly assembled the pieces of the old polities into a new configuration and
created a new community. Creating a new configuration based on distinctively Iroquoian
cultural traditions-an exogamous clan system, an Iroquoian language, surplus or market
farming-and complemented with new additions, such as French technology and
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"Relation de Lamothe Cadillac," [ca. 1694], MDE, 5 :81; According to the first edition (1694) of the
Dictionnaire de L'Academie franc;aise, a fox was a "stinking, malign, and crafty beast, which lives by
plunder" ("Beste puante, maligne & rusee, qui vit de rapine"). The proverb "to sew the skin of a fox to
that of lion," further, meant "to add ruse, finesse, to force" ("On dit prov. & fig. Coudre la peau du renard
acelle du lion, pour dire, Adjouster la ruse, la finesse, ala force"). Dictionnaire de L 'Academie franc;aise,
1st ed., 393. Jesuit Jean de Quens used the same language to describe the Algonkians, who faced
circumstances similar to the Hurons. "It [the Algonkian nation] knew well that it was not equal in number
[to the Iroquois] and that, having lost the skin of the Lyon, they were very well served by that of the Fox"
("11 s~auoit bien qu'il n'estoit pas egal en nombre, & que la peau de Lyon luy manquant, ils, s'estoit fort
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Catholicism, a new Huron entity emerged from the ashes of Huronia. 16 This Huron
community continued to refashion itself long after their arrival at Detroit, but nonetheless
remained an integrated and coherent whole.
That these reconstituted Hurons successfully fought to insure their autonomy from
both the Ottawas and the French largely through their connections to the Iroquois and
Miamis, furthermore, demonstrates how relationships between native peoples shaped the
region. Without their connections to the militarily powerful Iroquois and Miamis,
Cheanonvouzon and his people could not have dreamed of achieving the kind of
autonomy they wanted. Their neighbors and allies, the Ottawas living at Detroit used
their superior numbers and connections with peoples throughout the region to project
their power over the Hurons. Only by establishing connections to the militarily powerful
Miamis and Iroquois and establishing an alternative to the powerful Anishinaabe alliance,
could the Huron escape the Ottawas' domination.

I. The Huron Fox: Cheanonvouzon's Vision
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Conrad Heidenreich, Huronia: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, !600-!650 (Toronto:
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Tawiscaron: The Western Wendat People to 1701." M.A. Thesis (Department of History, University of
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The Hurons who limped to Detroit in the early eighteenth century were a pale
shadow of their former glory. The Huron nations, Tionnontates, and Neutrals had
dominated western Lake Huron commercially and militarily. Reaching for familiar
language to describe the Hurons he met in Huronia in the 1630s, Recollect brother
Gabriel Sagard likened the Wendats to the "nobility," compared to the humble Ottawa,
"bourgeois" 17 Yet since 1649 they had been defeated both by the Iroquois and by Dakota
Sioux, whom they deemed cultural inferiors, in the 1660s. 18 Dislocation, warfare, and
disease, moreover, had taken a considerable toll on the Hurons. While the Hurons and
Tionnontates numbered as many as 30,000 at the dawn of the seventeenth century, the
portion of those survivors who arrived at Detroit in the seventeenth century number under
five hundred. 19 They were so diminished, in fact, that they had to rely on their allies, the
French and the Ottawas, for protection. As the French trader Nicolas Perrot maintained,
if the French "had not protected [the Hurons, they] would no longer exist," and the
Ottawa leader, Ontontagan claimed to have saved the Hurons more than once. 20 In such
reduced circumstances, the Hurons simply could not shape the world as freely as their
ancestors had.
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Judging from his actions, the Huron headman, Cheanonvouzon, known as
Michipichy to the Ottawas and Quarante Sols to the French appearantly understood the
root cause of his people's weakness in the late seventeenth century. 21 His people were
weak not simply because they had lost so many of their people or because the Ottawas
outnumbered them, but also because they had been plucked from the geographic and
diplomatic context in which they had long operated. Forced to flee from Huronia east of
Lake Huron, they abandoned the alliances, patterns of exchange, and networks of power
which had defined them before 1649. During their long sojourn through the Great Lakes
wilderness, the Huron refugees had been a strange people in a strange land. They had
been tom from the set of geopolitical relationships which they had enjoyed in the Huron
homeland and now lived among people whom they did not know and did not trust. This
vulnerability placed them at the mercy of both the French and Ottawas, who did have
connections throughout the region, especially with other Anihishnaabe peoples like the
Ojibwas and Potawatomis. The price of survival had been a surrender of autonomy and
influence.
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Cheanonvouzon and his people sought to do three things to reclaim Huron
autonomy. First they must compensate for his lack of military might in comparison to his
neighbors. Outnumbered and dependent upon the Ottawas for military protection, the
Hurons knew that they could not assert their independence or act with freedom as long as
the Ottawas and their allies could field more warriors. Alliances with powerful groups,
however, would not only help the Hurons defend themselves in case of conflict, but
would also serve as a deterrent in ordinary times. Second, the Hurons sought to situate
themselves in a commercial network which would give them access to goods and elevate
their status in the region. The Tionnontates and Hurons had long been commercial
intermediaries who traded with northern Algonquian peoples and the Iroquois before
1649, and Cheanonvouzon understood the connection between commercial and political
power. 22 Finally Cheanonvouzon knew that if the Hurons hoped to act as independent
players in the region, they would have to operate independently from their longtime allies
and rivals, the Ottawas. The Ottawas, whose constituent nations had settlements
throughout the region and who had connections to Potawatomi and Ojibwa communities,
had dominated the Hurons since the fall of Huronia in 1649. The Hurons could not hope
to operate independently as long as the Ottawas held them in "a sort of slavery.'m
To an extent, the Hurons addressed this problem by courting the French. Arriving
at Montreal for the peace negotiations in August 1701, Cheanonvouzon told Calliere that
it gave him a "particular joy to come hear his word" and assured the governor of "the zeal
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he [Cheanonvouzon] had to please him." 24 He was so eager to see a peace concluded
between the Iroquois and the nations of the pays d' en haut that he had lent canoes to his
allies, the St. Joseph Miamis, so they could come to Montreal and participate in the talks.
A grateful Calliere thanked Cheanonvouzon for the "good sentiments that he has come to
convey to the French Nation." The aid he had provided to the Miamis, furthermore, was
a sure "proof of the attachment" that the Huron had to French "interests." 25 That summer
at Montreal he promised Gov. Calliere that he would work to move his people to the new
post of Detroit. At Cadillac's request, Cheanonvouzon worked to convince his own
people and the Miamis to come settle at Detroit in 1701 and 1702. 26 He even
collaborated with the commandant, who served as his godfather when he was baptized in
1707, against Cadillac's rival, the governor of New France, Philippe Rigaud, the marquis
de V audreuil, in 1704.
Yet Cheanonvouzon quickly realized that his alliance with the French and
participation in the French-led alliance would not guarantee him the autonomy he wanted
or help him subvert the Ottawas. He in fact grumbled that "the French were preventing
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him from revenging himself' on the Odawas. 27 Accordingly he sought to address all of
these problems by crafting a series of alliances with peoples in the Great Lakes Region.
Building on an ancient cultural affinity and the effective demographic blending of the
two peoples during the seventeenth century, Cheanonvouzon continued Huron attempts
to maintain an exclusive and powerful alliance with the Five Nations of the Iroquois
Confederacy. Alliance with the Iroquois not only served as a deterrent against external
attack from other nations, but also ensured access to the British, with whom the Iroquois
were bound in the celebrated Covenant Chain. In addition to this Iroquois alliance,
Cheanonvouzon also slowly forged an alliance with the Miamis, a group living along the
St. Joseph River southeast of Lake Michigan. Like the Iroquois alliance, this relationship
provided military protection for the Hurons and helped them compensate for their relative
weakness. In 1706 Cheanonvouzon, well aware of the hostility between the Ottawas and
Miamis, engineered a conflict between the two nations in hopes of escaping Ottawa
domination. Finally, Cheanonvouzon sought to create a larger regional alliance-a
southern alliance-which included both the Miamis and Iroquois. This coalition allowed
the Hurons to do more than separate relationships with those peoples. By mediating trade
and diplomacy between the Iroquois and Miamis, the Hurons claimed for themselves a
place of influence and prestige for themselves which would have otherwise been
impossible. This southern alliance likewise challenged the grip of the Anishinaabe
people on the region. Through skillful diplomacy, Cheanonvouzon built a series of
alliances which situated the Hurons in a region-wide commercial and diplomatic context
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and helped them regain some of their erstwhile influence. Cheanonvouzon and the
Hurons pursued these three separate alliances simultaneously. In order to examine the
particular dynamics of each of the alliances, I deal with them separately meaning that
there is chronological overlap in the three sections.

II. "Flesh and Blood": The Iroquois and the Hurons
In March 1758, during the height of the Seven Years' War, the Huron man,

Theata, traveled to Seneca territory to recount the proceedings of a recent council
between Fran~ois Marie Picote, sieur de Belestre, the commandant of Fort Pontchartrain
and the peoples of Detroit. According to Theata, Belestre had invited the nations to
attack the Six Nations in order to secure territorial rights to the Ohio Valley. When some
of the nations agreed to the attack, the Huron leader named Sastaretsy reacted angrily. 28
Grabbing the belt that Belestre had presented, he chastised his neighbors for so easily
betraying the Iroquois. The Huron leader rhetorically asked how "I, whom am Flesh and
Blood of the Six Nations and in whose Towns Number of our Friends & Children are
living and settled, declare War against them." He then reminded his neighbors that they
too were allied with the Six Nations and implored them to reject the "French Hatchet." 29
Sastaretsy's angry reaction to Belestre's invitation reveals not only the long-term
and exclusive affinity between the Hurons and Iroquois, but also indicates the key to that
relationship: the cultural kinship and intermarriage of the two peoples. This relationship,
28
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which had begun in the late seventeenth century, allowed the Hurons to claim an
unprecedented power in the region. The Hurons' relationship with the Iroquois allowed
them to accomplish two specific goals. First, the alliance with the most powerful people
in the region discouraged any potential enemies from menacing the Hurons. Living in
western New York and numbering some 6,400 individuals, the Iroquois Confederacy was
the most powerful native group in northeastern North America. 30 No nation in the region
wanted to resume the warfare which had broiled the region during the late seventeenth
century. At the same time, their alliance with the Iroquois also allowed the Hurons
access to the Iroquois' allies, the British. The British entrepot of Albany, after all, was
situated in the midst of Iroquois country, and no one could reach the post without the
Iroquois' blessing.
In spite of the fierce conflict between the Hurons and Iroquois in the seventeenth

century, the two peoples formed an unusually close alliance in the last decades of the
seventeenth century. That alliance was premised upon a shared cultural kinship and a
practice of intermarriage which reached back hundreds of years. Both the Hurons and the
Iroquois claimed a kinship with an ancestral group of St. Lawrence Iroquoian peoples
who had inhabited the lower reaches of that river, and whom Jacques Cartier had
encountered in the 1530s. Following Cartier's last visit these Iroquoians dispersed; while
some moved west into southern Ontario and formed the Wendat nations, others traveled
south and became the Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, Senecas, and Oneidas-the
constituent nations of the latter-day Iroquois League. 31 Descendant from the same the
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ancestral groups, these people shared many cultural and linguistic traditions as well as a
sense of cultural kinship and a sense of common kinship. As a French official later
observed, the Hurons' "language and customs" had a strong resemblance to those of the
Iroquois, and the two groups therefore shared a "great affinity." 32
This shared mythic heritage, and the very real cultural and linguistic affinities it
bequeathed, led to an impressive cultural and biological convergence between the Hurons
and Iroquois in the mid-1600s. When epidemics reduced the populations of both the
Hurons and the Iroquois, these peoples sought to compensate for their losses by raiding
other Iroquoian peoples and forcibly assimilating captives into their communities.
Because of the shared sense of Iroquoian heritage and cultural similarities, both the
Iroquois and the Hurons preferred to capture and incorporate other Iroquoian peoples.
Indeed Jon Parmenter argues that the Iroquoian attacks on the various northern Iroquoian
peoples, including the peoples who later became Wendats, reflected, not a particularly
hatred for the Hurons, as the Jesuits believed, but a preference for Iroquoian captives.
These Huron captives, or "Iroquois by affection," represented a sizeable minority among
the Iroquois population. 33 Indeed Cheanonvouzon hi~self may have been born as an
Iroquois. 34 An adopted Huron leader who had become an Iroquois war leader
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encapsulated the ambiguous blending of Iroquois and Huron identity. Addressing a
Huron audience as "My brothers," he proclaimed that "I have not changed my soul by
changing my country; & my blood has not become Iroquois, although I have lived among
them. My heart is completely Huron, as is my language." 35 In a very real sense, these
peoples were a hybrid Iroquoian people.
Even after the peace of 1701 ended the captive-raiding between the Hurons and
Iroquois nations, these peoples continued to marry and have children together. Although
they are incomplete and only include those children presented for baptism, the surviving
baptismal records bespeak a pattern of conception, and probably marriage, between the
Hurons and the Iroquois. In May 1707, for instance, the Huron woman Marie Timengure
had a child with TBrakBinnen, a Seneca man. In the next six decades, Hurons from
Detroit and Iroquois parents from the St. Lawrence Valley and Iroquoia conceived eight
more children which appeared in the existing baptismal records. 36 Father Pierre Potier's
census of the Huron communities at the Bois Blanc mission and Sandusky taken around
1746 further bears out these patterns of intermarriage and cohabitation. In his manuscript
he identified twenty-three individuals by a designation other than Huron. Of these the
majority, fifteen, were either Foxes or Flatheads who had either been captives or slaves
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adopted into Huron families. 37 Potier identified one "Loup," or Delaware, and one
Abenaki, presumably a Christian convert from Kanahsatake. 38 The other six individuals
identified were Iroquois, three of which were specified as Senecas and three simply as
"Iroquois." Two of these Iroquois individuals were women and the rest were men. 39 Of
the eight non-Huron individuals who had come to live with the Hurons willingly
(compared to those captured in slave raids), the vast majority were therefore Iroquois.
And this number excludes those Hurons of both Iroquois and Huron descent whom Potier
identified as Huron instead of Iroquois and, of course, those Huron who had gone to live
in Iroquois villages. As in the baptismal records, no Ottawas, Potawatomis, or Ojibwas
appear in Potier's census.
To put these numbers into context, existing parish records suggest that priests at
Detroit only baptized three children with a Huron and Ottawa parent between 1735 and
1764. There are no recorded incidents of a Huron parent having a child with a
Potawatomi or Ojibwa between 1704 and the death of the last Jesuit missionary, Pierre
Potier, in 1781. The paucity of such children is telling. Although the Hurons lived less
than a mile from the Ottawas and Potawatomis at Detroit and less than a day from the
Ojibwa village, the existing baptismal and marriage registers indicate that the Hurons
rarely ever married these peoples. The Hurons were much more likely to marry their
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Iroquoian cousins than the Algonquian-speaking peoples who lived nearest them. 40 As in
the baptismal records, no Ottawas, Potawatomis, or Ojibwas appear in Potier's census.
These numbers confirm indications that Hurons had intermarried with Algonquianspeakers during the seventeenth century, and suggest a clear distinction between
Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples. 41
Iroquois people married to or living with Hurons at Detroit or settlements like
Sandusky surfaced frequently in official correspondence over the years. In 1709, for
example, a "Sinneke Indian who livd at TjuhhSagrondie [Detroit]" had married a woman
living at the post, possibly a Huron. 42 An anonymous French chronicler noted that a
Seneca man, whom he called "the great Sononton," lived at the primarily Huron
settlement of Sandusky in 1745.43 This is likely TaBita, a Seneca man whom Potier listed
in his census. 44 In the early 1750s the British captive James Smith noted that his adopted
Kahawake Iroquois brother had a Huron wife and he belonged to what ethnohistorian
Eminie Wheeler-Voegler called "a mixed Caughnawaga Mohawk-Wyandot
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assemblage." 45 When Smith and his Kahnawake family arrived at Detroit to buy
supplies, naturally, they stayed at the Huron village. 46 In 1760 George Croghan spoke to
a "Six Nation Indian, who has lived .... amongst the Wyandotts" at Detroit for fourteen
years. 47
The Hurons themselves testified to their practice of intermarrying with the
Iroquois. In 1747, for example, the Hurons noted that because the "greater part of their
village were children" of the Six Nations, they were no longer truly Hurons but actually
Iroquois. 48 As we have seen, Sastaresty likewise claimed to be "Flesh and Blood of the
Six Nations" and added that many of the Hurons' "Children" lived in the villages of the
Six Nations in 1758.49 Two years later Huron representatives used the same phrase in a
conference with British and Iroquois representatives. 5° These fragmented references hint
at a larger pattern of cohabitation and sexual intimacy between these two peoples,
especially given the frequency of intermarriage and captive adoption between the peoples
in the seventeenth century.
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This intermarriage facilitated constant communication and travelling between the
Huron settlement at Detroit and the various Iroquois outposts in Iroquoia, in the St.
Lawrence Valley, and after the 1730s, in the Ohio Valley. Indeed the Iroquois seemed to
be omnipresent in the Huron village at Detroit. 5 1 Cadillac claimed that thirty Iroquois
families had settled at the Huron village at Detroit in 1704. To be sure, Cadillac serially
exaggerated the number of natives settled at Detroit, and the commandant presented the
claim in an attempt to demonstrate the Iroquois' acquiescence to the French settlement at
Detroit. Yet other evidence validates his claim. The Ottawas testified that some
Kahnawake Iroquois had been present in the Huron fort in the summer of 1706, for
example. 52 Fran<;ois La Forest, commandant of Detroit in 1711, referred to the
"Iroquois ... established at detroit." 53 In 1728, a Mohawk even threatened the British that
if they continued to encroach on their lands the Iroquois would move "to
Tughsaghronide," or Detroit, and other places, suggesting the ties between the Iroquois
and Hurons. 54 Potier listed "La Cabane des Iroquois" in his 1746 census, and indicated
that the "old Iroquois woman" Therese headed the household. Since two of the
inhabitants of the longhouse were "at the sault"-Sault-Saint-Louis, or Kahnawakethese Iroquois were likely from the St. Lawrence Valley settlements. 55 In 1747, the
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marquis of Vaudreuil-Cavagnal, the governor of Louisiana and Canadian-born son of a
long-serving governor of New France, accused the "Jroquois of detroit" of acting as
messengers for the British. 56
The appearance of Iroquois children in the Detroit parish register also suggests
that some Iroquois people either lived at Detroit or at least visited there frequently. In
addition to the nine children of Huron and Iroquois parents baptized at Detroit, parish
priests and the Jesuit missionaries recorded the births of nine children with at least one
Iroquois parent, but no Huron parent, between 1707 and 1765, as well as the deaths of
three Iroquois people, the majority of which came from the Huron mission. 57 These
visitors included not only Iroquois from the St. Lawrence Valley, but also Cayugas,
Senecas, and Mohawks, as well as many "Iroquois" from unidentified nations. While
these numbers are by no means overwhelming, they do give a sense of the
communication and interchange between the Hurons and Iroquois. That pregnant women
and small children traveled from Iroquois villages in the St. Lawrence Valley and
Iroquoia to the Huron village of Detroit suggests an intimacy and frequency of contact
between the two peoples.
The cultural and physical intimacy between the Hurons and Iroquois led to an
enduring diplomatic alliance between the two nations beginning in the final two decades
of the seventeenth century. 58 Not only did the mingling of the Huron and Iroquois
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populations create a shared sense of trust and common culture, but it also created a large
cadre of Huron-born Iroquois and Iroquois-born Hurons who served as intermediaries
and facilitated the diplomacy between the two peoples. These diplomats thus began
negotiating a separate peace to end the disruptive beaver wars. As early as 1679, the
Senecas informed the Indian Commissioners at Albany that they had reached a separate
peace with the "Dionondadaagas"-or Hurons. 59 Three years later, after the Hurons
visited the Seneca territory, the Ottawas complained that the Hurons had "an
understanding" with the Iroquois and they had frequent clandestine meetings with them. 60
By the end of the decade, the Hurons had sent envoys to the Iroquois and apparently
concluded a peace with the Hurons. 61 In 1689, the fur trader Nicolas Perrot concluded
that the Hurons and Iroquois were, despite appearances to the contrary "at peace." The
French interpreter and trader claimed that the Hurons only pretended to fight against the
Five Nations because the French and Ottawas compelled them to do so. 62 Eventually
they dropped their pretenses. In 1695, Cadillac, then commandant ofMichillimackinac,
complained that, no matter how much he cajoled them, the Hurons would not raise
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raiding parties against the Iroquois. One Huron leader, called Le Baron by the French,
rebuffed French demands to attack the Iroquois, claiming that the Christian God had
forbidden him to do so. 63 While some Hurons, led by the headman Kondiaronk, finally
relented and sent a war party against the Iroquois, Le Baron, Cheanonvouzon and others
moved to the Miami settlement on the St. Joseph River in order, Perrot opined, to
abscond to the "Irroquois."64
By the time the peoples of the Great Lakes met with Calliere in 1701, then, the
Iroquois and Hurons had translated their cultural and biological union into a diplomatic
one. Indeed their cultural and diplomatic bonds were so strong that the Iroquois
frequently invited the Hurons to relocate in Iroquoia and the Hurons, or at least some of
them, often seemed disposed to do so. Around the tum of the eighteenth century, for
example, Iroquois people from the St. Lawrence communities of Kahnawake and
Kanehstake asked the Hurons to move to their settlements near Montreal. 65 When
Huron-Ottawa tensions rose in 1705, for example, the Hurons wanted to move to Seneca
territory and, anticipating fear from the Ottawas and others, asked the Senecas to send
three hundred warriors to Detroit to help them leave. 66 In August of the following year,
after the Hurons and Ottawas had fought openly at Detroit, the Michilimackinac Ottawas
fretted that the Hurons would flee to the Iroquois and implored Gov. Vaudreuil to prevent
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them from doing so. 67 The governor shared the Ottawas fears and worked hard to prevent
"too close a connection between the Miamis, Hurons, and Iroquois." 68 On his tour
through the pays d' en haut the following year, Fran<;;ois Clairambault d' Aigremont once
again learned that the Hurons "may settle with the Iroquois." Indeed the officials'
sources told him that the Hurons would have done so already if the Senecas had
permitted them to establish their own village in Seneca territory and retain their
autonomy, rather than merge with the Iroquois and lose their distinct identity. 69 In the
1715, the Hurons still "irritated" by the Ottawas and desperately alarmed by the Fox
incursions in the neighborhood of Detroit, again considered an Iroquois invitation to
settle with them. 70 Although the Hurons never moved to Iroquoia, the Iroquois' frequent
invitation for them to do so, the Hurons' serious contemplation of these offers, and the
continual French fear that the Hurons would do so all attest to the strong cultural and
political alliance which had bound the Iroquois and Huron together. As late as 1726, the
Senecas identified Detroit as the "place where the Tienonadies [Hurons] now live." 71
The remark suggested that the Senecas associated Detroit, not with the more numerous or
powerful Ottawas living at the place, but the Senecas' cultural and linguistic cousins and
commercial partners, the Hurons.
Their ties to the Iroquois, the most powerful and well-connected people in the
region, allowed the Hurons to act with a freedom of movement and autonomy that they
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had lacked for the past fifty years. Since the fall of Huronia and during their long sojourn
through the Great Lakes wilderness, the Hurons had been a strange people in a strange
land. They had been tom from the set of geopolitical relationships which they had
enjoyed in the Huron homeland and now lived among people whom they did not know
and did not trust. This vulnerability placed them at the mercy of the Ottawas, who did
have connections throughout the region. By forming alliances with the Iroquois,
however, the Hurons had created a place for themselves in the pays d' en haut. They were
no longer wanderers who lacked ties to their neighbors and depended upon the Ottawas.
They had situated themselves as part of a larger social and diplomatic reality. On its
most practical level these connections guaranteed protection for the Hurons: few nations
would risk a fight with the Iroquois by attacking the Hurons. Having finally made peace
with the Iroquois in 1701, the people of the region had little interest in renewing the
conflict that had consumed much of the seventeenth century. In the aftermath of HuronOttawa violence in 1706 and 1738, for example, the Ottawas implored the Iroquois to
"take no part" in their quarrel with the Hurons. 72
Their relationship with the Iroquois, furthermore, allowed the Hurons
unprecedented access to the Iroquois' English allies, and, in tum, access to British goods.
The Iroquois, who had joined the English colony of New York in the Covenant Chain,
introduced the Hurons to their allies and mediated between the two peoples.
Cheanonvouzon admitted to Gov. Vaudreuil that the Mohawk messengers "have come on
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the part of the English to invite the Hurons to Orange." 73 According to rumors, in fact,
Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon had been plotting since the late seventeenth century to
defect from the French alliance altogether and move to Niagara, or some other location
where they could trade openly with the British. 74 To that end, he had sent representatives
to Albany along with Miami leaders to "see if goods be cheaper here than elsewhere." 75
Having succeeded in doing so, the Miamis and Hurons apparently tried to return to
Albany in 1705. 76 Twelve Huron and Miami representatives returned to Albany in 1708
in order to "Trade & Traffick" with the British. 77 In that year a French official
complained that the Hurons "constantly pass through their [Iroquois] districts to take their
beaver-skins to the English." 78 Their relationship with the English not only gave the
Hurons access to coveted goods like Caribbean rum and scarlet woolens, which the
French could or would not supply, but it also enhanced the Hurons' status in the region. 79
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The Hurons quickly situated themselves as intermediaries between their Iroquois and
British allies and the peoples of the pays d' en haut. As had their middlemen status before
the fall of Huronia, this commercial position conferred political power on the Hurons.
Indeed in 1687 the Marquis de Denonville, the governor of New France, speculated that
the Hurons wanted to make peace with the Iroquois and English because they hoped to
become "master of the entire trade of the other Far Nations." 80

III. "One Mind": The Hurons and Miamis
The Iroquois alliance allowed the Hurons to operate without fear of serious
reprisals from any regional rivals and to position themselves as commercial middlemen.
Yet for the Hurons to act with the kind of autonomy and power they desired,
Cheanonvouzon recognized that he would have to assert Huron independence from their
closest ally and most determined rival in the region, the Ottawas. Constituted of four
nations who had settlements throughout the region and allied to the other Anishinaabe
peoples-the Potawatomis and Ojibwas-the Ottawas had lorded over Huron affairs
since the Hurons first fled Huronia and took refuge at the Ottawa communities on
Manitoulin Island and Michilimackinac. To revenge himself on the Ottawas and declare
Huron autonomy from them, Cheanonvouzon relied on another alliance with a regional
power, the Miamis. Adeptly reading the geopolitical situation at Detroit and marshalling
his considerable diplomatic skills, the Huron leader orchestrated a conflict between the
Miamis and Ottawas in 1706. In so doing, Cheanonvouzon, leader of a small and muchreduced band, used his diplomatic skills to shake the pays d' en haut.
80
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As the third chapter explores in greater detail, relations between the Hurons and
Ottawas, two longtime allies, had deteriorated badly by 1701. At the 1701 peace talks
with the Iroquois, for example, Cheanvouzon and the Ottawa leader Ontontagon, also
known as Jean leBlanc, clashed. When Ontontagon claimed to speak for both the
Ottawas and the Hurons, a "scandalized" Cheanonvouzon asked the Ottawa leader how
he dared speak "for all the Nations, without having asked for the Hurons' particular
advice," and demanded to know why Ontontagon was "meddling" in Huron affairs. 81
Ontontagon's brazen pretentions to authority over the Hurons nettled Cheanonvouzon,
who envisioned a future of Huron ascendency. This event convinced him, if he was not
already convinced, to strike against the Ottawas. In 1702, Father Jean Mermet,
missionary to the Miamis, warned that Huron resentments against the Ottawas would
"explode one day" very soon, and Gov. Vaudreuil confirmed that the Hurons were "only
waiting for an opportunity to avenge themselves" on the Ottawas. 82
Knowing that the Hurons could never take on the Ottawas by themselves,
Cheanonvouzon reached out to the Miamis for help in striking the Ottawas. He
apparently tried first with the Iroquois in 1702. Speading an apparently spurious rumor
that an Iroquois man had killed an Ottawa, he sought to reawaken the war which the two
nations had so recently ended. When the Iroquois refused to participate and sharply
reproached Cheanonvouzon for trying to "disrupt the land," Cheanonvouzon turned
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instead to his close allies, the Miamis, for help in humbling the Ottawas and exerting
Huron influence in 1706. 83 The Miamis provided the perfect partners, not only because
they had quarreled with the Ottawas in previous years, but because the Huron and
Miamis had already formed a close alliance in the previous decade. The Miamis, settled
at the St. Joseph River in southwestern Michigan in the early 1700s but later moving into
the Maumee and Wabash watersheds, consisted of around 2,000 in 1736. 84 While the
Hurons did not share the same cultural bonds that they did with the Iroquois,
Cheanonvouzon nonetheless crafted powerful personal and diplomatic ties to the
Miamis. 85 As early as 1682 the Hurons, Miamis, and Kiskakon Ottawas concluded a
defensive alliance, announcing that they had formed "one body and one spirit." 86 When
the Iroquois threatened the Miamis in 1695, Cadillac reminded the Hurons of this alliance
and implored the Hurons to protect their long-time "friend and ally." 87
The decision of a group of Hurons, led by Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon, to move
from Michilimackinac to the Miami settlement on the St. Joseph River in southeastern
Lake Michigan in the early 1690s both testifies to the importance of these bonds and
strengthened those same connections. Although a rival Huron leader, Kondiaronk, or Le
Rat, accused these Hurons of moving to the Miami settlement in order to betray them to
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the Iroquois and then "promenade in their prairies," Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon likely
moved to the Miami settlement in order to collaborate more closely with the Miamis and
Iroquois, and to escape the oppressive thumb of the Ottawas at Michilimackinac. 88
Accordingly, between three and six extended Huron households, or about half of the
nation, settled with the Miamis. 89 These "Hurons of saint Joseph," traveled with the
Miamis to Montreal in the summer of 1701, and Cheanonvouzon even provided canoes
for the Miamis' voyage. 90 During the negotiations with the French and Iroquois
Cheanonvouzon even spoke for the Miamis "with whom we make only one Body." The
Miami leader Chichikatalo agreed that their two nations constituted only "one body," and
added that they had the "same will as the Hurons" 91
When Cheanonvouzon decided to accept Callere's offer and move to Detroit, he
sought to convince the Miamis to do so as well. Holding a council with the Miamis and
the Hurons who remained at the settlement in October 1701, he extended an invitation
from Cadillac to establish a village near the newly erected Fort Pontchartrain. 92 In doing
so, he used evocative language to suggest the intimacy between the Miamis and Hurons.
He suggested, for instance, that the Miamis and Hurons join "the two villages together" at
Detroit, and repeated Cadillac's promise that the Hurons and Miamis would "be one
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body" with each other and with the French. 93 Despite Jesuit opposition, Cheanonvouzon
convinced all of his people and some of the Miamis to settle at Detroit. By autumn of
1702, the Miami headman, Miamensa, and several Miami families lived with the Hurons
in a fort constructed less than half a mile from the French fort. 94 This cohabitation was
remarkable. Not even the culturally similar Anishinaabeg peoples-the Ottawas,
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis-shared villages at Detroit. 95
Even among the Hurons, Cheanonvouzon appeared to have especially close ties to
the Miamis. Cadillac, in 1702, and the Ottawas, in 1706, had enlisted the man to carry
messages to the Miamis, and the Miamis trusted him to carry their case to Iroquois and
other groups. When the Senecas failed to return Miami captives as they had promised
Calliere, for example, Cheanonvouzon chastised the Iroquois nation. 96 Even more
tellingly, one of Cheanonvouzon's daughters married a Miami man. Such intermarriage
is perhaps the greatest symbol of Huron and Miami intimacy. 97 Although the Hurons
often married the culturally and linguistically similar Iroquois, they rarely married
Algonquian-speaking peoples, perhaps because they considered them culturally inferior.
That they would marry the Miamis, then, suggests an unusually powerful alliance.
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Cheanonvouzon's daughter and his Miami son-in-law had symbolically become one
flesh, just as their nations had.
By 1702, the Miamis and Hurons had forged a powerful alliance. 98 At the peace
talks in Montreal in 1701 the Hurons claimed that the two nations had "formed only one
body," and the Miamis insisted that they had the "same will as the Hurons."99 The
following year a Huron leader told the governor of New York that the "greatest part of ye
Twichtwighs [Miamis] are removed and come to live" at Detroit and that the "said two
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nations are united." 10 Cheanonvouzon likewise told Vaudreuil that the two nations were
"united together" and shared a common "head by the union that is between us." 101 This
relationship continued long after Cheanonvouzon' s death in 1707. In 1713, the Miamis
sent the Hurons to talk to Gov. Vaudreuil in their name. 102 The Miamis partcipated in the
anti-French movement led by Huron dissident Nicolas Oronotny in the 1740s (see
Chapter Four). 103 In 1759, the Hurons and Miamis gave a joint response at a conference
with British representatives, the Delawares, and the Shawnees, suggesting that they
maintained their close connection. 104 Twenty years later a Huron leader claimed to speak
in the "name of the Wyandotts [Hurons] & Miamis." 105 To be sure the relationship was
not without its problems-the Miamis resented the Hurons' reconciliation with their
98
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mutual foes, the Flatheads, in 1729, for example. 106 Yet they nonetheless cooperated
closely during the eighteenth century.
When Cheanonvouzon began looking for a partner to help humble the Ottawas in
1706, he settled on the Miamis. Not only were the Miamis closely aligned with the
Hurons, they, too, had recently had trouble with the Ottawas and the Ottawas' close
allies. In early 1704 some Weas, a group allied to the Miamis, attacked Detroit and killed
two Hurons, a Potawatomi and an Ottawa man. 107 Sometime around then, they also
attacked the Mississaugas, an Ojibwa group closely allied with the Ottawas. 108 To
prevent war between the Ottawas and Miamis and Weas, the French sought to mediate
the disputes. Cadillac demanded that the Weas come to Detroit to atone and they
apparently did so before August 1704, meeting with the acting commandant, Tonty. 109
Noting that the attacks had been a "mistake," Vaudreuil encouraged the offended parties
to put the unpleasantness behind them. In so doing, the governor concluded, the French
had successfully "set matters right." 110
Yet Cheanonvouzon, closely allied with the Miamis and familiar with the
Ottawas, knew that the groups had not forgotten their anger as easily as the French
imagined. The Huron leader may well have attended an 8 March conference in which the
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Kamiga Ottawa leader Mekoua, known to the French as Le Pesant, or "the Heavy One,"
railed against both the French and the Miamis. Meeting with Ensign Etienne Bourgmont,
the acting commandant in Cadillac's absence, Mekoua noted that the Weas had "killed
us" and that the Miamis had attacked "our Comrades the Missisaguez," but that the
French had done nothing to resolve the solution and had implored the Ottawas not to
retaliate against the Miamis. Instead Onontio had only put him off, telling him "to wait,
and that he Wished to be master of That affair. " 111 Later that month, Mekoua told
Bourgmont that the "Missaguez Are angry ... that the Miamis killed two of their men last
year, and want. .. to go kill them."u 2 The Mississaugas, in fact, nearly did so and only
relented when the Ottawas and Hurons convinced them to do so. 113 Frustrated and
embarrassed, Mekoua worried that, if the Ottawas allowed any more murders to go
unrevenged, his neighbors would "no longer esteem us, and will look on us as
women." 114 The Ottawas, therefore, were primed for confrontation. Ottawa informants
told the sieur d' Aigremont in 1708, the Miamis had never made reparation for their
attacks and directly connected later violence to these on-going disputes. 115
Reading the conditions adeptly, Cheanonvouzon saw his chance to finally revenge
himself on the Ottawas. In such combustible conditions, he only needed to provide a
spark to ignite the war he wanted with the Ottawas. Those Ottawas unwittingly gave him
111
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an opportunity to do just that in 1706. Sometime in late spring or early summer, the
Ottawas had organized a raid against the Dakotas and, at the Sieur de Bourgmont' s
urging, invited the Miamis to come along. Because of his close ties to the Miamis, the
Ottawas sent Cheanonvouzon to both the Miamis at Detroit as well as the Weas on the
Wabash to deliver the invitation. When he arrived, however, he apparently told the
Miamis and Weas that the raid on the Dakotas was merely a ruse. The Ottawas,
Cheanonvouzon warned them, planned to betray the Miamis. 116 He suggested instead
that they wait until the Ottawas warriors left and then attack the undefended Ottawa fort.
The Miamis agreed. All the parts were in place. 117
Unfortunately for Cheanonvouzon and his Miami allies, however, secrets were
hard to keep at Detroit. According to later Ottawa testimony, a Potawatomi who lived
with the Miamis told the Ottawas about the plot. The Ottawas, who had already left
Detroit for the Dakota territory, stopped to confer. Two Ottawa brothers, Miskoaky and
Ontantagan, later told Vaudreuil that they had urged the warriors not to attack the Miamis
until they had consulted with the French. Mekoua, still angry with the Miamis because of
the uncovered deaths, however, prevailed over them and the party returned to Detroit to
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attack the Miamis preemptively sometime in early June. 118 Just as the group returned to
the fort, they encountered a delegation of Miami leaders walking to the French fort for a
feast, perhaps in preparation for the attack. The Ottawa column split, allowing the
Miamis to pass between them. Then Mekoua gave a signal and the warriors, after an
initial hesitation, attacked the Miami leaders, killing or capturing all but one. The
warriors then rushed to attack the Miami encampment, situated to the north of Fort
Pontchartrain. Luckily for the Miamis, they saw the Ottawas advancing and scurried into
the safety of the French fort. Ontontagan struggled to restrain the warriors, urging them
to douse the arrows they had already lit to set the French fort on fire, but could not keep
them from killing a French soldier and a Recollect priest, who, by unlucky circumstance,
were outside of the fort. 119
Cheanonvouzon had been discovered before he could execute his plan, but he
nonetheless succeeded in kindling a war between his allies, the Miamis, and his enemies,
the Ottawas. Nor was he content to stop there. Following the initial attack, the headman
frequently visited the Ottawas, who were apparently ignorant ofCheanonvouzon's
involvement in the contemplated attack. He convinced the Ottawas to attend a feast with
the Miamis in order to reconcile their differences. On the appointed day, the Hurons laid
118
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out a spread of maize on a large cloth in a clearing and invited the Ottawas to partake.
The Ottawas, however, became suspicious when they saw movement in the trees
surrounding the field. When they investigated, the Ottawas found Miami warriors ready
to spring on the Ottawas as soon as they entered the clearing. The Ottawas rushed back
to their village, where they found Miami warriors preparing to attack and destroy the
undefended fort. Reaching the safety of their palisades, the Ottawas immediately fired
upon the Miamis. Huron warriors soon joined the Miamis besieging the Ottawa fort.
They reportedly insulted the Ottawa warriors, calling them "women" and cowards.
Finally, the Hurons could revenge themselves on the Ottawas, and even claim that they
were acting in French interest while doing so. 120
Even then, however, Cheanonvouzon continued to exacerbate matters. Earlier
that summer, some Ottawa warriors had joined a Huron party headed to attack the
Catawbas of the Carolina Piedmont. The group returned just as hostilities broke out
between the Ottawas and Miamis, and the Hurons detained their erstwhile comrades in
the Huron fort. In a clear sign of the Hurons' enmity, they tortured the Ottawa warriors
and killed at least one. Now, Cheanonvouzon offered to return the remaining Ottawa
warriors to their people in exchange for some Miami captives. The Hurons and Ottawas
gathered outside of the French fort to exchange prisoners. Just as Cheanonvouzon
offered his hand to Ontontagan, however, some Huron sharpshooters shot at the Ottawa
leader. Barely escaping with his life, Ontontagan seemed truly hurt by the Huron's
betrayal. After "having been our friends so long," he told Vaudreuil, the Hurons "have
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basely betrayed us." 121 After two months, Ontontagan and the Ottawas decided that they
were no longer safe at Detroit, escaped the post and joined the Michillimackinac Ottawas
in late July or early August. 122
Following the Ottawas' departure, Bourgmont struggled to keep the Miamis and
Hurons from immediately counterattacking the Ottawas at Michilimackinac. Meeting
with the officer in early July, the Hurons, speaking for the others, bluntly declared "We
Came to tell you that we Want to Avenge to Strike that outaotias have made in this land"
and that they would "not listen to you." They only relented when Bourgmont pointed out
that the natives had little ammunition and that, if they attacked Michilimackinac, they ran
the risk of killing the French people at the fort. 123 The next month the Hurons repeated to
Cadillac, who had finally returned to Detroit, that they would "never hear a word of any
arrangement with the [Ottawas]; on this point we do not listen to the Governor, nor to
you either," hardly the words of obedient children. Promising that he would personally
lead the campaign to annihilate the Ottawas if they failed to make amends for their
attack, Cadillac barely managed to restrain them. 124 The commandant also sent a cadet,
Pierre Boucher de Boucherville, Cheanonvouzon, and the Detroit Miami leader,
Pakoumakotia, to allay the Miamis and Weas during the winter of 1706-1707. 125
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Although Cadillac succeeded in temporarily restraining the Hurons and Miamis,
the Ottawas' behavior put the French in a delicate situation. They could not allow the
death of French people, and especially a priest, to go unanswered. Such would be an
invitation to further attacks and would ruin French credibility in the region. They also
had to find a solution that would satisfy the Miamis and Hurons. 126 Those groups, after
all, claimed to be defending themselves and the French by fighting the Ottawas. More
threatening, the Hurons and Miamis had developed close bonds to the Iroquois and, if the
French failed to punish the Ottawas, those groups might ally with the Five Nations. 127 If
they feared alienating the Hurons, the French were terrified of estranging the Ottawas.
The Ottawa nation was not only the largest and most powerful in the region but also
claimed close relations to the other Anishinabeeg groups, the Ojibwas and Potawatomis,
as well as a host of smaller Algonquian groups. A wrong move could have triggered a
regional war between a Huron, Miami, and Iroquois bloc, on the one hand, and the
Ottawas and their allies on the other. 128
Taking all of these concerns into consideration, Cadillac charted a cautious
strategy. 129 To allay the Hurons and Miamis, who still wanted revenge for what had
happened, he would demand that the Ottawas tum over one scapegoat, whom would bear
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the responsibility for the entire affair, for execution. 130 To avoid alienating the Ottawas,
he demanded that they tum over Mekoua, then promptly let the Ottawa man escape. 131
Far from placating all the parties, however, Cadillac's design only fanned the fire. The
Miamis, Hurons, and Iroquois, apparently infuriated by the commandant's indulgence
toward Mekoua, demanded justice, and even contemplated assassinating Cadillac
himself. Some Miamis took justice into their own hands in April, attacking Detroit and
killing some French people, and, intriguingly, some cows, which they may have seen as
symbols of the French presence. Another group attacked the Ottawas wintering at
Saginaw. When the Miamis failed to make amends, Cadillac organized an abortive and
mismanaged campaign against the offenders. 132 Cadillac's gambit was not a subtle use of
"creative misunderstandings" but an ill-informed and disastrously managed attempt to
mediate between people who knew their business much better than the commandant or
governor. 133 Ultimately, the Hurons, Miamis, and Ottawas resolved their problems
themselves, although animosities lingered long after 1706. Animosity still lingered
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between the groups in 1718, when Alphonse de Tonty, now commandant of the post,
suggested that Hurons were once again trying to trigger a war between the Miamis and
Ottawas. 134
The chroniclers of the 1706 conflict locate Cheanonvouzon squarely at the root of
the crisis. Granted, these accounts favor the Ottawas' versions of these events. Since the
French officer commandanding at the time left no official report of the events, we only
have the testimony of the Ottawa brothers Ontontagan and Miscouak:y to Vaudreuil in
1706 and 1707 and the statements of five Ottawas to the sieur d' Aigremont in 1708. 135
These Ottawas, having just killed a Recollect priest, had reason to deflect the blame and
therefore may have overemphasized Cheanonvouzon' role in the events. Still, their
accusations ring true. All the accounts agree upon Cheanonvouzon's involvement in the
affair and offer a consistent version of events. Vaudreuil noted, moreover, that a French
person who had been at Detroit during the conflict had corroborated the Ottawas'
story. 136 No one, not even Cadillac, bothered to deny Cheanonvouzon's involvement in
the affair, either. The allegations of Cheanonvouzon also make sense, given what we
know about the man. Cheanonvouzon, after all, had been openly denouncing the Ottawas
since he arrived at Detroit, and he had close ties with the Miamis. Nor would this be the
first time that he had used such trickery and diplomacy to advance his group's interest.
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Cheanonvouzon, then, finally had his revenge on the Ottawas, thanks in part to
Mekoua' s rashness. He had not only successfully arranged a conflict between the
Miamis and Ottawas, but had, by Ontantagan's count, betrayed the Ottawas four times.
Cheanonvouzon, to be sure, had not "destroyed" the Ottawas-far from it. 137 Although
the group lost between twenty-six and thirty warriors, they soon returned to Detroit,
albeit on the opposite shore of the river. 138 But he had revenged himself upon the
Ottawas. According to Father Marest, this had been his goal all along. Moreover,
Cheanonvouzon apparently succeeded in lowering the Ottawas' standing with the French,
while elevating the Hurons' status. In the peace talks of 1707, Cadillac praised the
Hurons for their support and defense of the French during the previous year. Although
the commandant had heretofore counted the Ottawas as his "elder son," that group's
rebellion had cost them his esteem. Henceforth, the Hurons would be Cadillac's "elder
brother in my heart." 139 The leader of a small, embattled group had used diplomacy and
trickery to reshape the political landscape at Detroit.

IV. "too close a connection": The Southern Alliance

Both his connections with the Miamis and the Iroquois had allowed
Cheanonvouzon to assert Huron autonomy in the region. In order consolidate their
independence from the Ottawas, he sought to create a larger alliance that incorporated
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both the Miamis and Iroquois. Although he had not yet been born when the Hurons
abandoned Huronia in 1649, Cheanonvouzon surely had been raised on stories of the
ancient glory of the northern Iroquoian peoples. Those people had been powerful in part
because they served as commercial mediators between the Iroquois nations and the
Algonquin-speaking people to the west and north. 140 Well aware of the connections
between commercial clout and polticial influence, Cheanonvouzon envisioned a new
world in which the Hurons would serve as mediators in an expansive alliance which
included both his Iroquois and Miami allies. By mediating interactions between their two
allies and by channeling goods from the Iroquois and British to the Miamis, the Hurons
positioned themselves at the center of an important strategic and commercial network.
Observing these movements, Gov. Vaudreuil publically fretted that "everything was to be
feared from too close a connection between the Miamis and Hurons and the Iroquois." 141
Since this alliance involved the Miamis and Iroquois living to the south of Detroit, I refer
to this coalition as the "southern alliance," in comparison to the northward-facing alliance
of Anishinaabe people addressed in the following chapter.
Cheanonvouzon seems to have conceived of this southern alliance before he
moved to Detroit in 1701. He laid out his scheme to the Miamis in early 1702, when he
visited the St. Joseph settlement purportedly to invite the Miamis to settle at Detroit. 142
According to Jean Mermet, the Jesuit missionary stationed at Miamis' St. Joseph
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settlement, Cheanonvouzon suggested that the Hurons and Miamis move to a location
sixty to ninety miles away from the new post in the Maumee River watershed, in hopes of
concluding an "alliance ... with the English," the foes of New France. The Iroquois, after
all, purportedly planned to establish a trading post on the Maumee River, and
Cheanonvouzon wanted move to the region so he could have "his choice of the English
or the French for trade." Mermet also spoke of the Huron's "resentments" against the
Ottawas and feared they would soon lead to violence between the nations. 143 From
Michilimackinac, Father Joseph Marest repeated his brother Mermet's warnings. He
understood that Iroquois, the Mahicans (Loups), and the Detroit Hurons, particularly
Cheanonvouzon, planned "to establish at Ouabache [Wabash] an English post." 144
As articulated to the Miamis, Cheanonvouzon's plan to move to the Maumee
portage contained the four crucial elements of Cheanonvouzon's plan for the southern
alliance. First he would use his connections to the Iroquois to facilitate a closer
relationship between his people and the English and Dutch traders settled at Albany, in
the colony of New York. Having done so, he would then implicate the Miamis into this
alliance and convince them to take their furs to Albany instead of Montreal. To facilitate
the trade between the Hurons, Miamis, Iroquois, and British, he would convince the
Miamis to move with the Hurons to some place far from French supervision and closer to
the English, where they could trade with either the French or English as they saw fit.
Finally, and emphatically, the plot excluded the Ottawas from this arrangement, and
sought to shut them out from this commercial network altogether. The Ottawas were
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conspiculously absent at this meeting, as they were from subsequent meetings between
the Hurons and Miamis.
Although some Miamis opposed the plan and leaked it to Mermet, others
apparently supported his proposal. 145 Accordingly, joint Miami-Huron delegations made
two critical embassies in the spring of 1702, one to the Seneca village of Sonnontuan and
the other to the English entrepot of Albany, where they met with the governor of New
York. First a delegation of twenty-four Miamis and Hurons on their way to the trading
fair in Montreal visited the Seneca village of Sonnontuan in the spring. Noting that the
two nations had now "concludd a firm Peace"-referring to the Great Peace of 170 1-the
delegates invited the Senecas to come to Detroit, where both nations now lived, to
exchange captives as per the terms of the Great Peace. 146 The delegates hoped thereby to
finalize the emerging alliance between them and the Senecas as well as "all i five
nations ... as also

i

Governour of New York." But they also sought to ensure that this

alliance excluded their Ottawa rivals. They warned the Senecas that although the
Ottawas had made peace in 1701, the Senecas must not "trust too much to i
Dowaganhaes [the Ottawas and probably other Anishinaabe peoples] for they are a
brutish People." Moreover, they asked them not to blame the Hurons and Miamis if "any
of your men happen to be killed" by the Ottawas. The implication here was clear: the
untrustworthy Ottawas might very well break the terms of the Great Peace.
Cheanonvouzon therefore sought to consolidate the ties between the Miamis, Hurons, and
Father Marest prematurely pronounced that this intervention had "caused his design to fail" (Marest a
Cadillac, 23 July 1702, in ibid., 243).
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Iroquois, while also sowing doubt and distrust between the Iroquois and the Ottawas. 147
Symbolizing this tripartite union, a joint party of Miamis, Iroquois, and Hurons left to
attack the Dakotas. 148
Shortly after the Miamis and Hurons met with the Senecas, Cheanonvouzon and
the Miamis sent five delegates to Albany in the summer of 1702. Here, they met with
Lord Cornbury. The delegates told Cornbury that the "Sachims" of the Detroit Hurons
and Miamis had sent them to Albany to trade and "to see if goods be cheaper here than
elsewhere." For "where we find goods cheapest," they promised, "thither we will bend
our course." Esctatic about the prospect of wooing important allies from the French
rivals, Lord Cornbury, the governor of New York, assured his guests that "ye Goods are
farr cheaper here than at Canada." The Hurons and Miamis were, of course, welcome to
visit Albany whenever they liked, but Cornbury could more easily supply them if "you
would come and live nearer us," away from French intervention. Then, the governor
assured them, they would have little need to go to Montreal. The governor finally
presented them a wampum belt which showed the Hurons, Iroquois, and governor of
New York linked hand-in-hand. 149 The Hurons carefully curated this belt for at least
another fifty years, when they presented it to British officials. 150
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These two meetings provided the groundwork for an emerging tripartite alliance
between the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois. At Sonnontuan, the Hurons had explicitly
articulated an alliance of the southern nations which explicitly excluded the Ottawas. At
Albany, Huron and Miami deputies reiterated that proposal and sought to establish an
exclusive relationship with the English, although the Iroquois were not "privy to this
Conference." These negotiations led directly to the formation of a commercial and
strategic alliance between the conferees. In fact, that year some Hurons and Iroquois had
joined a Miami war party against the Dakotas. 151 The Hurons visited the Seneca
settlement of Sonnontuan in 1703, as they had in 1702, and discussed the message of a
belt the Senecas had given them. 152 The Miamis and Hurons apparently tried to return to
Albany in 1705. 153 Twelve Huron and Miami representatives returned to Albany in 1708
in order to "Trade & Traffick" with the British. 154 Satisfied with the prices they found at
Albany, the representatives agreed to return the following spring. The six people of the
"Farr Nations" who arrived at Albany the following June, therefore, may well have been
Hurons and Miamis. 155 In addition to visiting Albany directly, the Hurons also traded
with their Iroquois partners at the Iroquois entrepots in Lake Ontario, Niagara and
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Cataroquoi (Fort Frontenac). The Iroquois also visited their Huron allies at Detroit
regularly, bringing with them British goods to exchange for Great Lakes peltry. By 1706,
the Iroquois had already begun bringing British goods to Detroit. Cadillac complained
that a Seneca man named Pimabauso frequently brought English rum to his relations at
Detroit. 156
Concerned about losing trading partners and military allies to their British rivals,
the French testified to this emerging alliance. Even before their second visit to Albany,
Vaudreuil had fretted in 1706 that the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois might "be united"
and that the English and Dutch merchants at Albany would "profit from this
opportunity." 157 He fretted that "everything was to be feared from too close a connection
between the Miamis and Hurons and the Iroquois." 158 Fran~ois Clairambault
d' Aigremont, a French official and Vaudreuil's protege, witnessed this nascent trade
first-hand in 1708. After his inspection tour of the western forts, Aigremont noted that
the Hurons and Iroquois enjoyed "close relations" because of the "great resemblance" in
the two groups' language and culture. 159 This intimacy allowed the Hurons to
"constantly pass through their [Iroquois] districts to take their beaver-skins to the
English." Aigremont elsewhere noted that, if the nations currently settled at
Michilimackinac moved to Detroit, the beaver pelts "would almost all go to the English
by the agency of the Iroquois, the Hurons, and even many other savages who have gone
that way." To make matters worse, the Hurons had proctored an alliance between the
156
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Miamis and Iroquois, creating a massive and potentially threatening alliance of southern
nations. While Aigremont certainly exaggerated the frequency with which the Hurons
visited Albany, his observations do attest to a growing trade network which, if
unchecked, could seriously threaten French trade in the region. In fact, he noted that
nearly all the goods at Detroit came from the English and that most of the furs coming
from Detroit found their way to Albany, not Montreal. 160
In 1711 Fran9ois La Forest, formed y the third in command at the post and now its
commandant, likewise pointed to the Hurons' centrality in linking the Miamis to the
Iroquois and thus the British. La Forest lamented that the Miamis and lllinois, who
lacked the boat-handling abilities of the Ottawas and others, seldom made the arduous
trip to Montreal to trade. Instead, those peoples preferred to "to trade their pelts with the
Iroquois, hurons and missaguez [Mississaugas] established at detroit who then carry them
to the English." 161 Just as Aigremont had, then, La Forest testified to a powerful trading
alliance which united the Iroquois and British with the Miamis and even lllinois, through
Huron mediators strategically located at Detroit. In his formulation, the Hurons acted as
agents or middlemen, mediating trade between the Iroquoian allies and other nations who
came to Detroit to trade for British goods, much as their ancestors had mediated trade
between Iroquoian and Algonquian groups before the fall of Huronia. Obtaining British
goods either by trading with the British themselves or with the Iroquois, the Hurons then
trafficked these goods to other nations in the pays d' en haut.
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An incident in 1711 further speaks to this Huron-Iroquois-Miami nexus and
suggests the centrality of the Hurons to that alliance. In the summer of 1711, Vaudreuil
received reports that the British planned to invade Canada and called upon the nations
d' en haut to assemble in Montrea1. 162 Most of the nations answered the call-including
the Hurons, Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Foxes of Detroit. Yet when the governor asked the
nations to declare war against the British, the delegates hesitated. According to
Vaudreuil, the people of the pays d' en haut had "long fluttered between the Desire to
declare themselves [against the British]" and the fear that by doing so they would close
"the path going to the English." Only when twenty Hurons "began to sing [the war song]
and to take the hatchet" did the other nations follow suit. 163 The other nations' reaction
to the Hurons' behavior is suggestive, if ambiguous. The Hurons' show of bravery might
have shamed their neighbors into declaring war against the British; if the Hurons,
numerically reduced as they were, agreed to fight, then the Ottawas and other nations
might have felt obliged as well. Yet Aigremont' s and La Forest's testimony suggests
another alternative. If the nations d' en haut, like the Miamis, lllinois, and Ottawas, saw
the Hurons as uniquely attached to the British and Iroquois, then the Hurons' reaction to
Vaudreuil's invitation would be especially meaningful. As crucial mediators between
Albany and Detroit, the Hurons' position mattered profoundly, and therefore the others
deferred to them. At the very least, the other nations might have looked to the Hurons to
decide whether war with the British would, indeed, close the path to Albany as they
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feared. If so, the incident demonstrates that Cheanonvouzon's design had worked exactly
to plan; by forging ties with the Iroquois and British, the Hurons had improved their
status in the pays d' en haut.
Even though Cheaunonvouzon died in 1707, the alliance which he had proctored
had outlived him. The Hurons and Iroquois continued to nurture their friendship and to
keep their competitors-especially the Ottawas-away from the Iroquois. Although the
southern alliance seems to have diminished, especially after the establishment of the
British trading post at Oswego in the 1720s, echoes of the southern alliance continued to
reverberate for years afterward. In 1758, as we have seen, the French commandant
invited the peoples of Detroit to attack the Iroquois. When several nations, including the
Miamis, accepted the war belt and agreed to strike the Iroquois, the latest Huron elder to
bear the title of Sastaresty angrily erupted at their "Conduct & Readiness to take up the
French Hatchet." After refusing to accept the hatchet, he pointedly "kicked" the
wampum belt "toward where the Twightwees sat, & desired they wou'd speak their
Sentient." Following a "short pause" the Miamis acknowledged that the Iroquois were
"their old Friends and Allies" and therefore "kicked" the belt toward the Illinois leaders
who had come. The episode demonstrates the lingering connections between the three
nations. Sastaresty acknowledged his ties to his "Flesh and Blood" Iroquois kin, and the
Miamis conceded that they had enjoyed a long relationship with their "old Friends."
More importantly, Sastaresty had reprised Cheanonvouzon's role as a mediator between
his Miami and Iroquois allies. Even if the alliance no longer operated as it had, its
remnants were still plain to be seen fifty years after Cheanonvouzon's death.
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Conclusion
As the 1711 and 17 58 incidents testify, the southern alliance had allowed the
Hurons to exercise an influence far beyond their numbers. In each incident, the Hurons'
neighbors looked to them, and some even deferred to their judgement, before deciding
how to proceed in regard to the Iroquois and British. As Payen de Noyan witnessed in
1721, "All the Savages [of Detroit] are guided exclusively by the feelings of the
Hurons." 164 The Marquis de Beauharnois, governor of New France, explicitly drew the
connection between the Huron-Iroquois alliance and Huron influence in the region.
Noting the necessary to accommodate a recent conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas,
the governor observed that "the hurons are allied with all the 5 Nations Iroquois" and
worried that the Hurons and Iroquois might combine against the Ottawas. In a very
explicit way, the Hurons had translated their relationship with regional allies into
influence among their neighbors. They were able to do so because Cheanonvouzon had
inserted himself into a regional network and a diplomatic reality. He had used diplomacy
to compensate for the Hurons' weakness. No longer able to act as "lyons" who
intimidated their neighbors through the threat of force, the Hurons acted like "foxes" that
used diplomacy to compensate for the weakness and to project their influence in the
region.
The Hurons' maneuvering after their arrival at Detroit defied all odds. That
activity not only demonstrates that the Hurons remained a profoundly and defiantly
distinct people, but also that relations between peoples like the Hurons, Miamis, and
164
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Iroquois, shaped the region as much as the accommodative "middle ground" where
French and native peoples negotiated. By all objective accounts, the Huron community
should have been shattered and should have clung to the French and other allies in order
to survive. Yet Cheanonvouzon's dogged pursuit of autonomy from the Ottawas
suggests that no matter how badly the Hurons had been battered since the epidemics and
wars of the seventeenth century, the Huron community nonetheless remained distinct and
separate from their neighbors in the region. Cheanonvouzon and his people were not
orphaned refugees who needed Onontio to solve their problems, but wily and resourceful
survivors who sought to retain their separate existence. Moreover, Cheanonvouzon was a
Huron leader seeking to advance the ends of his own nation, even when that meant
flouting his French or Ottawa allies. In fact, when Vaudreuil appeared ready to
undermine Detroit in 1704, Cheanonvouzon brazenly declared Onontio to be a "liar" and
refused to "listen any longer to his word." 165 He clearly perceived himself to be a child
of Aatentsic-the ancient mother of the Hurons-rather than of Onontio. Nor was he
alone. Mekoua also railed against the French for deferring their vengeance on the nations
which had attacked and killed his people. 166
Both the Hurons' survival as a discrete entity and their later ascendency as a
regional power were premised upon a set of relationships which were only partially
connected to the French and which often undermined French interests. In fact, the
Hurons' alliances, and the activity it enabled, threatened to undermine New France
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constantly. Although Cheanonvouzon worked to attract nations to Detroit when it suited
him, his extracurricular activities proved much less conducive to Onontio's interest. His
plotting against the Ottawas, for instance, threatened to ignite a regional war between the
two nations which would have drawn the French into an unwinnable war. The intensity
of the Huron-Ottawa rivalry continually overwhelmed French attempts to mediate it, and
the two nations only came to terms when they saw fit to do so. By openly courting the
British, furthermore, Cheanonvouzon threatened to send furs to France's imperial rivals,
the English in Albany. Onontio continually demonstrated his inability to "arrange
affairs" in the region. Cheanonvouzon, on the other hand, used his alliances with the
Iroquois and Miamis to establish Huron ascendency, humble his Ottawa rivals, and shape
Detroit along Huron lines.
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CHAPTER TWO
"The Ottawawa Confederation":
The Anishinaabeg during the Pax Vulpinae
In late June 1717, a small Ottawa party left Detroit, ostensibly to attack the
Flatheads, their perennial enemies. Instead of attacking the Flatheads, however, they
headed for the Miami settlement on the Maumee River and murdered a Miami woman,
her Iroquois husband, and two of the couple's children. The murders threatened to engulf
the pays d'en haut in war. In one fell swoop, the Ottawas had offended the Iroquois and
the Miamis, two of the most powerful nations in the pays d'en haut. Noting that the
Ottawas had already attacked them several times, the Miamis were disinclined to "listen
to talk of peace." 1 By August, they had reportedly mobilized a large war party against
the Ottawas. Watching the crisis unfold, the Hurons, rivals of the Ottawas and friends of
the Miamis, silently hoped that a "war would be ignited" between the two nations, just as
they had a decade earlier, and tried to prevent delegates from visiting the Miamis. The
events so roiled affairs at Detroit that the nations settled at the post dared not to descend
to Montreal to attend peace talks with the Foxes that summer. 2
Arriving in early July, Alphonse de Tonty, the new commandant at Detroit,
desperately worked to prevent further bloodshed. He dispatched envoys to Saginaw Bay
to apprehend the murderers and to invite the Miamis to come reconcile with the Ottawas.
When a Miami delegation finally arrived in September, Tonty convoked an assembly
1
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with the Miamis and Ottawas, as well as the Potawatomis, Hurons, and Ojibwas at the
fort. He then ordered musketeers to escort the perpetrators before the council. Speaking
to the council, he dramatically offered to surrender the Ottawa men to the Miamis, but
implored them to be merciful toward them. The Ottawas likewise apologized for the
indiscretion of the reckless "young men" and presented the Miamis gifts to "cover" their
dead symbolically. Despite the Hurons' opposition to the terms of reconciliation, the
Miamis reluctantly accepted the peace and surrendered the murderers to Tonty's care. If
the Ottawas attacked again, however, they promised swift retribution, regardless of
Tonty' s intervention. Having kept the peace, Tonty convinced the assembled nations to
sign a peace treaty. 3
The Ottawas never really explained why they had attacked the Miamis and
suggested that the crime was simply the work of uncontrollable "young men," the
ubiquitous excuse for bad behavior. Yet the identity of the victims and the timing of the
attack suggest a more serious and intentional motive. The warriors had not attacked just
any Miami family; they had targeted a mixed Iroquois-Miami household living near the
Miami settlement. The Ottawas had long been concerned about the growing commercial
and diplomatic intimacy between the Miamis, Iroquois, and Hurons. The Ottawas, the
most powerful and well-connected nation in the region, worried that this emerging
alliance might diminish Ottawa influence and commercial clout. They had repeatedly
and unsuccessfully tried to disrupt this alliance and to forge their own partnership with
the Iroquois. When they failed to do so once again in the spring of 1717, their frustration
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became deadly. They struck out at the unfortunate mixed family, the physical and
biological manifestation of this alliance.
The murders therefore constituted a skirmish between two rival blocs within the
French-allied coalition: the southern alliance described in the preceding chapter and an
alliance between the culturally and politically connected peoples of the Anishinaabe
culture group-called Anishinaabeg in the plural-the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and
Potawatomis, a group whom the British later referred to as the "Ottawawa
Confederacy."4 Fearing that the southern alliance would successfully challenge Ottawa
and Anishinaabe interests in the region and reorient the region toward the south and away
from the core Anishinaabe settlements, the Ottawas and their allies sought to disrupt that
coalition (see figure 7).
Gov. Vaudreuil observed this emerging rivalry in 1706 when he fretted that "if the
Hurons, the Miamis and the Iroquois be united, they will accomplish the destruction of
the Outtaouois." 5 Thirty years later Vaudreuil's successor, the Marquis de Beauharnois,
observed the same rivalry. Emphasizing the importance of reconciling the Hurons and
Ottawas, who had recently clashed again, he noted that the affair "is very delicate the
hurons being allied with the 5 Nations Iroquois, and the Outaotiais with all of those in the
pills d'en haut," meaning chiefly the Anishinaabe peoples. 6 At the same time, the
intendant, Gilles Hocquart confirmed that the Hurons were allied "to all the Iroquois"indicating both those in the St. Lawrence Valley settlements and those living in
4
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Miamis, Detroit Hurons, and
Iroquois
Figure 7: The Southern and Anishinaabe Alliances, ca.1700 The map shows the two competing
spheres of influence within the pays d'en haut. One, dominated by the Ottawas, centered on
Michilimackinac. The other, a southern alliance forged by the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois, linked
Albany to Detroit and points west.

Iroquoia-and the Ottawas of Detroit were allied to the "Savages of the same name"
living elsewhere and the "Sauteur of Michilimackinac"-an Ojibwa community. 7 These
two blocs had been quarrelling ever since the Hurons moved to Detroit and begun
negotiating with the Iroquois and Miamis and continued to do so long after 1717. At a
council with the British commandant of Detroit, Henry Hamilton in 1779, an Ottawas
orator spoke for "the Outawaas, Chippeweys and Poutwuattamies," while a Huron leader
7
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spoke in the "name of the Wyandotts [Hurons] & Miamis." Even at this late date, these
two peoples acted as separate entities. 8
Such commercial squabbles and fights over influence between these two blocs
would not be surprising had they not come when they did, amidst a series of conflicts
against the Foxes, also known as the Outagamis or Mesquakies. By all accounts, the era
should have been one of harmony between the peoples of Detroit and in many respects it
was. Engaged in a common effort against a common foe-the Foxes and their alliesthe Ottawas, Hurons, Miamis, and other nations overlooked their differences and
cooperated as they had not since the Iroquois wars. In the midst of these conflicts, these
nations enjoyed an era of cooperation-a Pax Vulpinae, or Fox Peace. Indeed, the
previous year those nations had issued a severe blow to the Foxes and the groups had
promised to come to Montreal that very summer to conclude a treaty with the Foxes. Yet
if the Fox threat drew them together, the 1717 murders remind us that other forces
continued to separate them.
This chapter therefore charts the curious paradox between the harmony,
engendered by both the Fox threat and the subsequent wars, and the sometimes violent
competition between the peoples allied against the Foxes. The first section recounts how
the common threat posed by the Foxes and their allies galvanized the peoples of Detroit
to form a powerful military alliance against the Foxes in 1711 and 1712. This threat, and
the anti-Fox campaigns that followed, provided these peoples with common ground from
1711 until the 1730s. Yet, as the remainder of the chapter shows, this temporary
cooperation neither melted the boundaries separating the different members of the
8
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alliance nor implied a greater political fusion. In particular, the Anishinaabeg saw the
rise of the Huron-led southern alliance as a threat to their traditional dominance of the
region. Exploring the dynamic of the Anishinaabe alliance-the so called "Three
Fires"-the second section sketches out the ways in which the Anishinaabe communities
used their cultural and familial ties to control the pays d'en haut. Finally, the third
section describes the ways in which the Anishinaabe challenged the southern alliance,
first by seeking to disrupt Iroquois-Huron relations, and then by trying to supersede that
relationship. This rivalry led, in 1717, to the doorstep of the unfortunate Miami-Iroquois
family.
This juxtaposition between peace and conflict, between cooperation and
competition, reveals the durability and stubborn independence of the peoples living in the
pays d'en haut. The Fox threat, like the Iroquois threat the previous century, could have
spurred these communities to forget their past difficulties and to remain in harmony. The
common endeavor in the following years could have suppressed the struggles for
influence in the region. Instead the two rival blocs continued to spar and compete even
as they faced challenges from a mutual enemy. Such competition reveals not only the
depth of the antipathy between different groups, but also the natives' loyalty and
commitment to their own nations' well-being. Happy to cooperate when conditions
called for such cooperation, these groups nonetheless maintained their sense of
separateness and never heeded French calls to live in harmony and to fuse into one cozy
family. Not even an external threat could completely overcome the friction between the
peoples of the pays d' en haut.
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I. Pax Vulpinae

Beginning in 1710, the nations of the pays d' en haut, although fractured and wary
after the conflicts of the previous decade, coalesced in an alliance against their longtime
foes, the Foxes, Sauks, and Mascoutins. To be sure, these nations had long shared
common enemies, like the Sioux in the north and the Flatheads in the south. Yet none of
them posed the threat that the Foxes did in 1711 and 1712. In those years, the Foxes and
their allies, who had sometimes clashed with other nations, adopted an especially
aggressive and menacing stance. Moving eastward from Green Bay, bands of Foxes and
their allies settled at Detroit, the Saint Joseph River and elsewhere. At the same time,
they collaborated, or at least appeared to collaborate, with the Five Nations Iroquois-the
all-purpose bogeymen of the region-against the peoples of the pays d'en haut.
Threatened by an external enemy who posed a real and imminent danger to their common
interests, most of the peoples of the pays d' en haut banded together to attack the Foxes in
the winter and spring of 1712. Once the nations had allied, the continuing menace
presented by the Foxes worked to unify the people of the region. The common endeavor
against a common foe moreover counteracted their tendency toward distrust and gave
them a shared project and common ground. This collective fear, shared suffering, and a
common enemy created conditional harmony, a flawed and fragile Pax Vulipinae, which
extended from 1712 until the 1730s.
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By 1712, relations among those nations d'en haut certainly needed some repair. 9
Speaking to an assembly of nations in Montreal late in 1711, Governor Vaudreuil
acknowledged that the previous decade had been one of discord and conflict among his
allies in the pays d'en haut. In a palpably weary tone, Vaudreuil recounted "how much
trouble and care I have taken ... to keep you at peace and in union with one another" and
noted that their "dissensions" had deeply troubled him. 10 Despite the high hopes and
lofty promises of 1701, the peoples had spent the subsequent decade squabbling. The
Ottawas had attacked the Iroquois just three years after the conference, casting doubt on
the durability of the peace. More troubling, the Miami raids on the Ojibwas and Ottawas
in 1704 and 1705 triggered the confrontation at Detroit in 1706. That violence threatened
to permanently poison relations among Ontonio's children and to split the pays d'en haut
into two blocs-one dominated by the Miamis and Hurons and the other by the Ottawas
and their Anishinaabeg allies. Lamothe Cadillac's pardon ofMekoua had then triggered
retaliation from the Miamis and a French-led retaliatory campaign in 1708. Since then
the Miamis and Ottawas had observed a tentative cease-fire without fully reconciling. II
The Ottawas' allies and Miamis' erstwhile targets, the Mississaugas, an Ojibwa group,
had attacked a group of Miamis on their way to the 1711 conference. Before dismissing
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Figure 8: Detail of De
Couagne, " Carte du
Canada," 1711.
Bibliotheque nationale de
France, Paris.
The Foxes and Mascoutins
settled south of the Huron
fort (see "Fort des renards")
and immediately began
positioning themselves as key
players in the French alliance.

his allies to return home, Vaudreuil once more enjoined his children "to reunite your
minds and to induce you to live together as brothers." 12
Most of these nations did in fact reunite their minds in the autumn and winter of
1712, but this unity had more to do with the threat of a Fox incursion than acquiescence
to Onontio's pleas. At the invitation of Lamothe Cadillac, two bands of Foxes, as well
as many closely allied Mascoutins and Kickapoos-some seven or eight hundred souls all
told-had moved eastward in 1710 (see figure 8). 13 While some of these settled near the
home quickly, establishing a camp in the shadow of Fort Pontchartrain and-to ingratiate
themselves to their French neighbors-presenting many of their children for baptism by
the post's Recollect missionary. 14
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The Foxes' arrival at Detroit troubled many of the peoples the region, especially
the Ojibwas and illinois, who had been fighting with the Foxes for decades. This conflict
only intensified when the Fox settled in the midst of their Ottawa, Huron, and
Potawatomi enemies at Detroit. 15 The Foxes, already on bad terms with their long-time
enemies, the Ojibwas of Sault-Ste.-Marie, with whom they had been fighting since at
least 1708, defiantly "menaced" the Saginaw Ottawas. 16 At the same time they moved
eastward in 1710 and 1711, the Foxes also provoked conflicts with the illinois. 17 In 1711
the Foxes attacked some Miamis at Detroit, killing two of that nation-a Wea and
Piankshaw . 18 Moreover, the Kickapoos, close allies of the Foxes, and, to the minds of the
nations' d'en haut, inseparable from them, attacked the Miamis as well in the spring of
1711. 19 In addition to insulting the Hurons at Detroit in 1711, the Foxes reportedly
planned to ambush both the Hurons and Miamis, on their return trip from Montreal to
Detroit. 20 Although the Foxes did not succeed in this attack, a Kickapoo leader settled on
the Maumee River, whom the Hurons regarded as "really an Outagami," captured and
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killed a Huron man and two of his Iroquois companions the following winter. 21 Finally,
the Foxes attacked the Potawatomi settlement at Fort St. Joseph in the autumn or winter
of 1712. 22 Surveying the damage brought by the Foxes in late 1711, Vaudreuil enjoined
the Foxes and Mascoutins to return to Green Bay, lest they "draw down upon
[themselves] all the tribes in the land." 23
If the Foxes' and Mascoutins' arrival at the post and subsequent aggression were
not alarming enough, the nations d'en haut thought they discerned even more sinister
motives in those nations' behavior. Piecing together scraps of information and rumors,
the nations d'en haut concluded that the Foxes' aggression was part of a larger
conspiracy, hatched with the Iroquois and the British, to destroy Detroit and the nations
d' en haut entirely.
First, the Iroquois and British had been acting more aggressively in recent years.
Early in 1710, representatives had complained both to the English and the French that the
"Wagenhaes"-the Iroquois name for the Ottawas-had frequently murdered their
people and that the Five Nations were "determined to take Revenge" against them?4
Some Senecas and Onondagas confirmed this to Vaudreuil in 1710, complaining that the
Ottawas had repeatedly attacked them since 1701 and that they would no longer defer
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their vengeance. 25 In the summer of 1712 the Senecas reported that the Onondaga
headman, Teganissorens, had spent the previous winter plotting an attack on Detroit and
had invited the other four nations to join him. 26 Moreover, Vaudreuillearned of an
anticipated British invasion of New France in 1711 and had called all the nations d'en
haut to protect Montreal from invasion, which added to the sense of alarm and gave
credence to the rumor that the Foxes were in league with the British?7
These rumors of Iroquois and British aggression coincided with evidence of
collusion between the Fox and their allies and the Iroquois and British. The Foxes and
Mascoutins had visited the Iroquois in 1710 and "renewed their alliance" and the Iroquois
had placed the nation "under their protection." 28 In fact, Vaudreuil feared that they
would fuse into "one body with the Iroquois." 29 In seeming confirmation of this new,
troublesome alliance, a band of Foxes abruptly abandoned Detroit in the spring of 1712
and took refuge among the Five Nations. 30 This alliance, moreover, extended to the
Iroquois' partners, the British. In 1712 Claude Dubuisson, acting commandant at Detroit,
claimed that the Foxes had accepted "many presents and belts from the English." 31 An
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official in New York confirmed in 1715 that the Foxes had "made an Alliance with this
Gvt" several years earlier. 32
Aware of the intensified British and Iroquois aggression toward New France and
its allies and the rumored dealings between the Iroquois, British, and Foxes, many
observers reasonably interpreted the Foxes' aggression in 1711 as definitive proof of a
conspiracy. Specifically, they feared that the Foxes and Mascoutins, on orders from
Albany, would attack Detroit in 1712 and immediately flee to the Iroquois, who would
shelter them from any recriminations. Thereafter, the Five Nations and Foxes would
scour the pays d' en haut. Dubuisson articulated this theory in his report in the spring
1712. Citing the testimony of a Fox defector, the officer claimed that the Foxes had
received orders from the British "to destroy the post ... and then certain tribes allied to
us." 33 More importantly, native observers also believed that the Foxes had colluded with
the British to attack Detroit. In the spring of 1712 an lllinois leader told the Foxes that,
despite their subterfuge, he knew about "the messages that [they had] received from the
English to slaughter our father and the children here"-the nations of Detroit. The
Potawatomi elder Makasabe likewise chastised the Foxes for betraying their French
father for a British one and for countenancing the Protestant "enemy of prayer." 34
According to Joseph Marest, the Jesuit missionary at Michilimackinac, the Ottawas had
attacked the Mascoutins "so as not to be attacked by them first," suggesting that they
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believed the rumors about a coordinated assault on Detroit and the nations d'en haut. 35
Whether the Foxes truly had conspired with the British-something they apparently
claimed during the siege-the nations d'en haut clearly believed that they had and the
prospect tern"f"1ed th em. 36
By creating a common threat-specifically one that involved the powerful
Iroquois-the Foxes had curiously and unintentionally given those nations common
ground (their resentment and fear of the Foxes) and a common cause (the ultimate
destruction of the Foxes). The emergence of a threatening external enemy quickly
eclipsed the conflict that had separated the nations d'en haut in the previous decade. If
the Foxes really planned to sack Detroit then unite with the Iroquois, all of the nations
d' en haut would suffer the consequences. The suspected involvement of the British and
Five Nations was critical because it made what would have otherwise been a serious
threat a potentially devastating one. Facing this common threat, moreover, these nations
remembered the ties which had long bound them. They recalled their shared struggle
against the Five Nations during the seventeenth century. Accordingly, the Fox threat
propelled the nations d' en haut into a harmony not seen since the seventeenth century.
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Ironically, the Foxes had done in a few short months what French officials had been
trying to do for years-they unified the peoples of the pays d' en haut.
While the nations d'en haut certainly worried about an alliance between the
Foxes, Iroquois, and British, they may also worried that the Foxes and other nations at
Green Bay threatened their position within the pays d' en haut. French traders had been
travelling to Green Bay more frequently, and the eastward migration of the Foxes,
Kickapoos, and Mascoutins might have triggered worries, especially among the Ottawas,
that the Foxes would displace them as crucial traders in the alliance. The Ottawas,
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis certainly had no interest in seeing their longtime enemies
settled and trading with their French partners. They accordingly sought to impose their
"vision of a more limited alliance" that excluded the Foxes. 37
Capitalizing on the almost universal ill-will toward the Foxes and their allies and
hoping to prevent a Fox attack, the peoples d'en haut built a formidable anti-Fox
coalition during the autumn and winter of 1711-1712 and resolved to attack the Foxes
and Mascoutins at Detroit in the spring of 1712. As Dubuisson noted, the war against the
Foxes had been "well planned during all the autumn and winter, with all the tribes and
presents given." 38 According to the St. Joseph Potawatomi war leader, Makisabe,
Sagima, the Saginaw Ottawa headman coordinated the affair, inviting first the
Potawatomis, and then the lllinois to join the coalition. By late spring the coalition
included "almost all the other nations," such as the Hurons and Miamis as well, in
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addition to nations as distant as the Osage of the Missouri River Valley. 39 Together these
peoples aimed to "Entirely destroy" the Foxes and their friends. 40
The new coalition wasted little time implementing its strategy. Claiming to act,
not just for themselves but for "all the upper nations," the Potawatomis and Ottawas
combined to attack some Mascoutins who were wintering near Saginaw. 41 Proceeding to
Detroit, the Ottawas and Potawatomis joined with Illinois, Miamis, Huron, Osage, and
Sauk warriors to attack a party of Foxes and Mascoutins encamped at the fort.
Numbering some six hundred and perhaps as many as nine hundred warriors, the allies
arrived at Detroit in May 1712.42 Taking up positions both in the fort and around the Fox
and Mascoutin camp, the allies besieged the shabby enclosure for nineteen days.
Although the Foxes finally managed to escape the siege on a dark night, the hapless
refugees only made it a few miles north of Fort Pontchartrain before a combined force of
Ottawas, Hurons, Potawatomis, and Misssissaugas reached them and easily defeated the
weary refugees. According to Dubuisson, the allies killed all the men and enslaved the
women and children. 43 Demonstrating the depth of their hatred toward the Foxes, the
Hurons murdered their captives rather than retain them as slaves. 44
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Dubuisson noted that the attack on the Foxes had immediately improved relations
among the nations d' en haut. During the siege, the allies had coexisted and cooperated
"in peace, union, and good understanding" in the cramped French fort and had
cooperated to defeat a common foe. In the warm afterglow of their victory, furthermore,
the nations seemed poised to forget their ancient troubles altogether. Dubuisson asserted
that this "general assembly of all the tribes" had "put them all at peace with one another,
and has renewed their former alliance. " 45 The Potawatomis, impressed with the bravery
and sacrifice of some St. Lawrence Iroquois, reconciled with their erstwhile enemies. 46
Dubuisson also took credit for making a "firm peace" between the Miamis and the
Ottawas. The two nations-estranged since the violent encounter in 1706-finally
created "a strong alliance with one another." Dubuisson even hoped that the lllinois and
Miamis might finally reconcile. 47 Violence had begotten harmony.
If the threat of a Fox attack in the winter of 1711-1712 had bridged the rifts

opened by the violence of 1706, the subsequent violence, lasting intermittently for the
following two decades, cemented that alliance. Within weeks of the siege, a Kickapoo
delegation arrived at Detroit to address the nations settled there. The Hurons and
Ottawas, seeking vengeance for an attack on the Hurons the previous winter and
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regarding the Kickapoos as virtual Foxes, intercepted and slaughtered them. 48 Learning
of the siege later that summer, the Mascoutins and Kickapoos from the Green Bay
settlements mobilized war parties to Detroit and elsewhere, scattering the allies, "who
dared not hold at their approach." 49 Rather than directly attacking the fort, these parties
lurked in the outskirts of the post, ambushing hapless victims and occasionally
skirmishing with the peoples of the post. Hostilities resumed in the summer of 1713. A
Fox party led by the ominously named Le Tonnerre-or The Thunderer-launched a raid
on Detroit early that year. The Hurons intercepted the party on the lie aux Dindes-a
small island in the Detroit River about six miles from Fort Pontchartrain still known as
Turkey Island-and killed the chief and two other Foxes. 5° Later that summer, a
Kickapoo warrior killed a Huron on the outskirts of Detroit. By the end of the year, war
parties had killed five Hurons and three French people in the vicinity of Detroit. 5 1 The
Foxes returned in the spring of 1714, sending "several small parties toward Detroit." In
September of that year, Vaudreuil reported that these parties had killed thirteen people
around the post. 52 Between the autumn of 1714 and the summer of 1715 alone, the Foxes
had made five raids around Detroit. 53
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These attacks inflicted a crippling psychological blow far beyond what the death
toll would suggest. Carrying on a guerrilla war and randomly attacking anyone who
strayed too far from their forts, the Foxes traumatized the peoples of Detroit. The
Hurons, who seemed to bear the brunt of these attacks, complained in 1713 that the Fox
incursions forced them to remain close to Fort Pontchartrain for "fear of having their
heads broken every time" they ventured too far from it. 54 Commandant La Forest
reported in October of the following year that Hurons and Ottawas remained sequestered
in their forts and that the frequent "alarms" of imminent attack disturbed the peace at the
place and that the Ottawas, Hurons, and Potawatomis remained confined to their forts. 55
The Governor of Montreal, Claude de Ramezay, likewise noticed that the peoples of
Detroit did not go hunting "on account of their well-grounded fear that the Reynards will
destroy them all, one after the other." 56 As one clearly rattled Huron headman lamented,
the Foxes were killing them "one by one. " 57
The continued Fox incursions only bound the peoples of Detroit closer. At the
very least, the continual threat of Fox or Kickapoo incursions dampened the rivalry which
had sometimes separated these nations. The nations of Detroit had enemies aplenty and
therefore saw no reason to alienate their allies and neighbors. Yet the conflict did more
than simply reduce quarrels among the peoples of Detroit. The violence provided a
shared experience of suffering and psychological torment, which encouraged the Miamis,
the French Marines, saw evidence of a Fox war party headed toward Detroit in the summer of 1715.
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Ottawas, Hurons, Ojibwas, and others to put aside their differences and to see each other
as allies rather than rivals. More importantly, the continual violence-and the
vulnerability it engendered-bred a deepening animosity toward the Foxes and their
allies. Constantly alert for potential attacks and confined to their forts, the peoples of
Detroit felt vulnerable and increasingly resented their Fox tormentors. Indeed their
resentment of the Foxes ripened into a genocidal hated of the Foxes and anyone who
dared side with them. 58 As their hatred of the Foxes grew, their resentment of one
another abated. The animosity toward the Foxes drew attention away from their old
grievances and rivalries and pulled them into ever greater harmony.
United in their hatred of the Foxes, the nations d' en haut once again joined forces
to destroy their common enemies. In 1713, eight hundred Ottawa, Huron, and Miami
warriors amassed to launch a raid against the Foxes and apparently inflicted a blow on
them. 59 In 1715, the French and their allies launched a formal campaign against the
Foxes, supported by several hundred French coureurs de bois. When an outbreak of
measles in the pays d'en haut and a poor harvest derailed the campaign, the nations d'en
haut took their own initiative. 60 The Hurons and Detroit Potawatomis, joined by a
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contingent of Canadian Iroquois warriors and a few French soldiers, traveled to the
lllinois village of Kaskaskia, where they invited the lllinois to attack a nearby Mascoutin
and Kickapoo camp. In late November of that year, the combined force attacked the
village and killed or captured 150 men and uncounted women and children. 61 Buoyed by
this success, the French launched another campaign in the summer of 1716. The
combined force defeated a Fox settlement near Green Bay and imposed rigorous
conditions on them. 62
Although the decisive victory in 1716 quieted the Foxes' aggressive stance, the
nations of Detroit remained wary and distrustful of the Green Bay nations. In August
1720, Alphonse de Tonty, now commandant at Detroit, reported that the Detroit
Potawatomis had agreed to attack the Foxes and that he thought the Miamis, lllinois, and
other nations would join them. 63 When Vaudreuil invited these nations to attack and
"destroy" the Foxes the following year, the Hurons, Ottawas, and Potawatomis agreed
that such a war was necessary. 64 Tonty reported in 1722 that the peoples of Detroit
intended to attack the Foxes in the spring of the following year and in fact the Saginaw
Ottawas did make a raid in 1723. 65 In 1728, the Ottawas, Potawatomis, Hurons and other
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nations joined a French expedition commanded by Lignery against the Foxes and
participated in other attacks on the Foxes and their allies in subsequent years. 66
The net effect of these conflicts, then, was a period of sustained cooperation and
relative harmony among the peoples of Detroit that lasted from 1712 until the early
1730s. During these years, the quarrels of the proceeding decades abated. The nations of
Detroit seemed to forget, or at least subordinated, their old animosities. Hatred of the
Foxes washed clean the blood spilled in 1706 and following years. Groups which had
previously promised the destruction of their neighbors now sent their young men in
common raiding parties against the Foxes, their allies, and Onontio's enemies to the
south. In the face of intimidating and foreign enemies, the nations reaffirmed their old
friendships. As Ramezay noted in the aftermath of the 1716 Fox defeat, the Ottawas and
other nations d' en haut had been "peaceably disposed" and· "their relations with each
other have been amicable." 67
Within months of Ramezay' s observation, however, the Ottawas had killed the
Iroquois-Miami family. Even while conflict with the Foxes healed the wounds opened in
1706 and drew the nations of Detroit in closer harmony, other forces continued to reopen
them. Amidst this Pax Vulpinae, the nations of Detroit and their neighbors in the region
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continued to wage a desperate contest to establish commercial and strategic prominence
begun in the previous decade. Each nation tried, with whatever resources they could
muster, to shape the region in their interests, often at the expense of their neighbors.

II. The Iroquois of the North: The Anishinaabe Alliance
The violence on the Maumee in 1717 was part of an Anishinaabe response to
what they perceived to be a serious challenge to their long-held dominance in the region:
the southern alliance. Connected by ties of real and fictive kinship and united by a
common language and culture, the Anishinaabe peoples-the various Ottawa, Ojibwa,
and Potawatomi communities that lived throughout the region-formed a powerful
commercial and diplomatic network which had allowed them to dominate the region
since at least the fall of Huronia. As one historian has put it, the Anishinaabe were the
"dominant people" in the region during the eighteenth century. 68 Yet the emergence of
the southern alliance had threatened to undermine Ottawa commercial and diplomatic
dominance in the region by creating a rival network which explicitly excluded the
Ottawas and their Anishinaabe partners. If successful, the Miami-Iroquois-Huron
configuration could provide a serious military and commercial threat to the
Anishinaabe. 69 In response to this threat, the Anishinaabe mounted a coordinated effort
to maintain control of the region. This section explores how the Anishinaabe, united by
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culture and ties of real and fictive kinship, cooperated to dominate the pays d' en haut.
The following section narrates their joint response to the threat raised by the southern
alliance between 1704 and 1717.
Shortly before the fall of New France in 1760, an anonymous British official
compiled a rough census of the peoples occupying the pays d' en haut. Referring to the
"Ottawas, Chepaways [Ojibwas], Putuvatimies [Potawatomis], Melkomineys, or
Shockeys," he suggested that the "Nations are in confederacy somewhat like the Six
Nations" Iroquois. 70 While the analogy exaggerates the formality of the Anishinaabe
alliance-or "Ottawa Confederacy" as other British officials sometimes called it-the
official nonetheless recognized that the Anishinaabe people had formed a powerful
strategic and commercial alliance. 71 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
Anishinaabe peoples had formed a loose coalition of culturally similar, interrelated, and
diplomatically allied peoples which their descents would later call the "Three Fires." 72
This Anishinaabe network allowed goods, information, and people to flow easily
throughout the region from Anishinaabe settlements at Sault Ste. Marie, Manitoulin
Island, Michilimackinac, Saginaw Bay, the St. Joseph River, Green Bay, and Detroit.
The "Three Fires" also formed an intimidating military alliance which worked together to
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fight external threats, such as the Dakotas, Iroquois, Foxes, and, in the eighteenth
century, the southern alliance. This section argues that the Anishinaabe alliance was built
on a common Anishinaabe cultural tradition, nourished and sustained through
intermarriage between peoples and frequent travel between villages, and expressed in
strategic cooperation and trade. This cooperation allowed the Anishinaabe people to
dominate affairs in the pays d' en haut.
As it had for the Hurons and Iroquois, a common cultural tradition served as the
basis for the relationship between the Anishinaabe peoples. Nineteenth century accounts
even suggest that, by that time at least, the Anishinaabe peoples claimed a common
ancestral people. Just as they did among the Iroquois in the seventeenth century, this
shared mythic past created a sense of exclusive kinship and familiarity. 73 The
Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and Ottawas moreover spoke very similar Algonquian dialects,
which both facilitated communication between them and confirmed their sense of
commonality. 74 James Smith, a British colonist captured by Kahnawake Iroquois,
pronounced the Ottawa and Ojibwa dialects "nearly the same." 75 Indeed, the languages
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were closely related enough that the French Crown only maintained one Algonquian.
spe aki ng mterpreter
at the post. 76

In addition to language, the Anishinaabe peoples shared other cultural traditions.
In 1718 Jacques Charles Sabrevois, Sieur de Bleury, the commandant at Detroit, asserted

that the Mississauga Ojibwas' "manners are the same" as the Ottawas. 77 The Ottawas,
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas were so similar, in fact, that Charles Stuart, an AngloAmerican colonist taken to Detroit by his Huron captors, could not differentiate between
the Anishinaabeg he met at the post. Stuart berated Lewis Evans's influential "General
map of the middle British colonies in America," for listing the "Poutewatamis,"
"Outawas," and "Sississogaes [Mississaugas]" separately. 78 These were not distinct
nations, Stuart insisted, but only "different Names given to the Same Nation." He
likewise referred to the Potawatomi village at Detroit as "an Outotoway Town." 79 Given
the close proximity in language and culture, Stuart confused the different peoples and
called them all "Outotoway." As they had among the Hurons and Iroquois, these
common bonds of culture facilitated, although they did not dictate, diplomatic
cooperation between these peoples.
If this common cultural tradition served as a basis for cooperation, the exogamous
marriage between different Anishinaabe peoples facilitated cooperation between these
peoples. When the Shawnees and Delawares threatened the Potawatomis in 1771, for
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example, the Potawatomis gave the Ottawas a wampum belt asking for safe harbor for
their women and children. As the Potawatomi put it, the Ottawas and Ojibwas were "all
Relations, being intermarry' d with one another." 80 Such unions, of course, created
diplomatic and personal bonds between the peoples, and created webs of loyalty and
kinship which enhanced the connections between peoples. Their relations were never
distant strategic alliances between peoples, but real, affective bonds connecting peoples. 81
These connections of loyalty and marriage, then, knit the Anishinaabe peoples
together into a regional alliance. In many important respects, the Anishinaabe alliance
resembled Jon Parmenter's description of the Iroquois League in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Like the Iroquois League, the Anishinaabe recognized a common
culture, perhaps one derived from a common ancestor, and spoke mutually
comprehensible languages. Exogamous marriage between individuals from different
communities, moreover, fostered loyalty and kinship networks that extended past the
village and wove the villages together. These connections created what Parmenter,
referring to the Iroquois communities, calls a "geography of solidarity" which connected
Anishinaabe across a wide swath of the Great Lakes. 82 Anishinaabe people easily moved
through an Anishinaabe social world which stretched from Sault Ste.-Marie and other
Ojibwa settlements in Lake Superior, down to Saginaw Bay, Detroit, Toronto, and west
to the St. Joseph River and Green Bay. These connections allowed goods and
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information to pass quickly through the region, and allowed the peoples to pursue
commercial and military strategies in their common interest. Anishinaabe leaders
constantly met together to discuss joint issues, and Anishinaabe warriors left Detroit in
joint war parties destined for the Flatheads, Foxes, or other enemies. The Ottawas, for
example, helped the Sauteur Ojibwas fight the Dakotas in the early eighteenth century
and sought to revenge the Miami attack on their Mississauga Ojibwa "comrades" in
1706. 83 Capable of fielding a joint army of nearly twelve hundred warriors by the 1750,
the Anishinaabe alliance could easily face any challenge to its authority. 84 By these
means, the Anishinaabe established a powerful grip on the region, one that they were
loath to surrender the Hurons, Miamis, and Iroquois.
Yet to say that the Anishinaabe cooperated and frequently intermarried is not to
suggest that the nations abandoned their separate identities in favor of a pan-Anishinaabe
one, any more than the Senecas or Mohawks jettisoned their autonomy by joining the
Iroquois Confederacy. Indeed the Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Ottawas maintained
separate villages at Detroit, indicating a spatial and psychological boundary between the
peoples. These villages squared off against one another on the lacrosse field; as
Sabrevois observed they "play village against village, the [Potawatomi] against the
[Ottawas] or the Hurons." 85 While it might be facile to liken such competition to an
inter-city rivalry between two sports teams, the practice does suggest that Anishinaabe
attributed meaning to the differences separating them.
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More seriously, two eerily similar Ottawa attacks on the Potawatomis at St.
Joseph separated by twenty years reveal much about relations among Anishinaabe
communities. In 1734 a Saginaw Ottawa party encountered and murdered two
Potawatomi men and a woman, and, as the commandant at St. Joseph reported, the
Potawatomis were "determined to Avenge their deaths on the OutaBacs." 86 Twenty years
later, after another Ottawa party killed a Potawatomi man and woman, the French learned
that the Ottawas and Ojibwas from Saginaw were planning "to make war on the
Potawatomis of the St. Joseph River." 87 That such conflict between Anishinaabe peoples
was rare and easily resolved without bloodshed tells us much about the relationship
among those groups. That it could happen at all tells us more. The Anishinaabe, bound
by close cultural and kinship ties, coordinated their movements and deployed a
geographic strategy which ensured Anishinaabe dominance in the pays d' en haut and
influence far beyond. Yet, as the Ottawas' willingness to attack the Potawatomis
demonstrates, these separate Anishinaabe peoples continued to act with a great deal of
autonomy. This, then, was the central dynamic of the Anishinaabe alliance-no matter
how much they cooperated or how often they married one another, they continued to
view each other as closely related, but ultimately different peoples.
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III. The Anishinaabe Response
Their alliance had allowed the Anishinaabe people to dominate affairs in the
Great Lakes Region, yet the Huron-Iroquois-Miami configuration threat posed a serious
challenge to that dominance. That alliance had, after all, explicitly excluded the Ottawas
and their Anishinaabe partners. Cheanonvouzon had snubbed his Ottawa rivals in 1702
and 1708 by visiting Albany with the Miamis, and actively sought to distance the
Ottawas from the Iroquois and their British partners. 88 Cheanonvouzon had positioned
the southern alliance as an explicit rival to the Anishinaabe.
Not only would an alliance of Miamis, Iroquois, and Hurons rival the military
might of the Anishinaabe, it would also threaten their commercial monopoly on the
region. Since the fall of Huronia, the Ottawas had worked carefully to dominate the trade
of the region. In addition to strengthening ties with the Anishinaabe neighbors, many
Ottawas had married into French mercantile families, who recognized the Ottawas'
connections. 89 They therefore stood to lose much from the southern alliance. If
successful, the Miami-Iroquois-Huron configuration promised to reorient the political
landscape of the pays d' en haut away from Michilimackinac and from Anishinaabe
hegemony toward the south. 90 Detroit-positioned much closer to the entrep6ts of Fort
St. Joseph, home of the Miamis and Potawatomis, as well as the Iroquois trading posts in
Lake Ontario, and Albany itself-would slowly displace or at least compete with
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Michilimackinac (see figure 7). In turn, the Miamis and Hurons would no longer play
second fiddle to the Ottawas. To be sure, the competing alliance would never displace
the Ottawas entirely; the French demanded the high-quality furs only found in northern
climes. Yet the Miami and Huron ascendency would erode the Ottawas' profound
influence in the region.
In order to undermine the southern alliance, the Anishinaabeg, led by the Ottawas,
pursued an evolving geopolitical strategy. The Ottawas first sought, through diplomatic
maneuvering, to disrupt the alliance by fostering animosity between the Hurons and
Senecas in 1704. When this failed, the Ottawas hoped that they might subvert the
relationship by forging their own ties with the Senecas, as well as with the other four
Iroquois nations and the British in 1708. Blunted by a continuing hostility between
Ottawas and Senecas, the Ottawas finally sought to circumvent the southern alliance
altogether. Calling upon their Anishinaabe allies, a group of Ojibwas whom they called
the Mississaugas, for help, they tried to establish their own relationship with the British
and hence mitigate the influence of the Hurons and Miamis. The Mississaugas, who
maintained villages both at Detroit and near the Iroquois outposts on Lake Ontario,
seemed perfectly poised to help their Ottawa allies form their own trading alliance with
the British. After this attempt, too, failed, the Ottawas took their revenge on the hapless
Iroquois and Miami couple in 1717. The Ottawas' unwillingness to acquiesce their
control over the region to their Huron and Miami neighbors, the lengths to which they
were prepared to blunt those nations' influence, and especially their willingness to attack
their erstwhile partners in 1717, shows the level of animosity which separated the peoples
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of the pays d' en haut. The Ottawas seemed willing to sacrifice solidarity in the face of
the Fox threat if it meant retaining their dominance of the region.
The Ottawas first tried to disrupt the southern alliance. They first struck in 1704.
Distressed by the Huron-Miami trip to Albany two years earlier, they hoped to poison the
nascent relationship. Accordingly, some Ottawas from Michilimackinac and Detroit
accompanied the Hurons and Miamis to Seneca territory in August, where they offered
condolences for recent Wea attacks on the Iroquois. 91 Once they arrived in Iroquoia,
however, the Ottawa warriors abruptly attacked the Senecas and Onondagas "without
giving any reason for doing so" and took six Iroquois prisoners. 92 They took these
captives first to Detroit, where they ostentatiously paraded them for all the nations to see
and then distributed the prisoners to their allies. 93 The Ottawas apparently hoped that the
Iroquois would blame the Hurons and Miamis for the attack and judge them guilty by
association with the Ottawas. According to Lamothe Cadillac, the Ottawas even planted
a distinctive Huron club on a slain Iroquois warrior. 94 Once the Five Nations realized the
Hurons' apparent betrayal, the Ottawas surmised, the emerging alliance would collapse. 95
At the same time, the Ottawa leader identified only as Tyhadagro, sent a representative to
Albany, escorted Mohawks, to meet with the English and Dutch traders and find a "good
91
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Market" for the furs. 96 By simultaneously courting the English and Iroquois and framing
the Hurons, the Ottawas hoped to disrupt the southern alliance and forge their own
connections to the Iroquois and English.
Far from sundering the Hurons and Miamis from the Iroquois, however, the
Ottawas' 1704 attack only provoked the Iroquois wrath against the Ottawas. The
Iroquois blamed the Ottawas, and not the Hurons, for their perfidy and for breaking the
terms of the Great Peace. 97 Traveling to Montreal in the fall of that year, the Senecas and
Onondagas denounced the Ottawas' aggression and only grudgingly agreed to defer their
revenge. 98 That winter the Senecas caught and killed an Ottawa warrior whom they
found lurking near Cataroquoi. 99 In late May 1706, the Senecas informed colonial
officials in Albany that some of the "farr Indians [e.g. the Ottawas] have taken up the
hatchet against the 5 Nations" and that the confederacy planned to meet in Onondaga to
discuss the situation. 100 Afraid of the resumption of war with the Iroquois, Vaudreuil
sought to reconcile the Ottawas and Iroquois. He convinced the Ottawas to "replace" the
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dead Iroquois warriors with captives, which they did in the summer of 1706. 101 Yet the
Ottawa attack on Detroit that summer shattered the fragile peace. 102 The Senecas visited
V audreuil in August and demanded justice for their offended Miami and Huron allies.
Huffing that it was the Ottawas' "usual manner" to attack without reason, the Five
Nations bluntly informed Vaudreuil that they planned to attack the Ottawas and that they
would not be dissuaded. 103 A delegation of Senecas also traveled to Detroit, where they
joined with the Hurons and Miamis in demanding vengeance. Assembled together at
Detroit, the Huron, Miami, and Seneca allies agreed that "We will not have peace [with
the Ottawas]; that must not be spoken of." 104 When Lamothe Cadillac pardoned Mekoua
the following year, the Iroquois apparently conspired with the Miamis and Hurons to
attack the Ottawas and to murder Lamothe Cadillac. 105
Having catastrophically failed to estrange the Iroquois from the Miamis and the
Hurons, the Ottawas revisited their strategy. Their efforts to estrange the Miamis and
Hurons from the Iroquois had only strengthened that southern bond. The Ottawas
101
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decided that, if they could not destroy that alliance, perhaps they could supersede it by
creating their own, separate relationship with the Iroquois and British. Beginning in
1708, they tried to forge their own relationship with the Iroquois, concluding a peace with
the Five Nations and visiting Albany in 1711. Despite their best efforts and constant
French hand-wringing about the possibility of an Ottawa-Iroquois trade, lingering
animosity between the Ottawas and the Iroquois frustrated Ottawa attempts to establish a
relationship with the Iroquois and British like that enjoyed by the Hurons and Miamis. 106
In hopes of forming their own separate peace with the Five Nations, the Ottawas
sent messengers to the Senecas in August 1708 and asked them to clear the "Path that
was formerly opened to them down to Albany" through Seneca country. 107 The
following year the Ottawas and Senecas agreed to purge "all past evil thoughts" and to
unite in a "fast & everlasting peace." In 1710, the Ottawas ratified this peace with the
Senecas and with the other four Iroquois nations assembled at Onondaga and proceeded
to Albany where they met with British officials and merchants. The Ottawas promised to
visit Albany again the following year, which they might have done. 108
The "everlasting Peace" lasted scarcely the year. Despite their diplomatic
overtures to the Ottawas, many Iroquois still had substantial misgivings about their new
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allies. The Ottawas had, after all, attacked the Iroquois at Cataroquoi without cause and
had subsequently attacked the Miamis and Hurons. As the Iroquois bitterly observed, the
untrustworthy Ottawas did not customarily speak from the "bottom of their hearts," but
from other, less pleasant, quarters. 109 Aware of this lingering animosity, indeed, British
officials prohibited the Iroquois from drinking rum at the 1710 conference, lest they
attack the Ottawa delegates in a drunken rage. 110 In August 1710, a scant two months
after the peace negotiations at Onondaga, Seneca and Onondaga representatives
complained to Vaudreuil about the Ottawas. The Ottawas had attacked them several
times since the Great Peace in 1701, including the unprovoked attack in 1704 and the
1706 conflict. Until now, the Iroquois had followed Vaudreuil' s will and postponed their
vengeance, but now they demanded justice. The Great Peace had declared, after all, that
if any nation attack another and fail to make amends, then the others would unite to
punish the offenders. 111
In January 1711, representatives of all Five Nations told the Albany
Commissioners much the same thing. The Ottawas had "at several Times murdered
sundry of their People_ & offered them repeated Insults." They had decided, accordingly,
to "take Revenge" against the Ottawas. 112 Regardless of French and British opposition,
the Iroquois proceeded with their preparations. Either that year or the following, the
Senecas reportedly invited the Weas to join an Iroquois attack on Detroit and explicitly
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warned them not to tell the French or the Hurons about the plans. 113 In the summer of
1712, rumor had it that the Five Nations, led by the Onondaga leader Teganissorens,
' . 114
p1anned an attack on D etrmt

Although the Iroquois' plans never came to fruition, thanks to intervention from
the French, British, and ultimately the Senecas, the threat of war nonetheless slammed
shut the symbolic path that the Ottawas and the Iroquois had opened between them. The
following year, Paul Marest, the Jesuit missionary at Michillimackinac, reported that the
Ottawas were "menaced" by the Iroquois and therefore dared not attack the Foxes. 115
And, of course, the Ottawas suspected Iroquois and British collaboration with the Foxes.
In 1714, a Detroit Ottawa delegation confronted the Senecas and demanded to know why

a group of Foxes, Mascoutins, and Kickapoos had visited Seneca early that year,
suggesting they still suspected collusion between the Iroquois and the Green Bay
nations. 116 The mutual suspicion guaranteed, at least for the short term, that the Hurons
and Miamis would continue to enjoy access to the Iroquois and the British, and that the
Ottawas would not. The Ottawas had b~en on the verge of superseding the southern
alliance, but their long and problematic history with the Five Nations ultimately scuttled
their detente. No matter how much the French might fear it, the Ottawa-Iroquois alliance
remained incomplete.
113
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Early in 1710, representatives had complained both to the English and the French
that the "Wagenhaes"-the Iroquois name for the Ottawas-had frequently murdered
their people and that the Five Nations were "determined to take Revenge" against
them. 117 Some Senecas and Onondagas confirmed this to Vaudreuil in 1710,
complaining that the Ottawas had repeatedly attacked them since 1701 and that they
would no longer defer their vengeance. They also reported trouble with the Potawatomis,
the Ottawas' Anishinaabe allies. 118 In the summer of 1712 the Senecas reported that the
Onondaga headman, Teganissorens, had spent the previous winter plotting an attack on
Detroit and had invited the other four nations to join him. 119 Moreover, Vaudreuil
learned of an anticipated British invasion of New France in 1711 and had called all the
nations d'en haut to protect Montreal from invasion, which added to the sense of alarm
and gave credence to the rumor that the Foxes were in league with the British. 120
The Ottawas had thus tried in 1704 to alienate the Iroquois and Hurons and in
1711 to forge their own alliance with the Five Nations and failed on both accounts. Now,
they and the Potawatomis looked to their old friends and fellow Anishinaabe people, the
Mississaugas, for help. Since the tum of the century, the Mississaugas, who had
established villages at Detroit as well as the Iroquois entrep6ts of Niagara and

117

Peter Wraxall, An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs, 80-84.
The Iroquois were also at odds with the Potawatomis who had recently attacked them. "Paroles des
Tsonnontuans et Onontagues ... et Reponse de Vaudreuil," 8 Aug. 1710, CAOM, C11A, vol. 31, fols. 99100v.
119
Vaudreuil au ministre, 6 Nov. 1712, in ibid., vol. 33, fols. 57-58; "Resume des lettres de Vaudreuil au
ministre," in ibid., vol. 123, fols. 24-28.
120
"Memorandum to Serve as Instructions from the Marquis de Vaudreuil to the Officers and Voyageurs
Despatched to Bring Down to Montreal the Savages of the Upper Country," 10 March 1711, MPHSCR,
33:497.
118

124

Cataroquoi, had developed powerful economic ties with the Iroquois and the British. 121
The Ottawas therefore hoped that their old allies might help them finally make a
meaningful and sustained partnership with the Iroquois and, in the process, disrupt the
southern alliance. Although the Mississaugas enthusiastically cooperated and the
Ottawas nearly reached Albany in 1717, however, their attempts failed yet again, thanks
to an unfortunate twist of fate. This latest disappointment apparently motivated the
Ottawa warriors to attack and kill the Iroquois/Miami family later that summer.
In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Mississaugas deployed a
sophisticated geographic and commercial strategy. By maintaining villages both on Lake
Ontario and at Detroit, they insinuated themselves as crucial intermediaries in the region.
They began by establishing settlements near the Iroquois on Lake 9ntario. Having
fought viciously to expel the Iroquois from the northern shore of the lake during the
seventeenth century, the Mississauags settled at the key Iroquois trading posts in the pays
d'en haut-Cataroquoi (the site of the French post, Fort Frontenac), at the eastern
entrance to Lake Ontario, and Niagara, at the western terminus of the lake-as well as
smaller settlements (see figure 9). 122 Having settled at Niagara and Cataroquoi, the
Mississaugas established another settlement near Detroit, just north of Lake St. Clair,
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with other Ojibwa groups in the early eighteenth century. 123 From Lake St. Clair, the
Mississaugas could easily and quickly ascend the river which the French referred to as
the Duluth, portage to the Grand (Thames) River, and continue down to the vicinity of
Toronto.
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With villages both at Detroit and on Lake Ontario, the Mississaugas positioned
themselves as essential couriers carrying furs from the Upper Great Lakes to Albany and
British products (especially Caribbean rum) to Detroit. Not only did they trade with the
Iroquois who lived in Lake Ontario, but, more troubling to the French, the Mississaugas
actually went to Albany itself, where they traded their furs for British goods and
particularly Caribbean rum. The Commissioners of Trade in Albany reported that the
headman Kaqucka and four others of the "Mesasaga Nation" had arrived in May 1709.
Kaqucka framed his visit as a business trip, telling the Commissioners of Indian Affairs
that he was seeking "the best Markett" for his furs. He promised that, if the rates at

Figure 9: Major
settlements in Lakes
Ontario and Erie.
The Mississaugas
occupied the crucial
entrances to Lake
Ontario, Niagara in
the west and
Cataroquoi, site of
Fort Frontenac, in the
east.

123

Cadillac to the Minister, 31 Aug. 1703, MPHSCR, 33:162; [Sabrevois], Memoir on the Indians between
Lake Erie and the Mississippi [1718], in WHC, 16:370; Charlevoix, Journal, 409-10.
124
The Mississaugas could also use the Thames River to gain access to Lake Huron (Joseph-Gaspard
Chaussegros de Lery, "Journal de la Campagne que le sr de Lery," 1749, RAPQ, 7:335, 339-40).

126

Albany pleased him, more of his people would return there. When the delegation left two
weeks later, the commissioners gave the Mississaugas a wampum belt "to come to
Albany & Trade." 125
The Mississaugas, in tum, traded British goods to their neighbors at Detroit. As
early as 1708, Joncaire, a French officer stationed at Niagara, complained that the
Mississaugas of Detroit frequently brought their pelts to the Iroquois, who proceeded to
trade these to the Albany merchants. 126 That the Detroit Mississaugas-those from Lake
St. Clair-regularly traded in Lake Ontario suggests that the Mississaugas settled at
Detroit cooperated with those living at Niagara and Cataroquoi to shuttle goods between
Detroit and Albany. The Albany Commissioners confirmed in 1711 that the
Mississaugas "from the Country about Tuchsakrondie," or Detroit, came to Albany to
trade. 127 That year Commandant La Forest identified the Mississaugas, along with the
Hurons and Iroquois, as purveyors of British goods at Detroit. 128 In 1714 Vaudreuil and
Intendant Michel Begon de la Picardiere claimed that the Mississaugas, unable to obtain
French brandy, had traded all their beaver pelts to the British for rum. 129 The following
year, Claude de Ramezay, governor of Montreal and acting governor-general,
complained that Mississaugas and Amikwas-another Ojibwa people-traded with the
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Iroquois when they ventured into Lake Erie to hunt. When Ramezay confronted them
about trading with the British, the Mississaugas remained defiant. They told him that
they preferred trading with the French at Frontenac to trading with the British, but that
the British offered them better rates and, significantly, provided them with sufficient
liquor. 130 Three years later, the commandant of Detroit, reported that the Mississauga
man, Itacougik, had brought some of this liquor to his neighbors at the post.
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Calling upon their Anishinaabe allies, the Ottawas hoped to turn the
Mississaugas' position and relationship with the Iroquois to their advantage. The
Ottawas living at Michilimackinac and Manitoulin Island had long lived near and traded
with the Mississaugas living northwest of Lake Huron and the Sauteurs, Ojibwas living at
Sault Ste. Marie on Lake Superior. The groups continued that alliance at Detroit, both
establishing villages near the post. The Ottawas acknowledged their close association
with the Mississaugas in 1706 when they complained of the Miami attacks on their
Ojibwa "comrades" in 1704 and 1705. 132 After the 1706 clash, the Mississaugas aided
the bloodied Ottawa refugees and considered counterattacking the Miamis and Hurons. 133
The Ottawas' aggressive stance toward the Foxes had also been premised on that nation's
conflict with the Ojibwas. 134
Shortly after the Ottawa-Iroquois truce collapsed, then, the Ottawas and
Mississaugas collaborated to open a trading network with the Iroquois and the British.
The Mississaugas, at the prompting of the British, had actually been endeavoring to do
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this for some time. Hoping to establish themselves as intermediaries between the
Iroquois and the Ottawas, the Mississaugas had frequently invited the Ottawas to trade
with the British and Iroquois. As early as 1711, they gave the Ottawas four belts on
behalf of the British, inviting them to trade with the Iroquois and British. 135 Three years
later, Ramezay alleged that the British had sent messages and gifts to the Ottawas
through their "emissary," a Mississauga man named Itacougik. 136 The British had even
floated the idea of establishing a trading post at the Mississauga settlement on Lake
Ontario in order to trade more directly with the Ottawas and other Anishinaabeg. 137
Itacougik returned to Detroit again in 1716 with a shipment of rum and a message for the
Ottawas and Potawatomis living at the post. Distributing some wampum belts, the
Mississauga go-between told his Anishinaabe cousins that they were "very foolish to
adhere to the French, that they rob them." The British, in contrast, offered cheap trade
goods, would accept all of their furs, and would grant them liquor in abundance. The
Mississaugas' invitation found a willing reception.
The Ottawas had tried and failed to establish a relationship with the Iroquois for
years. The Mississuagas now offered them an opportunity to finally succeed. Holding
secret councils during the autumn and winter of 1716 and 1717, the Ottawas and
Potawatomis decided to try yet again to establish a relationship with the Iroquois. In
order to accomplish their goals, the Ottawas had turned to their longtime allies and
Anishinaabe cousins. Moreover, they involved the third member of the triple alliance,
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the Potawatomis, but not the Hurons, in the project. 138 In doing so, the Ottawas explicitly
acknowledged the ties which connected the Anishinaabe peoples and the growing gulf
between the Anishinaabe and the Hurons, who had tried to and partially succeeded in
establishing a rival alliance.
Yet this attempt, like the previous ones, was ill-fated. A convoy of seventeen
Detroit and Saginaw Ottawa and Potawatomi canoes left Detroit in the spring of 1717
headed for Albany. Serendipitously for the French, the would-be traders made it no
further than Lake Ontario, where they met Alphonse de Tonty, the new commandant of
Detroit, on his way to assume command of the post. Alarmed that the Ottawas and
Potawatomis might take their furs to Albany, the officer held a series of councils. He
offered sixty blankets at the bargain price of five beaver pelts per blanket-the price they
fetched at Albany-and other presents to dissuade the Ottawas and Potawatomis from
continuing to New York. At length, the convoy agreed and some returned to Detroit with
the commandant while others continued to Montreal to do more trading and to speak with
the governor. 139
Once again the Ottawas had tried to establish their own ties with the Iroquois and
British and once again their attempts had failed miserably. They would have to continue
trading with Mississauga and Iroquois middlemen for British goods and liquor. More
importantly, they had failed to split or outmaneuver the southern alliance. The Miamis
and Hurons maintained good relations with the Iroquois and continued to trade with
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them. This latest failure clearly incensed the Ottawas. They had tried several times to
gain access to the British but such an alliance remained out of their reach, hampered by
poor relations with the Iroquois and by determined French opposition. The Ottawas
could only sit by quietly while the Hurons and Miamis progressively reoriented the
region toward the Iroquois and Albany. The Ottawas feared that they would lose their
coveted dominance in the region.
If the Ottawas repeatedly failed to cultivate ties to the Iroquois and the British, the
Miamis had no such problem. 140 After the Hurons proctored an alliance between the
Iroquois and Miamis, the Miamis and Iroquois had formed an important commercial
partnership. In 1707, in fact, the St. Joseph River Miamis moved closer to the Iroquois,
establishing a village at the portage of the Maumee River. 141 Uneasy about the Miamis'
physical and diplomatic proximity to the Iroquois, the Mississaugas attacked some
Miamis in 1711, as the Mississaugas returned from trading with the British. 142 This
rivalry actually may explain the Miami attacks on the Mississaugas going back to 1704.
Noting that the Miamis had "long wished" to trade with the British, Gov. Vaudreuil sent
Franc;ois-Marie Bissot de Vinsenne (Vincennes) in 1711 to prevent them from doing so.
Three years later, Dubuisson, still commanding at Detroit, again sent a Huron delegation
to the Miamis to prevent them from concluding an "alliance that they would like to make
140
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with the English and the Savages, their friends." 143 Despite these precautions, however,
the French could not prevent the Miamis and Iroquois from forming an alliance or from
trading together. Senecas allegedly met with the Weas and Miamis in 1713 and invited
them to attack Detroit with them. 144 In 1715, the Miamis, as well as the Weas and
illinois, reportedly met with traders from North Carolina. 145 The following year, just
months before the Ottawa warriors attacked and killed the Miami-Iroquois family, the
Iroquois had secretly sent the Miamis and Weas wampum belts inviting them to trade at a
new post on the Wabash River. 146 These embassies eventually bore fruit for the Iroquois
and British. In 1717, Tonty reported that "an Iroquois man and a miami man" had
brought 200 pots of rum to Detroit "from the English," suggesting the maturation of a
powerful Miami-Iroquois alliance. 147 In 1719, moreover, Iroquois ambassadors escorted
between eight and ten Miami canoes to Albany, and Vaudreuil conceded that the Miamis
were "very much under the influence of the English and Iroquois." 148 By 1721,
Vaudreuil averred that the Iroquois traveled to the Maumee settlement "almost every
year" to trade and to invite them to go to Albany and to new British trading posts in the
Ohio Valley. 149
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The Miamis' reported discussions with the Iroquois and British in 1716 coincided
with the Ottawas' latest failure to reach Albany themselves. This unhappy concurrence
meant disaster for the hapless Iroquois-Miami family. The family, after all, represented
the kind of relationship that the Ottawas had long coveted and repeatedly failed to
create-a commercial alliance with the Iroquois and thereby with the British. Not only
did the warriors resent the Miamis' success in trading with the Iroquois and British, but
they also feared what that relationship might ultimately mean for their position in the
pays d' en haut. The warriors might have hoped that the attack would have strained
relations between the Iroquois and Miamis, disrupting their intimacy. Iroquois custom
may have held the Miamis liable for the death, since it occurred at their village. 150 More
likely, however, the Ottawas acted as they did simply out of anger. They had launched
their attack, after all, right after the botched attempt to reach Albany earlier that summer.
The murder-rather than enslavement-of the couples' children also bespeaks an
irrational rage directed at their parents' nations and the political and sexual intimacy that
produced them. No matter how much fear and hatred of the Foxes pulled the nations
together, their competition for ascendency in the pays d'en haut pushed the Miamis,
Ottawas, and other nations apart.

Conclusion
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Although the Miamis, Ottawas, and Hurons made a "good peace" in September
1717, the nations did not thereby stop competing for commercial or political ascendency.
Indeed, events in the pays d' en haut made the British and Iroquois even more attractive.
The peoples of Detroit found the prices there poor and the conduct of the commandants
disrespectful. During his tenure as commandant, Jacques-Charles de Sabrevois, Sieur de
Bleurry, had disregarded commercial and diplomatic protocol by refusing to treat the
local headmen to feasts. 151 Tonty proved little better than his predecessor. 152 The Hurons
later confided that they could no longer abide Tonty and demanded that the new
governor, the Marquis de Beauharnois, relieve the man of his command. 153 Both
Sabrevois and Tonty, furthermore, had restricted the natives' access to French brandy. 154
Impelled by these forces, the Ottawas, now more determined than ever, finally
"broke thro" the French obstacles and reached Albany in the early 1720s. The Albany
Commissioners of Indian Affairs reported that sixteen "Ottowawa Indians" reached the
post in 1722. 155 In 1723, a much larger convoy of eighty Ottawa, Potawatomi, and even
Huron traders, along with their wives and children, finally arrived in Albany. Speaking
for the convoy, Sagima told the British that the inability of the French to provide
adequate goods prompted him to come to Albany. If the British would give them "goods
cheape," the Ottawas would forsake their French allies and even consider joining the
vaunted Covenant Chain. The British happily consented and sent them back to Detroit
151

Paroles des outa8as du saguinan, et des poute8atarnis, [1717], CAOM, C11A, vol. 38, fols. 172-75.
Sabrevois to Cadillac, [ca. 1718], MPHSCR, 33:694.
153
"Ordonnance du gouverneur Beauharnois accedant a la demande des Hurons de retablir la liberte du
commerce a Detroit," 21 Aug. 1727, CAOM, C11A, vol. 48, fol. 122; "Paroles des Hurons de Detroit," 9
Aug. 1727, in Ibid., vol. 34, fols. 49-51.
154
Louvigny au conseil, 15 Oct. 1720, Ibid., vol. 41, vols. 238-240; Vaudreuil et Begon au conseil, 26 Oct.
1720, in ibid.,vol. 41, fol. 19v; Charlevoix, Journal, 381-82.
155
Wraxall, Indian Affairs, 136, 140.
152

134

laden with twenty-six gallons of rum among other goods. 156 After the 1724 assembly, the
Ottawas returned to Albany. During a trip to Iroquois country in 1725, Charles le Moyne
de Longueil, a French captain, counted a hundred canoes of various nations, including the
Ottawas and Mississaugas, either destined for or returning from trading with the
British. 157 Vaudreuil owned that the Ottawas appeared to be "as much in the interest of
the English and Iroquois as they appear to be in ours." 158 After 1727, the Ottawas also
frequently traded with the British at the new trading post south of Lake Ontario,
Oswego. 159 At long last the Ottawas had forged a commercial relationship with the
Iroquois and the British. They could, with little French interference, trade for scarlet
woolens, rum, and other necessities. In some measure, the Ottawas had circumvented the
southern alliance. Yet if the Ottawas had finally gained access to the British, they had
not dismantled the Huron-Miami-Iroquois alliance that had long troubled them.
Although some Hurons had accompanied Sagima' s delegation in 1723, the Hurons
arrived again the following two years without the Ottawas. 160 The Hurons and Iroquois
continued to collaborate through the next four decades.
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This narrative of competition and strife, in the midst of a period of common
alarm, provides insight into the political and cultural tapestry of the pays d'en haut.
Since the seventeenth century, tremendous pressures had threatened to obliterate the
distinct ethnic communities in the region and to refashion them into one large Frenchallied polity. In many respects they appeared to have done so. They had cooperated
during the long struggle against the Five Nations throughout the latter half of the
seventeenth century. When those struggles ended in 1701, these peoples pledged to
subordinate their individual interests to the interests of the whole, to bring their disputes
to Onontio to mediate, and to remain in harmony. In subsequent years they (sometimes)
heeded these requests, seeking out the governor's guidance to resolve their quarrels.
Moreover, they addressed each other as "brothers" and often professed to share a "single
body." In many ways, they seem to have substituted their individual identities for a
larger regional "French" one.
In 1717, however, the nations d' en haut did not act like "French" Indians, but as
members of individual communities pursuing distinct and explicitly incompatible goals.
Even in the face of a determined external threat, they responded, not by collapsing into an
undifferentiated mass, or by abandoning their ethnic distinction, or even by suppressing
their animosity for one another any longer than absolutely necessary. Instead they
continued to vie for advantage even when that competition might threaten their collective
safety against a common foe. That they did so suggests that they continued to define
themselves as members of separate and competing ethnic groups. This recognition goes a
long way to explaining the communities' behavior. Seeing themselves as members of
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distinct nations, they sought to advance themselves at the expense of the others, by force
if necessary, and only cooperated with their neighbors when it suited them. Their
identities as members of distinct communities fundamentally ordered how they interacted
with each other and with the French.
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CHAPTER THREE
"Inseparable Companions" and Irreconcilable Enemies:
The Huron and Ottawas

The Detroit Hurons were terrified. Huddling behind their hastily-repaired
palisade in 1738, they listened as the Ottawas, their neighbors and erstwhile allies,
insulted and threatened them. And, when the Hurons ventured from their walls, the
Ottawas made good on their bloody promises. As the elder Hurons trembling within their
enclosure knew well, the current conflict with the Ottawas was but the most recent in a
long and complicated relationship between the groups. That relationship had long
oscillated between heart-felt affection and alliance and equally genuine disdain and
conflict. In 1738 the pendulum swung decidedly toward animosity, threatening to rend
the alliance permanently and to destroy the fragile French-led native alliance in the pays
d 'en haut. The longtime allies-once identified as "inseparable companions"-had

become, in short order, irreconcilable enemies. 1 Even these groups, arguably the two
most important allies in the French alliance, remained so fundamentally distinct, that they
nearly came to war in 1738.
As near as the Marquis de Beauhamois, governor of New France, could tell, the
most recent trouble between the Hurons and Ottawas had begun sometime in the spring
of 1738. The Hurons settled near the French post of Detroit had called a conference with
the other native groups settled at the post, the Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and Ottawas, to

I Les Ottawas etaient" Compagnons inseparables des Hurons, depuis que les Iroquois [Haudenosaunee] ont
oblige les uns & les autres, a abandonner leur Pays." Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier Charlevoix, Journal d'un
Voyage, 2 ed. Pierre Berthiaume, 2 vols. (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, [1744],
1994), 1:547.
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announce that they had made peace with the Flatheads and to invite their neighbors to do
the same. For years the Hurons had joined their allies in attacking the Flatheads, the
Iroquois' name for several southeastern nations. 2 Now the Hurons cautioned their
neighbors that, if they continued attacking the Flatheads, the Hurons would send couriers
to warn their newfound friends. The Ottawas scoffed at the Hurons' suggestion. Did the
Hurons not remember that the Flatheads had tortured and killed Ottawa warriors and that
no one less than the Governor of New France had "given this Nation to be devoured by
all the others"? 3
The Ottawas and other Detroit groups soon gave the Hurons an opportunity to
prove their loyalty to the Flatheads. In the summer of 1738 they organized a party of
seventeen warriors to attack the southern nation. True to their word, the Hurons
dispatched two parties to warn their southern allies and the Flatheads thus easily routed
the Detroit natives, killing all but three of the invaders. If the loss of fourteen warriors
was troubling, the news that the survivors brought was even more so; the Ottawa men had
seen familiar faces among their attackers. Not only had the Hurons warned the Flatheads
of the imminent attack, they had fought alongside them. The Hurons, the Ottawas'
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neighbors and close allies for centuries, had, as the Ottawas complained, spilled the
"blood of their brothers." 4
The fallout was swift. The Ottawas angrily confronted their neighbors, calling
them "dogs" who were "capable of killing ... your brothers." 5 Terrified, the Hurons took
refuge in their fortified village, scrambling to repair breaches in the walls and abandoning
their fields to the crows and weeds. 6 That fall, the Hurons retreated to Sandusky, on the
southern shore of Lake Erie, where they hoped to find some peace. 7 Although some
Hurons returned to Detroit the following summer, the situation there remained tense. As
late as the summer of 1740, some Ottawas warriors, who were destroying a Huron field,
shot at a Huron women and, with "knife in hand," chased two Huron children. 8 Despite
Governor Beauharnois' efforts to mend the rift, the Hurons ultimately decided that they
could have no peace as long as they were "within sight of the [Ottawas]" and other
groups. They implored the governor to grant them leave to join their fellow Hurons near
Quebec, where they could be safe from their enemies. When Beauhamois dithered, the
Hurons finally decided to leave Detroit and settle on Bois Blanc Island, south of Detroit,
where they hoped to be safe from the Ottawas' wrath. 9

4

"le sang de leurs freres, L'outa8ais [Ottawas]," in ibid., 126v-130v at 127v: "Resume de lettres de
Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie," 17 Sept. 1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 130-137v.
5
"vous Etes des chiens non seulement vous Etes Capables de ttier vos freres, mais Encore Votre Pere,"
Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1738, in ibid., vol. 69, fol. 127v.
6
Ibid., fol. 128.
7
Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, in CAOM, C11E, vol. 16, fol. 224; Roland-Michel Barrin de la
Galissoniere, Marquis de Galissoniere et Gilles Hocquart, "Journal concernant 'ce qui s'est passe
d'interessant dans la colonie ... ,"' 7 Oct. 1747, NYCD, 10:114.
8
"le couteau ala main," Armand de la Richardie a Beauharnois, 26 Aug. 1740, in CAOM, CllA, vol. 75,
fols. l36v-137
9
Les Hurons cherchaient "un lieu de Surete, n'en trouvant autant dans cet Endroit, ala vtie des les outatiacs
et saulteurs," Ibid.; La Richardie to Jean-Baptiste de Saint-Pe, 26 Aug. 1740, MPHSCR, 34 :172.

140

The rift demonstrated a profound ambivalence of Huron-Ottawa relations. By
1738, the Hurons and Ottawas, especially the Kiskakons, had long been trading partners
and close neighbors. The Hurons and the neighboring Tionnontates, had lived to the east
of Lake Huron, while the Kiskakon Ottawas settled nearby on the Bruce Peninsula.
Living in such close proximity, the Ottawas traded furs, meat, and other goods for the
Hurons' and Tionnontates grain and produce. 10 Moreover, the Tionnontates welcomed
Ottawa hunters to winter near their villages. When the Iroquois finally defeated the
Hurons in 1649 some of the Hurons thus sought refuge with the Ottawas on Manitoulin
Island and at Michilimackinac. Eventually these Hurons and some of the Ottawas moved
to Chequamegon Bay in Lake Superior, where they settled in a single village, and, in the
1670s, to Michilimackinac.u On the northern shore of the Mackinaw Strait, the Hurons
and Ottawas built their villages next to one another, separated only by a single palisade of
stakes. 12
Thus, the groups had lived in intimate proximity for more than three decades by
the early eighteenth century when they moved again, this time to a new French post
established on the strait connecting Lakes Erie and Huron. Arriving at the post in the
early eighteenth century, the Hurons and Ottawas continued their close relationship, born
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of centuries of interaction in the Georgian Bay region and decades of cohabitation at
Chequamegon Bay and Michilimackinac. 13 These long-time allies continued to interact
as they long had, sending their young men on raids against common enemies, hunting
game in the winter, playing lacrosse when there was no more work to be done, and, on
occasion, as all neighbors, quarrelling and fighting. They were, by French observers'
reckoning, "allies," "friends," even "brothers." 14
At the same time, however, a persistent undercurrent of hostility permeated the
Hurons' and Ottawas' relationship. Nicolas Perrot, an explorer, interpreter, and fur trader
well-versed in native affairs, reported what had become general knowledge by 1689; "the
Hurons [Hurons] have always sought to destroy the nations" of the pays d'en haut, and
especially the Ottawas. 15 The Hurons themselves even testified to this animosity,
warning the Iroquois in 1702 "not to trust the [Ottawas] for they are a brutish People." 16
Around the same time, the mission Indians of the Sault-Saint-Louis and Lac des Deux
Montagnes noted that the Hurons had settled among "nations who do not love you." 17 In
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1705, Governor Philippe Rigaud de Vaudreuil fretted that the Hurons "are only waiting
for an opportunity to avenge themselves" against the Ottawas and that they hoped to
abscond to the Iroquois. 18 In 1707 he reiterated that the Hurons "would have very much
liked to destroy the Outavois." 19 This long-running Huron "animosity" against the
Ottawas remained in 1718 when, according to Alphonse de Tonty, then commandant of
Detroit, the Hurons silently hoped for a war between the Miamis and the Ottawas. 20
Even more than these observations, however, a series of sometimes violent clashes
between the groups forcefully bespeaks an endearing mutual animosity. Born of ethnocultural differences, exacerbated by the pressures of colonialism, and finally triggered by
the immediate context of the Hurons' reconciliation with the Flatheads, this nagging
mistrust led to confrontation in 1738.

I. "people of whose customs you are ignorant": Culture and Politics
This animosity was premised, fundamentally, on a number of cultural and ethnic
differences. This diversity, especially evident among the Iroquoian Hurons and the
Algonquian-speaking Ottawas, survived the upheaval of the seventeenth century. Even
after living "so close" to one another for some six decades, a colonial official reported in
1710, the two nations still retained distinct "customs." 21
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differences separating the Ottawas and the Hurons. While the four Ottawa nations shared
much in common, he emphasized that "the Huron nation does not form a body" with
them. Not only were the villages "separated one from the other by a palisade," but the
two spoke different languages and held different cultural traditions. 22 These cultural
differences worked to separate the two nations and created an environment of mistrust
and mutual incomprehension that, under the right circumstances, bred conflict.
Language was, of course, the most obvious difference. While the Hurons spoke
an Iroquoian tongue, the Ottawa language belonged to the Algonquian language family.
The Hurons could speak with other Iroquoians easily-the languages being as similar, by
one estimation, as Norman and French-and the Ottawas could understand Potawatomi,
Ojibwa, and certain other Algonquian languages. 23 But the differences between Huron
and Ottawa were so great that the two groups could "only understand one another through
interpreters. " 24 The inability to communicate presented a considerable challenge to the
groups. Even the most mundane interactions required translation. 25 The net effect was to
enforce a sense of separateness between the two neighbors. For this reason, the Jesuits
assigned separate missionaries to the Hurons and Ottawas at Michilimackinac, and the
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French later maintained separate interpreters for each group at Detroit. 26 This isolation
could easily breed mistrust. The Hurons found the Ottawas incomprehensible, and
therefore unpredictable, and vice versa. 27
More abstractly, language became a marker of difference and, to the Hurons'
minds at least, inferiority. According to Gabriel Sagard, the Hurons did not bother to
learn the Algonquian languages of their neighbors before the fall of Huronia because they
did not "feel the need to learn another." 28 Sagard's observation indicates that the Hurons
may have seen the Algonquian-speakers' language as an indicator of cultural
backwardness. Their cultural cousins, the Iroquois certainly did. Philological evidence
suggests that "Dowaganhaw"-the generic Iroquoian term for a western Algonquianspeaker-meant "one who rolls (or gulps) their words." 29 In contrast, the Iroquois
referred to another Iroquoian-speaking people "those who speak the language of men." 30
This wording communicates much about the Iroquois' attitudes toward Algonquian
peoples. Not only did the Algonquian-speakers mumble and swallow their words, their
inability to speak an Iroquoian tongue classified them as non-humans, and thus perhaps
as other-than-human persons like animals and slaves. Just as the ancient Greeks mocked
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the indecipherable "barbarians" at their borders, the Iroquois, and perhaps their Huron
cousins and relatives, discounted those foreigners who grunted and murmured like
animals rather than speaking like humans.
If language was the most noticeable difference, the subsistence strategies each

group employed, and the resulting social, cultural, and political structures, proved to be
the most important and far-reaching divergence. While the Hurons focused on growing
food, the Ottawas, occupying a slightly different ecological niche, developed a much
more diversified economy that relied less upon cultivation. These economic preferences
shaped the two nations' cultures in profound ways.
The Hurons, like other northern Iroquoian culture groups, focused extensively on
horticulture, and relied on hunting, fishing, and gathering only to supplement their
crops. 31 Accordingly they developed a somewhat sedentary lifestyle, built substantial
and permanent villages, and settled in greater density than their neighbors. The Hurons
brought this preference west after they abandoned Lake Huron. In western Lake
Superior, they tried-and failed-to create a horticultural homeland by attacking the
Dakotas. 32 Later, living at the relatively infertile Straits of Mackinaw, they grew and sold
surplus corn to their neighbors. They may have even decided to move Detroit in order to
take advantage ofthe comparatively rich soils there. 33 Cadillac noted that, after a fire at
the fort in 1704, the Hurons generously gave Cadillac fifty minots of grain and sold more
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"at the usual price," suggesting that the Hurons had become market farmers. 34 In
addition to the traditional maize and beans, the Hurons also grew French peas and
wheat. 35
Few French observers passed an opportunity to praise the Hurons' agricultural
ability, often at the expense of the Ottawas and other nations. Fran<;ois Clairambault
d' Aigremont, a French official, noted in 1708 that the Huron nation had "applied itself
most diligently to cultivating land" and thus agricultural production at Michilimackinac
had fallen sharply when the Hurons left for Detroit. 36 Noting that the Hurons were
"naturally industrious," the trader Nicolas Perrot claimed that Huron men helped their
women farm, "contrary to the customs of the [other] savages." 37 Observing the Hurons
first-hand in 1721, Father Charlevoix concluded that Hurons were "always more
occupied than the others in the culture of the soil." Indeed, the Hurons boasted to the
Jesuit that "without the Hurons the other Savages of Detroit would die of hunger."
According to the Hurons, the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis, had little desire to
cultivate the lands they occupied, and the Hurons were happy to sell their surplus grain to
them. 38
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In contrast to the Hurons, the Ottawas chose a more diversified economy.

Although the Ottawas did cultivate crops, a skill probably acquired from their
interactions with the Tionnontates themselves, agriculture played a much smaller role in
Ottawa subsistence. Lying north of Huronia, the Ottawa's original territory proved less
hospitable to cultivation. The Ottawas could count on a growing season just long enough
to grow com, but not long enough to provide a reliable harvest. If the region was less
suited to agriculture, it nonetheless provided sustenance for the Ottawas in other ways.
Occupying the boundary between Carolinian and Canadian forest ecosystems, the region
offered a wide diversity of resources. Moving around the region in an intricate seasonal
rhythm, the Ottawas fished for whitefish near Michilimackinac, hunted for moose and
beaver north of Lake Huron, and gathered berries and other plants. 39 The Ottawas carried
these preferences with them when they left Georgian Bay. Even in the apparently fertile
Detroit River Valley, the Ottawas left the farming to the Hurons, preferring to buy grain
than to grow it. 40
The Hurons' and Ottawas' subsistence strategies and preferences trickled down to
every comer of their cultures. The Hurons' commitment to farming, in particular, shaped
their culture and society and set it apart from that of the Ottawas. Because they relied so
heavily on cultigens, the Hurons adopted a more sedentary lifestyle than the Ottawas,
who moved frequently to take advantage of a wider range of resources. Since the Hurons
spent more time in their villages, they constructed more substantial-and less mobile
lodgings-and larger and more impressive fortifications. The Ottawas, in contrast,
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moved frequently and so preferred portable structures. 41 Because agriculture allowed
them to sustain a larger population on less land and stimulated their fertility rates, the
Hurons formed larger towns and settled more densely than the Ottawas. To mediate the
conflicts and manage the difficulties of these denser settlements, the Hurons formed "a
more marked form of government" than their neighbors. 42 The Hurons' subsistence
patterns even influenced the position of women within society. Because of their
importance to agriculture and thus to survival, Huron women, even more than Ottawa
women, enjoyed "principle authority" and were "absolutely the mistresses" of their
communities. 43
Their relatively sedentary economic patterns and denser populations made the
Hurons the darlings of the French. French praise for the Hurons reflected the perceived
proximity of Huron culture to that of early-modern France. As well as being "the wisest,
most industrious, hardworking, and provident" people of the pays d' en haut, the Hurons
were the "most civilized and trustworthy" of France's allies. 44 The Ottawas, committed
to a lifestyle significantly different from the French, fared poorly in comparison. Indeed,
reaching for familiar language, Father Gabriel Sagard pronounced the Hurons "nobility,"
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while the Ottawas were merely humble "bourgeois."45 The baron de Lahontan went even
further, dismissing the Ottawas as "cowardly, ugly, ungainly Fellows," while the Hurons
were "a brave, active, and daring People." 46 The Hurons' greater "civilization" and
closer proximity to French social and cultural ideals clearly shaped French perception of
the groups.
More importantly the Hurons attributed meaning to this cultural difference. In
1721 they boasted to Father Charlevoix that "without the Hurons the other savages of
Detroit would die of starvation." 47 Sneering at the Ottawas' inability to grow enough to
feed themselves, the Hurons contemptuously reported that the Ottawas "thought about
nothing more than amassing Pelts" suggesting that the Ottawas continued to rely more on
hunting than the agricultural Hurons. 48 The Hurons, already accomplished market
farmers, thus drew a sharp distinction between themselves, the provident farmers, and the
Ottawas, the wandering hunters. The Hurons used such differences to define themselves
as ethnically distinct and to measure the distance between them and their Ottawa
neighbors.
While the first two cultural wedges separating the Hurons and Ottawas-language
and subsistence strategies-had existed well before the French arrived, the third was a
product of the colonial encounter. While some Ottawas welcomed the black robes, the
Hurons seemed more disposed toward the new religion than did the Ottawas, and many
45
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Hurons became willing acolytes of their adopted faith. No less than in contemporary
Europe, religious heterogeneity-or the perception thereof-divided and alienated
natives who retained traditional beliefs and those who converted to some form of
Christianity.
To be sure, Jesuit missionaries enjoyed some success among the Ottawas. In
1668, Father Claude Allouez reported that the Kiskak:on Ottawas living at the mission of
Saint Esprit at Chequamegon Bay had converted en masse, and the Jesuits long
maintained a mission to the Ottawas at Michilimackinac. 49 Yet other French observers
found the Ottawas only marginally committed to Christianity. Cadillac, always happy to
take a cut at the Jesuits, sniped that the Ottawas "would have themselves baptized a
hundred times a day for a glass of brandy." More troubling still, every Ottawa cabin
recognized "its own private divinity" to which they regularly offered sacrifices. 50 A more
dispassionate witness, Father Charlevoix, confirmed that there "were no Christians
among" the Ottawas at Detroit in 1721. 51 Three decades later, the court itself confirmed
that the Ottawas and most other natives in the pays d'en haut still had not "embraced the
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Christian religion." 52 Nor were the Detroit Ottawas likely to convert any time soon, since
the Jesuits never opened an Ottawa mission at the post. 53
While the Ottawas continued what Cadillac deemed "their deplorable sacrifices to
Baal," the Hurons proved more receptive to the black robes' message. 54 From the
beginning of their missions, the Jesuits had focused their attention more on the sedentary
and comparatively "civilized" Hurons and the neighboring Tionnontates than on the
mobile Ottawas, and that effort continued at Chequamegon and the mission of St. Ignace
at Michilimackinac. 55 The fathers' hard work apparently bore fruit. In 1710, a colonial
official averred that the Hurons had embraced Christianity with "the most intensity" and
were the "best catholics" of all of the nations in the pays d' en haut. 56 Another observer
opined in 1718 that, although the Hurons did not currently have a missionary, they
nonetheless avoided ceremonial dancing-which the Jesuits pronounced demonic-and
imbibed less liquor, which the fathers blamed for all sorts of villainy-than other
nations. 57 Father Charlevoix declared them Christians as well and reported that most of
the Hurons desired a missionary in 1721. 58 The Jesuits finally satisfied that request in the
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person of Armand de la Richardie, who arrived at Detroit in 1728 and established a
mission to the Hurons. By 1741 he could report that "not even one person in the whole
nation remained obdurate," and they flocked to the Gospel with "unfeigned heart." 59
Even while sequestered at Sandusky, the Hurons risked the Ottawas' vengeance to return
to Detroit for the saints' days. 60 Richardie obviously overstated his point; many Hurons
resolutely refused to convert, and those who did probably incorporated Christianity into
more traditional religious constellations. 61 Yet the Hurons' embrace of Christianity,
especially in the decade before 1738, served to distance them even further from the
Ottawas, and created potential grounds for dispute.
The Hurons, more importantly, perceived these differences to be meaningful.
When a group of Detroit Hurons and mission Iroquois attacked a group of Foxes in 1732,
they identified their enemies as "dogs who did not acknowledge the master oflife." The
Hurons, then, had begun not only to identify themselves as Christians, but as defenders of
the faith. In the aftermath of the 1738 encounter, furthermore, they fretted that they could
never be "fully confirmed in their Religion" as long as they lived among the Ottawas and
59
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other unbelievers. 62 Granted, the Hurons issued this proclamation in part for the benefit
of the French; they were trying to convince the governor to resettle them near Montreal.
Yet it does suggest that they had begun to distinguish themselves as Christians and their
neighbors as infidels.
The cultural distance that separated them allowed the Hurons and Ottawas to view
each other both as alien and, to some degree, as culturally inadequate. The Hurons
clearly saw the Ottawas as cultural inferiors; they were market hunters who could not
feed themselves without the Hurons and heathens whose presence inhibited the Hurons'
own conversion to Christianity. This may explain, in part, why the Hurons and Ottawas
rarely married, even though they lived in close proximity (see Chapter One). In this
sense, cultural distance was a necessary precondition to violence. The Canadian Iroquois
of Kahnawake and the Two Mountains explicitly made this connection late in the
seventeenth century. They noted that the Hurons lived among "a Multitude of Nations
who do not love you, you do not Understand their language, you are ignorant their
Customs, and by that, even Every day," the Hurons risked provoking some "bad
affairs." 63 Yet the differences in Huron and Ottawa culture do not, by themselves,
explain the enmity between the groups or the eruption of violence in 1738. Cultural
difference, after all, does not necessarily lead to cultural conflict any more than cultural
homogeneity guarantees peaceful relations. The Hurons and Iroquois spoke mutually
62
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comprehensible languages and shared many cultural traits, but nevertheless spent much
of the seventeenth century fighting. Necessary though it might have been to the HuronOttawa conflict, cultural difference, in itself, was not sufficient to spark violence. These
potent differences needed the right catalyst to transform their animosity into conflict.

II: "Who are you, Huron, to make laws for me?": Status at Detroit
Disputes over power and status in the region provided just such a catalyst and
gave added meaning to cultural differences. The disruptions of the mid-seventeenth
century, particularly the defeat of Huronia, upset the traditional power relationships in the
Great Lakes region. In a significantly changed world, each nation sought to assert its will
and shape affairs in the pays d'en haut. The Hurons tried to regain the power and the
dominance they had enjoyed before the fall of Huronia, while the Ottawas sought to
exploit their new ascendency in the region and their ties to the French. 64 As a result, the
two nations found themselves entangled in a high-stakes zero-sum game. Unable to
survive without one another and unwilling to submit to their neighbors, they each tried to
gain the upper hand over and to shape events within the pays d'en haut. Such rivalry, of
course, caused friction and gave added meaning to the cultural differences separating the
nations.
The fall of Huronia in the mid-seventeenth century upset the traditional
relationship between the Hurons and Ottawas. Before 1649, the Huron nations and their
neighbors, the Tionnontates, had been the undisputed senior partners in their relationship
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with the Ottawas. Demographically powerful and strategically located, the Hurons
dominated trade with the Ottawas, especially the Kiskakons who lived on the Bruce
Peninsula in Lake Huron. 65 They were, according to Cadillac, "lyons" prowling the
Great Lakes. 66
All that changed, however, when the Five Nations finally defeated and dispersed
the Hurons in 1649, allowing the Ottawas to step into the power vacuum left by the
Hurons. With the Hurons in disarray and diaspora, the Ottawas, who had extensive
connections with their Anishinaabe kinspeople, positioned themselves as intermediaries
between the French and the nations of the pays d'en haut. 67 As a result, the Ottawas soon
emerged as the most influential players in the region. Recognizing their standing among
the nations of the region, the French regarded them as the "elder sons in my heart" and
"eldest son," and focused on courting them as strategic and commercial partners. When
the British assumed control of the region in 1760, they also hailed the Ottawas as the
"Oldest nation" and referred to the people of the region as the "Ottawa Confederation."
Contemporary scholars have likewise recognized the Ottawas as New France's "most
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important ally," and "principal intermediary for the French," in the Great Lakes, and the
"central nation of the alliance. " 68
For their part the Hurons now found themselves dependent upon the Ottawas for
their very survival. After leaving their homeland, the Huron and Tionontate refugees
sought refuge with the Ottawas, first at Manitoulin Island and Michilimackinac, before
moving with the Ottawas to western Lake Superior. Here again, the Hurons depended on
the Ottawas for protection. In the 1660s, they attacked the Dakotas, whom they
considered their cultural inferiors because they lacked European tools, in order to
establish a new horticultural homeland. When the numerically superior Dakotas easily
routed them, the Hurons fled to the Ottawa settlement at Chequamegon Bay. 69 Years
later, the Detroit Ottawa leader, Outoutagan, boasted that he had saved the ungrateful

°

Hurons from destruction more than once. 7 Cadillac confirmed that "the Hurons
[Hurons] are only friends with the Ottawas by necessity, being the weakest, [because] the
other nations have killed and mistreated them so much." 71
Such protection, however, came at a price for the Hurons. They had to
acknowledge, and submit to, Ottawa dominance. For their part, the Ottawas, long the
junior partners in the relationship, likely reveled in the Hurons' new-found weakness and
dependence upon them. Nicolas Perrot reported that the Hurons at Michilimackinac lived
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in fear of the Ottawas whom they worried "would molest and aggrieve them" if the
Hurons failed to "obey them." 72 The Marquis de Vaudreuil vaguely alluded to the
Hurons' "just causes of complaint. .. against the [Ottawas]" in 1705."73 Fran~ois
Clairambault d' Aigremont, a colonial official, reported in 1708 that the Ottawas had
"held them [the Hurons] in a sort of slavery" at Michilimackinac and that this illtreatment had inspired "a natural dislike" for the Ottawas.
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Another French observer

confirmed that the Hurons lived "almost under their [the Ottawas'] domination." 75
Perhaps the Ottawas, themselves indifferent farmers, demanded that the green-thumbed
Hurons provide grain for them, while they invested more extensively in hunting and
trading. Indeed, crop production declined after the Hurons moved to Detroit, forcing the
Ottawas still at Michilimackinac to feed their children grass in the summer of 1707. 76
The Hurons' later claim to supply all Detroit with grain further suggests such a
relationship.
For the Hurons, this position of weakness and subordination represented an
embarrassing inversion. Finding themselves weak and vulnerable, the once-powerful
"lions" and "aristocrats" now ingloriously submitted to their cultural "inferiors."
Numbering, by one 1711 estimate, only a meager 60 warriors to the Ottawas' 500, the
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Hurons had no choice but to endure this indignity and accept Ottawa protection. 77
Moreover, the relationship had inescapable gender implications. Like most eastern
woodland cultures, the Ottawas and Hurons observed a gendered division of labor, in
which women grew the crops, while men hunted and fought enemies. The Hurons'
responsibility for growing crops coupled with the Huron men's inability to protect
themselves, therefore, created a symbolic marriage in which the Ottawa "men" fought
while the Huron "women" farmed. 78
To be sure, these gender divisions did not carry the same implications of
domination and subordination for the Hurons and Ottawas as they did for contemporary
Europeans. French observers like Cadillac disapprovingly noted that Huron and Ottawa
women held considerable authority and that Huron and Ottawa "men do almost nothing
without their consent." 79 Although such observations probably exaggerated the power
that native women exercised, they nonetheless demonstrate that native men and women
shared power. 80 But even if these gender divisions did not necessarily imply the

77

Raudot and Silvy, Relation par lettres de !'Amerique Septentrionalle, 131, 176.
The Iroquois explicitly entered a similar relationship with the Delawares, in which the Delawares were
designated "women" who grew grain for the other nations in return for their protection. The Iroquois
actually forbad the Delawares to wear breechcloths-a symbol of masculinity-and forced them to wear a
machicotte or skirt. "Memoir ofBougainville," 1757, WHC, 18:193-194; Nancy Shoemaker, "An Alliance
between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the
Mississippi" Ethnohistory, 46:2 (Spring 1999), 241-45.
79
"Les Outavois [Ottawas] ne sont pas jaloux de leurs femmes, les Hurons [Hurons] le sont encore moins,
et elles sont absolument les maistresses, en sort que les hommes ne font quasi rien sans leur consentment."
Cadillac, "Relation du Sieur de Lamothe," [ca. 1696], MDE, 5:119-20. Father Charlevoix confirmed that
Huron women had "principle authority" ("Les Femmes ont la principale authorite chez to us les Peuples de
la Langue Huronne"). Charlevoix, Journal, 1:557; Chev. de Beauharnois to the marquis de Beauharnois, 2
Aug. 1741, WHC 17:354.
80
Women's status and gender divisions within native cultures varied considerably. Among some groups,
like the Illinois nations, men severely repressed women and graphically punished unfaithful wives. In
others, like northern and southern Iroquoian nations, however, women enjoyed sexual freedom and even
some authority over traditionally "male" spheres like warfare. Gender relations among the Ottawas and
Hurons more closely followed the second pattern. See Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French
Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
78

159

hierarchical relationship found in Europe, Huron men doubtlessly resented being styled
as "women." Huron and Ottawa warriors evidently used "women" as an epithet to mean
"cowardly." 81 The Ottawa man, Mekoua or Le Pesant, complained in 1706 that if
Onontio did not allow him to revenge himself, the Ottawas' neighbors would no longer
"Esteem us, and they would regard us as women." 82 Cadillac noted that only "two
articles distinguish true men": war and hunting. 83 Unable to protect themselves from
their enemies and forced to grow food while the Ottawas hunted, the Hurons failed on
both accounts. They therefore found their masculinity challenged and resented the
Ottawas for forcing them into such a relationship.
If the Hurons no longer enjoyed the ancient strength, they refused to submit to
their Ottawa "inferiors." Haunted by memories of their ancient might and resentful of the
Ottawas' haughty pretentious, the Hurons struggled to reassert themselves. In the 1670s
both the Hurons and Kiskakon Ottawas moved to Jesuit missions at Michilimackinac. By
1682, the two nations had begun to fight for ascendency. In that year, the Hurons
reported that, when the Hurons warriors were away from Michilimackinac, the Ottawas
frequently harassed and insulted Huron women, children, and old men "without any
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reasons or cause." The Ottawas, well aware that the Hurons lacked the strength to resist
them, treated their neighbors as they pleased and thus reminded them of their
subordination. Resentful of the Ottawas' "rashness and violent conduct" but unable to
attack the Ottawas by themselves, the Hurons reportedly tried to enlist the Senecas to
betray the Ottawas. 84 Six years later, after the Ottawas killed a Huron headman of some
importance, the Hurons again appealed to the Iroquois to help them "destroy" the
Ottawas. Fearing retaliation, the Ottawas constructed a more formidable fort "1000 or
1200 paces" from the Huron village. 85 Finally, a party of Sable Ottawas likewise
assassinated a Huron leader in 1696. 86 In the context of such competition for status, the
cultural gulf separating the two groups-their language, customs, and religion-became
important markers separating the nations.

Figure 10: Detail of map of the Mackinac Straits by Louis Armand de Lorn d'Arce, Baron
de Lahontan, printed in Lahontan, Nouveau voyages de Mr. le baron de Lahontan dans
!'Amerique Septentrionale, (The Hague: les freres l'Honon~, 1703), vol.1, between pages
116-117
84
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When deputies from the two nations arrived at Montreal for a peace conference in
August 1701, then, they were already primed for confrontation. After signing the Great
Peace of Montreal, the Ottawa man, Outoutagan addressed Gov. Calliere. Claiming to
speak for the Hurons and Ottawas-who, after all, formed "only one body," despite their
occasional disagreements-the Ottawa man asked Calliere not to allow the traders to
carry eau-de-vie, or brandy, to the pays d'en haut. 87 Ostensibly, Outoutagan's speech
testified to the Ottawas' and Hurons' enduring friendship-the two nations, after all,
formed only one cozy family. Yet the Cheanonvouzon heard the address very differently.
The Huron leader remonstrated that Outoutagan had not sought his input on the matterin fact he was planning on taking a load of eau-de-vie to the pays d'en haut himself-and
therefore did not speak for the Hurons. In this light, Outoutagan's claim to speak in both
the name of Ottawas and Hurons implied a power relationship: the Ottawas spoke for the
Hurons. If they formed only a single body, then the Ottawas represented that body's
head. Moreover, the influential Huron headman, Sioi.ia, or Le Rat, had died just days
earlier. 88 Sioi.ia had been, by French reckoning, the "first mover of his Nation and all the
[Ottawas]," and his death had created a power vacuum at Michilimakinac. 89 Outoutagan
and Cheanonvouzon thus sought to claim Sioi.ia' s mantle.
The two nations carried this considerable resentment with them when they moved
to Detroit in the early years of the eighteenth century. In the spring of 1702
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Cheanonvouzon grumbled that "the French were preventing him from revenging himself'
on the Ottawas, and openly wondered if the English might be more obliging." 90 Nor did
the Ottawas do much to alleviate the Hurons' resentment. After sacking an Iroquois
village, Michilimackinac Ottawa warriors planted a distinctively Huron hatchet on one of
the slain Iroquois men to cast suspicion on the Hurons. 91 The Hurons finally found an
opportunity to avenge themselves in 1706, as chapter two narrates in depth. As much as
the crisis of 1738, this breach threatened to destroy the alliance and to plunge New
France into a war it could not win.
The Ottawas felt particularly betrayed by Cheanonvouzon's treachery. The
Ottawas and Hurons had been allies for a long time, after all, and had sent out a joint war
party against the Flatheads earlier that spring. The Ottawas had even met frequently with
the Hurons after the initial battle "without fear, always reckoning them among our allies."
As the Hurons put it when they invited the Ottawas to a feast in hopes of ambushing
them, the Hurons and Ottawas had "been brothers for a long time and fought together
against the Iroquois." 92 When they learned of Cheanonvouzon's role in the conflict, his
torture of captive Ottawa warriors, and his attempts to betray them, therefore, the Ottawas
were hurt and angry. 93 Their erstwhile allies and close neighbors had killed thirty of their
men and threatened their destruction. The Ottawa headman, Miscouaky, seemed
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personally hurt by the Hurons' betrayal. "I am stricken to the heart" he reported to
Governor V audreuil. 94
In spite of Cadillac's fumbling statecraft, the Ottawas and Hurons apparently
reached a reluctant detent on their own. Both nations participated in Cadillac's campaign
against the Miamis, and some Ottawas returned to Detroit in the spring of 1708. 95 Yet
neither nation had forgotten the conflict. As late as 1711, Gov. Vaudreuil enjoined the
two nations to "cast off... the evil suspicions" that the two nations still harbored and to
live in harmony. 96 Ultimately, only hostility toward the Foxes, and not Onontio's pleas,
bound the wounds opened in 1706, and then only temporarily. 97
The cultural differences separating the two nations, then, provided a basis for the
Hurons' and Ottawas' conflict, and that conflict gave added meaning to those differences.
Cultural difference proved essential to the two nations' struggle for power in that it
created and reinforced a sense of differentness between the two nations. The Hurons and
Ottawas had to perceive one another as separate, as distinct, in order to sustain such a
determined and prolonged rivalry, and their cultural differences allowed them to see each
other as alien. Indeed, had they not seen each other as separate, the nations might have
integrated more fully-creating a composite group as the Huron refugees and
Tionnontates had. Moreover these cultural differences provided a sense of cultural
superiority which animated the rivalry between the nations. Because of the Ottawas'
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cultural traditions, the Hurons deemed them cultural inferiors and so fought bitterly
against the Ottawas' attempts to dominate them and to shape the pays d'en haut. The
competition for resources and status, in tum, intensified both the sense of separateness
between the two nations and the cultural assumptions premised upon them. Engaged in a
pitched battle for authority, the Hurons and Ottawas ascribed greater importance to these
cultural differences.
The nations even drew the French into their rivalry. Each nation cultivated ties
with the French in order to win access to French trading goods and military alliance, and
to thereby gain an upper hand over its neighbors. For example, in 1703 the principal
Detroit Huron leader, probably Cheanonvouzon, asked Gov. Calliere to build him a house
"in French fashion," and Onontio consented. The Ottawas, not to be outdone, demanded
the same favor. These houses, after all, symbolized alliance with the French and the
Ottawas demanded that the French show them as much regard as they had the Hurons. 98
Native leaders also asked for other tokens of French esteem-an ornate military coat or
medals-to prove their standing within the region. 99 The "children of Onontio" thus
vied for their "father's" affection, in order to outmaneuver their neighbors and ensure
their own status within the region.

III. "evil suspicions": The Immediate Context of 1738
Thus the Huron elders huddled behind their palisade in 1738 could recall a longrunning hostility toward the Ottawas, reaching back several decades. Born of cultural
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difference, this animosity had been aggravated by a competition for status and the
difficulties inherent in cohabitation. Yet this tradition of conflict and strife cannot, by
itself, explain the timing of the violence of 1738. After the troubling crisis of 1706 had
settled down, the Ottawas and Hurons had reconciled, and resumed wintering together
and launching raids against Onontio's enemies. For the next three decades, the two
groups coexisted at Detroit without any major incident. By all appearances, the longrunning enmity between the groups had finally subsided; the two nations seemed to have
transcended those old grievances. Yet if the Hurons and Ottawas had lived in harmony
for thirty years, it was not because the old animosity had been forgotten but because it
had been suppressed. The hostilities did not surface because the Pax Vulpinae served to
draw the Ottawas' and Hurons' attention off one another and toward common enemies.
As those conflicts drew to a close, the Hurons' reconciliation with the Flatheads, and
their suggestion that their neighbors do the same, also rekindled fear of a Huron-Iroquois
alliance and, in the context of the ancient Ottawa-Huron animosity, foreboded danger for
the Ottawas.
From the very beginning, conflict with the Foxes served to mend the Ottawas' and
Hurons' relationship. In 1712 Huron and Ottawa warriors had fought side-by-side
against the Foxes and Mascoutins from the cramped Fort Pontchartrain. Shortly after the
siege, the Huron and Ottawa warriors combined to attack a group of Kickapoos, allies of
the Foxes, the first of many such cooperative campaigns. 100 The two groups also
launched raids against the southern nations allied to the British-the Chickasaws,
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Cherokees, Choctaws, and the Flatheads. As a result, between 1712 and 1738 the Hurons
and Ottawas seemed to be perpetually preparing for, carrying out, or returning from war
with either the Foxes and their allies or the southern nations. Such cooperation served
not only to heal wounded feelings but also, by creating a common enemy, to redirect the
Hurons' and Ottawas' anger away from one another and toward an external target.
Indeed, the Detroit natives, especially the Hurons, displayed an enthusiastic hostility
toward the Outagamis and their allies. They declared themselves "unwilling that a single
one of [the Outagamis] should be left," and wanted to attack a group of peaceful natives
only because they "bear the name of Sakis." 101
When the Fox Wars ended in the years before 1738, conversely, the Hurons and
Ottawas lost a common endeavor which had bound them together for decades. As they
lost reasons to get along, the two nations found reasons to distrust one another once
again. 102 Particularly, the Hurons' alliance with an old foe made the Ottawas uneasy.
The Hurons, hoping to augment their position in the region, had apparently made peace
with the Flatheads in 1729. 103 Given the Hurons' and Ottawas' long history, the Ottawas
viewed the Hurons rapprochement as threatening. The Flatheads, after all, had been
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fierce enemies of b~th groups for some time, and the Ottawas and Hurons had long and
frequently formed joint raiding parties against the southern foes. One such party,
ironically, returned to Detroit just at the time that the two groups broke into violence in
1706. 104 As the Ottawa headman reminded the Hurons in council in 1738, Ottawa "bones
are in their [the Flatheads'] Cabins and our scalps hung above them" and the stakes
where the Flatheads had tortured and killed Ottawa captives still stood in their villages. 105
Moreover the Flatheads were allied to the British colonies, Onontio' s treacherous foes
and the "enemy of prayer." 106 The Ottawas thus saw treachery in the Hurons'
reconciliation with the Flatheads. 107
A 1735 letter suggests another layer of apprehension for the Ottawas. In a
dispatch to the Minister of the Marine, Monsieur de Beaucours, the governor of Montreal,
described a conversation he had held with three Onondagas and a Seneca headman.
These Iroquois leaders told Beaucours that the Six Nations had held a council with the
Flatheads, at the request of the British, in which the Flatheads asked for an alliance very
similar to that they had offered to Hurons. 108 These negotiations belonged to an intensive
Anglo-American effort to proctor a peace between the British-allied Catawbas and
Cherokees (the Flatheads), and the British-allied Six Nations-what Jon Parmenter
deems the "holy grail" of British-native diplomacy. 109 By 1738, such a truce seemed
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more likely than ever. The Catawbas, bloodied by the frequent Iroquois raids, seemed to
be in a "more pacific dispesition" toward the Six Nations, and at least some Iroquois
advocated peace with the Flatheads. 110 In 1737, the Six Nations agreed to meet with the
Catawbas and Cherokees, although they insisted that the conference take place at Albany,
not in Williamsburg, Virginia, as the Flatheads had suggested. The Iroquois and
Flatheads also agreed to observe a twelve month cease fire. 111
In the light of the Catawba-Iroquois negotiations and truce, the Hurons' invitation
to make peace with the Flatheads in the spring of 1738 appeared suspect to the Ottawas
and their Anishinaabe allies. The Hurons were not simply suggesting an alliance with the
Flatheads, but a larger coalition which included the Six Nations as well. Just as had
Cheanonvouzon's collaboration with the Miamis and Iroquois earlier in the century, the
Hurons' recent cooperation with the Flatheads and the Iroquois troubled the Ottawas.
They discerned in this rapprochement another Huron attempt to challenge Anishinaabe
dominance of the region and expand Huron influence in the region. The Ottawas had no
interest in seeing a rival military and commercial coalition emerge in the region, much
less in becoming a junior partner in an alliance dominated by the Iroquois and Hurons.
Nor could they broach such a brazen Huron grab for power and declaration of
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independence from Ottawa suzerainty. Within the context of a long and troubled OttawaHuron relationship and an equally long tradition of Iroquois-Huron intimacy, the Ottawas
found the Huron invitation to make peace with the Flatheads and threat to defend the
Flatheads troubling.
Thus, when the Ottawa leader fretted that the Hurons wanted to "do bad things ...
[and] take refuge with the [Flatheads]," he might well have had an intensified HuronIroquois alliance in mind. 112 In the early 1730s, in fact, the Ottawas reportedly invited
the Iroquois to join them and "entirely destroy" the Hurons. 113 They hoped thereby to
drive a wedge between the Hurons and their would-be allies. 114 The Ottawas' attack on
the Flatheads in the summer of 1738 might have in fact been an attempt to keep the
scheduled Iroquois-Flathead in Albany from convening. Betraying their fears of a
Huron-Iroquois alliance, the Ottawas also pleaded that the Iroquois "take no part" in the
quarrel shortly after the conflict in 1738. Ominously for the Ottawas, the Iroquois
deferred their response. 115
As they had in 1706, questions about status and authority played a role in the
violent encounter of 1738. At Michilimackinac, the Ottawas had exploited the Hurons'
weakened position and subjected them to a sort of "slavery." After 1706, however, the
tables seemed to have turned again, this time against the Ottawas. In the peace talks of
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1707, Cadillac praised the Hurons for their support and defense of the French during the
previous year. Although the commandant had heretofore counted the Ottawas as his
"elder son," that group's rebellion had cost them his esteem. Henceforth, the
commandant promised, the Hurons would take their "elder brother's"-the Ottawas'place "in my heart." 116 Charlevoix found that the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas
accorded the Hurons "the honor of speaking for all" the natives at Detroit. 117 In 1730,
Capt. Pierre-Jacques de Payan de N oyan noted that "All the Savages" of Detroit "are
guided exclusively by the feelings of the Hurons. [Hurons]" 118 French officials explicitly
attributed the 1738 conflict to the Hurons' "haughtiness," which the Ottawas heretofore
"endured impatiently." 119 This continuing contest for status and authority sheds light on
the Ottawas' angry dismissal of the Hurons' proposal in 1738. "Who are you, Huron,"
the Ottawa headman charged, "to make laws for me?" 120

Conclusion
The conflagration of 1738, then, had a complicated lineage. General cultural
differences-linguistic, economic, and religious-combined with conflicts over status
and power to produce an abiding animosity between the Hurons and Ottawas. This
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animosity could be muted, overcome by the very real ties of affection and alliance that
bound the groups together, but not completely forgotten, even after thirty years of peace.
Two dynamics, then, were at play among the Detroit Hurons and Ottawas; one
emphasized their shared interests and history of cooperation while the other accentuated
their differences and reminded them of previous slights. In 1738 animosity won out.
At bottom, the violence of 1738 demonstrates a simple but overlooked truth about
the Hurons and the Ottawas. No matter how much they may have cooperated withindeed depended on-one another, no matter how much they hunted together, fought
alongside each other, traded, laughed, or played lacrosse, they remained separate. Their
cultural identities-buffeted by colonial pressures such as depopulation and dislocationproved durable, resilient, and consequential. So consequential, in fact, that these longallied neighbors seemed poised to destroy each other.
That these two groups, perhaps the most important French allies in the region, not
only retained their cultural identities but also harbored a genuine resentment for one
another forces us to reconsider cultural exchange in the pays d'en haut. Specifically that
relationship poses problems for Richard White's description of the region. The Hurons
and Ottawas would be especially susceptible to the sort of disintegration that White
describes. Both groups, but especially the Hurons, faced depopulation on a massive
scale. As Cadillac observed, the Hurons' "sword" had been cut "too short" for the nation
to act with complete autonomy; the once numerous Ottawas could barely fill three
villages in 1721. 121 The two nations had also been forced to flee their ancient territories
in the face of the determined and relentless Iroquois juggernaut. That exodus precipitated
121
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a painful sojourn through the region. In only a few years' time, the Hurons had moved
from Huronia to Green Bay, western Lake Superior, and Michilimackinac before finally
settling at Detroit. The Hurons and Ottawas also dealt more closely with the French than
the other nations of the area, living with the French and welcoming the Jesuits among
them. By White's account, these pressures should have obliterated the Hurons' and
Ottawas' distinct identities. But they did not. Their complicated relationship
demonstrates that the Ottawas and the Hurons refused to leave their cultural identities
behind. Colonial pressures had battered these nations, but they had not destroyed
them. 122 As the Hurons noted when rejecting an Iroquois invitation to settle among the
Five Nations 1707, they could not allow "the Huron name [to] become extinct." 123
The Hurons and Ottawas eventually reconciled. In the aftermath of a joint
campaign against the Chickasaws in 1741 the Hurons and Ottawas met and finally
reached an accommodation. 124 As in the seventeenth century and the 171 Os, war against
a common enemy served to ameliorate the conflicts between the two allies. The Hurons
and Ottawas demonstrated their newly reestablished harmony in 1744, when the
commandant of Detroit, Paul-Joseph LeMoyne de Longueuil, offered a war belt to the
nations of Detroit to attack the British. The Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, noting that the belt
could not be cut up and distributed to each nation, pointedly offered the entire belt to his
"brothers the Hurons." 125 The Ottawas thereby publically testified to the Hurons'
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Figure 11: Detail from
Jacques-Nicolas Bellin
after Joseph-Gaspard
Chaussegros de Lery,
"La Riviere du Detroit
Depuis le Sainte Claire
jusqu'au Lac Erie,"
1764. From Archives of
Ontario, Toronto, C 78,
AO 6699. Accessed
online.
This detail shows the
proximity of the Huron
(lower left) and Ottawa
("Outaoums," lower nght)
villages m 1749

Importance and 1mphcitly offered to reconcile with the Hurons. The Huron headman,
Sastaretsy, accepted the belt, thus renewing the ancient alliance. Soon thereafter, the
Hurons established a village on the south side of the DetrOit River, directly adjacent to
their erstwhile persecutors. 126 Once agam the two groups renewed a centunes-old
acquaintance. Yet their proximity and cooperation Imphed no cultural or political fusion.
They remamed distinct.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"One heart and one body": The Huron Community
To illustrate what he saw as a crisis in the Huron community in September 1750,
the Jesuit missionary in charge of the Huron mission at Detroit, related a story to the
commandant of the fort, Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville. He told the officer that the
Detroit Huron man Otiok8andoron, known to the French as Babi, had come to him and
asked for a knife with which he could cut a roll of tobacco. When the priest gave him the
tool, the Huron man confided that he and his fellow Detroit Hurons kept their knives
handy, "even when we sleep ... to defend ourselves in Case of attack." The missionary
inferred that Otiok8andoron and the other French-aligned Hurons living at Detroit feared
"some Coup of treason on the part of the rebels," referring to those Hurons led by Nicolas
Orontony who, after trying unsuccessfully to surprise and massacre the French at Detroit,
had abandoned Detroit. Otiok8andoron' s fear of his "false brothers," in Potier's telling,
indicated a significant rift between two separate Huron communities: one which had
remained loyal to the French and to the Faith and which had stayed at the Huron mission
at Detrot, and another which had apostatized, embraced the Protestant British, and had
established a separate village on the Muskingum River. Father Potier found it "hard to
Believe" that the fracture in the Huron body politic could ever be mended, and predicted
that the fabric of Huron identity and unity had been rent forever. 1 By all appearances, the

1

"meme quand nous dormons, nous avons toujours un Couteau a notre cote pour nous deffendre en Cas
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Celoron de Blainville, 11 Sept. 1750, in Robert Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, (Ottawa: Les Presses
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Huron community had been divided into two separate groups-one British-aligned and
the other French-aligned-living in two different places-Sandusky and Detroit. 2
Yet within six years of this supposedly decisive break, most of the Hurons
returned from the Ohio Valley to Detroit. On the third of May 1753, the Hurons held a
council with their neighbors, the Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and French of Detroit
and announced that their "brothers the Hurons" had "returned forever." 3 As the Hurons
attested in May 1753, the Hurons had not divided into two separate peoples after 1747.
Ultimately what Potier and subsequent observers saw as a decisive break in the Huron
community was merely an animated debate over how to position itself in a changing geopolitical climate. While some Hurons favored remaining aligned with French and staying
at Detroit, others favored a more neutral or explicitly British-aligned stance and
suggested moving to Sandusky (or Conchake on the Muskingum River) to facilitate that
position. These two groups waged a determined contest to win supporters and build
consensus for their position, but they always did so within the context of loyalty to the
2
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War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
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vol. 99 fol. 75-77.
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Huron community. 4 Rather than "evidence of dysfunctional factionalism," this debate
reflects an innovative and experimental approach in which Huron people sought to
advance the interests of their people. 5
This chapter contemplates the decade-long debate between shifting Huron groups
from 1738 until its ultimate denouement in 1753. The controversy unfolded in three
identifiable stages. After a brief introduction about Huron political culture, I will
describe each of these phases in a separate section. In the first stage, lasting from 1738
until1744, the recent conflict with the Ottawas created a controversy within the Huron
community. While most of the Hurons favored moving from Detroit to the St. Lawrence
Valley and aligning themselves more closely with the French and the Canadian Iroquois,
a small but important group favored moving to Sandusky and intensifying their contacts
with the British, Shawnees, and Iroquois. Although the Hurons eventually elected to
remain at Detroit, the episode had illuminated important divisions within the Huron
community and had created two separate groups. The resumption of war between Great
Britain and France in 17 44 significant! y changed the terms of the controversy and
initiated a new, more contentious, phase in the crisis. After the British-aligned Hurons
tried to attack Detroit in 1747, the two sides became more defined and more antagonistic.
One side, residing at Detroit, remained loyal to the French, while the other, living on the
Muskingum River, allied themselves with the British. At the same time the attack
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deepened divisions between the groups, it also prompted the two parties to seek
reconciliation. In the final phase, therefore, both sides sought to win the other to its
position. The Detroit Hurons, aided by geopolitics and the smallpox virus, ultimately
won the contest when the Conchake Hurons returned in 1753.
This story of Huron survival and continuity, rather than fracture and
disintegration, during the 1740s and 1750s testifies to the durability and adaptability of
native peoples in the face of serious challenges. Many scholars have read this incident as
further evidence of the destructive power of colonial forces. Forced to choose sides in an
imperial conflict, the Hurons renounced the bonds which tied them together and divided
into feeble fragments. When the crisis is seen as a fairly ordinary groupal dispute within
an integrated political and social Huron community, however, that community appears to
be a flexible and integrated entity which could absorb the "hammer blows" of
colonialism. 6 The Hurons could do so largely because of the social and cultural bonds
which held them together and created a Huron identity. That identity was not a flat
formulation or self-conscious articulation of what it meant to be Huron, but a living and
breathing set of practices which bound the Hurons together. The fact of Huron
persistence, of the durable bonds tying that nation together, in turn tells us much about
the integrity of native communities in spite of the forces agitating against it. The Great
Lakes region, in fact, was populated by these persistent, durable, and discrete peoples, not
by shattered refugees.

I. ''families" and "bandes": Huron Political and Social Economy
6

White, The Middle Ground, 1.
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In order to understand the context in which this crisis took place, we must

understand how political leadership worked in the Huron community. As monarchist
French officials repeatedly observed, Huron leaders lacked the authority to command
their people to act. Instead they had to navigate a baroque and multivalent set of political
and social institutions and convince several different constituencies in order to create
consensus on issues. Given this complexity and decentralization, these coalitions often
proved unstable and consensuses on issues frequently shifted. To clarify the context in
which the Huron debate took place, this section explores the principal institutions and
interest groups which shaped Huron foreign policy.
Membership in the Huron community operated simultaneously on several
different levels. The most basic of these was that of the "longhouse," which the French
referred to either as a "famille," "cabanne," or "cabannee." These longhouses consisted
of the members of an extended family, who lived in the long segmented structures
common to all northern Iroquois peoples. 7 The population of these longhouses varied
considerably from four individuals to as many as seventy-five, with an average of about
twenty per dwelling. 8 Henri-Louis Deschamps de Boishebert, onetime commandant of
Detroit, counted twenty-eight such longhouses at the Huron village in 1732 (see figure
12), and Pierre Potier recorded the same number of inhabited longhouses at the two
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Figure 12: [Henri-Louis
Boishebert], "Plan do Village des
hurons au Detroit, Erie," 1732.
Bibliotheque nationale de France,
Paris.
Boishebert, the commandant at Detrmt
sketched this plan of Detrmt, mcluding
an elevation of a Huron longhouse and
an intenor plan of a longhouse.

villages on the Bois Blanc Mission in 1746. 9 These longhouses functioned as social units
as well, and each apparently had its own "head." 10
Besides the longhouses, the Hurons also organized themselves into exogamous
matrilineal clans, which the French referred to as "bandes." 11 As they did in societies
throughout North America, the bonds of fictive kinship and descent from a totemic figure
tied these clans together. 12 The Detroit Hurons counted ten such separate clans. These
clans were both exogamous, meaning that the Hurons considered marriage within one's
9
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own clan to be incest and instead insisted that young people find spouses from different
clans, and matrilineal, meaning that children inherited their clan designation from their
mothers, not their fathers. 13
The Hurons further divided these clans into three larger social units of related
clans, known by titular animal totems, the Deer, Turtle, and Wolf and denoted as
"bandes," or "tribus" by French writers. 14 Pierre Potier, the longtime superior of the
Huron mission at Detroit, noted that these interrelated clans claimed a sort of fictive
kinship with one another, that they were "hontaxen," meaning that their members were
"brothers and sisters in a moral sense." 15 The members of these "Families, or, Tribes,"
according to Charlevoix, were "intermixed" within the Huron community "without being
confused." 16 The origins of these social units-which I refer to as "hontaxen"-remain
disputed. 17 While the Tionontates, or Petuns, had apparent! y included both "Deer" and
"Wolf' hontaxen before the fall of Huronia, they had no division associated with the
Turtle. This hontaxen, then, might have consisted of non-Tionontates, perhaps remnants
of the constituent nations of the Huron Confederacy or the Ontario lroquoian Neutrals. 18
Regardless of their origins, these hontaxen operated as a powerful motif and organizing
principle in Huron social life. While they remained at Michilimackinac in the 1670s, for
13
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example, the Hurons participated in a Christmas celebration in which they organized
themselves into three separate bodies, each of which was associated with one of the
magi. 19 Nearly a century later, in 1761, Sir William Johnson noted that the Huron council
room contained "three fires burning," suggesting the political and cultural importance of
the Hurons' tripartite division. 20 When the Hurons undertook important diplomatic
missions, moreover, they often sent three representatives, apparently representing these
different social units.
Huron conventions of leadership and political authority derived from the Huron
social structure and therefore likewise operated on several different levels at once. 21 The
longhouse appears to have been the most basic unit of Huron decision-making. On
several occasions individual ''families" or longhouses made their own decisions that
deviated from those of the clans and of the Huron community generally. In 1738, for
instance, three or four "cabanes" opposed the plan to move to Montreal; ten years later
Potier noted that some clans had decided to return to Detroit on their own. 22 In addition
to these households, each clan had both male and female elders, which constituted an
important council and deliberated on issues common to the entire community. Potier
19
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listed thirty-three men-"anciens"-and twenty-nine women-"anciennes" in the Huron
community. 23 In 1746, the commandant of Detroit invited the Hurons to meet with the
governor but stipulated that they should be represented only by "the captains, the elders,
and only the elders, because the young people are not powerful." 24 In decentralized
Huron politics, these elders had to reach consensus in order to make a decision.
Finally, the Hurons also recognized three principal chiefs, representing each of
the three hontaxen. 25 Each of the three exercised considerable power in the community
and important decisions required their unanimous consent. In all important diplomatic
affairs, therefore, the Hurons sent representatives of the three hontaxen. In 1668, Father
Philippe Pierson noted that the Hurons were divided into three bands and each their own
separate "Chief." 26 When the Hurons asked Gov. Beauhamois for permission to move to
the St. Lawrence Valley in 1738, they did so in the name of the principal chiefs of each of
the three hontaxen. When the governor's nephew, Claude de Beauhamois, the Chevalier
de Beauharnois, visited Detroit in hopes of bringing them to the St. Lawrence in 1741,
moreover, he distributed three gorgets-a metal device worn around the neck by
European officers-to three Huron chiefs, presumably the leaders of each hontaxen?7
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The following year, three Huron "Sachems" arrived at Albany to represent the Hurons. 28
Three "principal men of the Weyondotts [Hurons]" met with the British Indian agent
George Croghan in 1759 to discuss a peace between their nation and Great Britain.Z9 In
1761, Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, spoke to "the Huron
Chiefs." 30 Some evidence suggests that the Hurons ranked these principal chiefs-indeed
"Sastaretsy," the hereditary title of the leader of Deer hontaxen, ruled as "king" of the
Hurons and his name even served as a metonym for the entire population. 31 Yet the
evidence suggests that each exercised considerable power and that the unanimous consent
ofthese leaders remained vital to Huron decision-making.
In addition to the household, clan elders, and principal leaders, a number of other
powerful institutions operated constituted the Huron political structure. For example,
Huron women, in addition to serving as clan elders, exercised their own autonomous
influence in the community. As early as 1721, Charlevoix noted that Huron women
exercised considerable power and that they had asked the Jesuits to send a missionary to
their village. When some Hurons proposed abandoning the French and moving to Seneca
territory in early 1739, the Jesuit missionary, Armand de la Richardie, had to use the "old
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women's influence" to prevent them from doing so? 2 In 1741, the Chevalier de
Beauhamois, arriving to find most of the men gone to war, spoke to the Huron women
whom he concluded possessed "absolute power over the Minds of the men." 33 The
Pennsylvanian Charles Stuart identified an "old Indian Squaw" as one of the "Chief
Leaders of the Wondot [Huron] Council at Detroit." 34 Likewise the "young people" or
"young men"-the Huron warriors not yet old enough to serve as elders-also held
political power and acted independently from their principal leaders. These young people
successfully subverted their elders in 1742, leading Gov. Beauhamois to question if the
principal chiefs were really the "masters of deciding" things for their village. 35 Finally, a
few French people, most notably the superiors of the Huron mission, Fathers Armand de
la Richardie and Pierre Potier, enjoyed considerable influence in Huron policy-making.
Serving as external advisors to influential Huron elders, these missionaries provided
critical access to French power and mediation between the Hurons and French. Richardie
proved able to influence the Hurons not to abscond to the British in 1739, to exclude his
Huron enemies from council in 1740, to "place" the Hurons at a new mission site in
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Richardie wrote the letter on 15 June 1739 ("Ete oblige d'Employer la credit de Vieilles femmes pour en
arreter le Course," "Resume de lettres de Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie," 17381741, CAOM, CllA vol. 75, fol. 130v.
33
The officer certainly exaggerated this, especially since he noted that the same was true of paternalistic
French society (Chevalier de Beauharnois to Governor Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:354).
34
"The Captivity of Charles Stuart," 1755-57, in Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 71-72.
35
"si vos Chefs n'etoient pas les maitres de decider du sort de leur Village, il ne devoient pas me parler en
son nom," "Paroles de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois Gouverneur General de la nouvelle France, a
trois Chefs hurons du Detroit qui Sont descendfis de cet Entroit L'autornne dernier avec M. leCher de
Beauharnois," 28 Juin 1742, COAM, C11A, vol. 77, fol. 164v. In another instance in 1741, the young men
wanted to attack the Flatheads in order to ingratiate themselves with the Ottawas, but the elders
successfully halted this plan. Richardie to St. Pe, 10 June 1741, WHC, 17:339.
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1742, and to bring some of the Hurons back to Detroit in 1751. 36 Father Pierre Potier,
furthermore, "Assisted" in a Huron council in 1756 and in 1763, a French habitant at
Detroit noted that the missionary likewise "led" (conduire) all of the Hurons. 37
Huron political culture, like Huron social organization, then, was a matrix of
several cross-cutting institutions and interests which exercised influence and crafted
policy. Decisions_could only be reached, accordingly, through careful and tedious
consensus-building and could easily be destabilized by any one of these groups. Huron
politics, therefore, was a complicated machine with many moving parts. When a series
of crises struck the Hurons beginning in 1738, the Hurons sought to form coalitions and
to shape Huron policy and their response to those external problems.

II. "within sight of the Outa8acs & Sauteurs": Debating Removal, 1738-1743
This crisis in the Huron community began in the immediate aftermath of their
violent conflict with the Ottawas in 1738. Noting that the Ottawas-with whom they had
been quarrelling for decades-had tried to enlist the Iroquois to attack them in 1731 and
1732 and had actually done so in the summer of 1738, the Hurons finally concluded that
they could no longer hope to live "within sight" of their persecutors. 38 If the Hurons
agreed that they could no longer remain at Detroit, they could not reach consensus on
36

"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," [1741], MPHSCR, 34:172; Beauharnois to Richardie,
14 June 1741, ibid., 203; "Paroles des Sonont8ans a Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois Gouverneur," 17
July 1742, vol. 77, fol. 205v; Richardie to Potier, 10 Dec. 1750, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 654-55.
37
"The Captivity of Charles Stuart," 1755-57, in Bond, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 71-72.;
[Robert Navarre], Journal de La conspirarion de Pontiac, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 711.
38
For the rumored attack on the Hurons, see Beauharnois to the Minister, 1 Oct. 1731, CAOM, C11A, vol.
54, fol. 406-407v; Beauharnois to the Minister, 10 Oct. 1731, ibid., 417 -18v; Parolles de Monsr le M. de
Beauharnois aux chefs Iroquois, Octobre 1732, ibid., vol. 57, fols. 352-53. For quotation see, "Indian
Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201-202; Payen de Noyan to the Minister, in
CAOM, CllA, vol. 89, fol. 194v.
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where they should go. This controversy divided the Huron community into at least two
parties and exposed rifts within the community. These groups centered on not only
where to live, but more fundamentally on two different visions about how the Hurons
should situate themselves diplomatically and geographically, based on their foreign
policy objectives. While one party-whom I refer to as French-aligned, or Detroit
Hurons-espoused a steady French-aligned orientation and advocated moving to one of
the mission settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley, closer to the seat of Onontio's power
at Montreal, the other-the British-aligned, or Sandusky (later Conchake) Huronssupported a British alignment and advocated living at Sandusky, south of Lake Erie,
where they could easily access British trade at Oswego and in the interior of the Ohio
Valley, or moving to one of the islands in the Detroit River. During this early phase of
the crisis, these two Huron groups began to articulate two different visions of Huron
geostrategy which they later intensified.
The first group, led by Mattias Sastaretsy, the latest leader of the Deer honaXen
and "true chief' of the entire Huron community and Tayachitin, the leader of the Wolf
honaXen, advocated moving to the relative safety of the St. Lawrence Valley, most likely
at the Christian Iroquois village of Kahnawake or the settlement at Iroquois-AlgonquinNipissing settlement at Oka, or Lac des Deux Montagnes? 9 In advocating this position,
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin sought to ally their nation more closely to the "domicilies"the Christian peoples of the St. Lawrence Valley-and, of course, to the French. The
Hurons had long been allied to the Christian Iroquois at both Oka and Kahnawake, whom
they considered "our brothers who love us." Those communities had invited them to
39

Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac, "Relation du Sr. De Lamothe,"[ ca. 1698], in MDE, 5:119.
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settle among them around the tum of the eighteenth century, and Huron men and women
had married and had children with the Iroquois from these mission settlements. 40 These
bonds had only intensified after the resumption of the Jesuit mission to the Hurons in
1728. In 1732, for example, the Christian Hurons and Christian Iroquois from Oka
launched a raid against the Foxes, whom they deemed "dogs who did not acknowledge
the master of life" and the Iroquois later chided their Christian brothers for their
syncretistic religious practices. 41 The Hurons thus concluded that, if they settled near
their Canadian Iroquois kin-and near the French settlement of Montreal-they would no
longer have anything to fear. The Ottawas and Potawatomis would not dare provoke the
Canadian Iroquois or the French by attacking the Hurons in the St. Lawrence Valley.
They hoped for "their Father's Protection ... from every attack." 42 Accordingly,
Sastaretsy sent a message to Beauhamois and to the Canadian Iroquois in October 1738,
just months after the attack, and asked him for a safe haven. 43
Yet not all Hurons agreed with Sastaretsy and Tayachtin. A splinter group,
involving three or four longhouses and led by the leader, "highly considered" Ang8irot,
the leader of the Turtle hontaxen and "third chief' of his nation, purposed that the Hurons
settle, not at Montreal, but at Sandusky, where the Hurons had fled for safety in the

40

"ces freres qui nous aiment," "Paroles des Hurons du Detoit aM. de Beauharnois," [1740], CAOM, ·
C11A, vol. 74, fol. 72; Beauharnois to Richardie, 14 June 1741, MPHSCR, 34:304; "Baptisme de MarieAnne," 1 Aug. 1718, in RPD, 1:70; "Baptisme de Madelene Michelle," 2 Aug. 1718, in ibid., 71.
41
Boishebert to Beauharnois, 1732, WHC, 17:150, 153-54.
42
Richardie to Beauharnois, 17 Sept. 1740, in ibid., 287.
43
"Paroles des hurons du Detroit ... ," 12 Aug. 1738 [1740], CAOM, CllA, vol. 74, fols. 72-76v; "Resume
de lettres du Canada avec commentaires des autorites metropolitaines," [1740], ibid., fols. 232-36v,
"Paroles de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle France, aux Iroquois
du Sault st Louis et duLac des deux Montagnes," 12 June 1741, ibid., vol. 75, fol. 93; "The Huron of
Detroit Desire to Migrate," WHC, 17:279; Hocquart au ministre, CAOM, C11A, vol. 70, fol. 118v.
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autumn of 1738, or some other place in the Ohio Valley (see figure 13). 44 Sastaretsy
grudgingly alluded to these dissenters in his August 1738 message to Beauhamois,
although he dismissed them as "only three persons ... who were not heeded." 45 These
three individuals most likely represented distinct longhouses because Richardie later
noted that "three or four longhouses (cabanes)" still opposed removal in 1741. 46 Another
officer noted in April of the following spring that many Hurons remained at Sandusky,
"which they wanted to assign as their resting place." 47 By 1740, Ang8irot and other
Hurons had begun preparing land for cultivation at Sandusky, suggesting that they hoped
to settle there permanently, rather than just hunt in the area. 48 As late as 1741 Richardie
noted that Ang8irot and a few others still opposed migration and that "a large number" of
the nation remained at Sandusky. 49 When the Chevalier de Beauharnois arrived at
Detroit in 1741, he found Ang8irot "more obstinate than ever" and worried that the leader
would spoil his mission to bring the Hurons to Montreal. 50
Just as Sastaretsy and Tayachitin hoped to insulate themselves from Ottawa
violence by allying themselves with the Canadian Iroquois and French and moving to the
St. Lawrence Valley, Ang8irot hoped that moving to Sandusky would allow him to
develop closer ties with the Shawnees and Senecas and to orient the Hurons to the
British. Sandusky, positioned several days from Detroit, was closer to Seneca territory
44

"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR, 34:201; "Copie d'une lettre de
Beauharnois au pere Armand de La Richardie," 14 June 1741, CAOM, CllA, vol. 75, fol. 154v.
45
"il n'y a que trois personnes qui y Soient opposees, Encore ne sont elles point Ecoutees." "Paroles des
hurons du Detroit. .. ," 12 aout 1738 [1740], in ibid., vol. 74, fol. 74.
46
Father de la Richardie aPere St. Pe [M. de Boucherville], [26 aout 1740], in ibid., vol. 74, fol. 268v.
47
"Memoire des fournitures ... hurons rester au fond duLac-Erie, en un endroit nomme Sandosket ou Ils
voueloient assigner leur demeurre," 24 April1739, in ibid., vol. 73, fols. 149-49v
48
"Indian Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," [1741], MPHSCR, 34:201.
49
Father de la Richardie to Pere St. Pe [M. de Boucherville], [26 aout 1740], CAOM, C11A, 74 :269.
5
Chevalier de Beauharnois to Governor Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:354.
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Figure 13: Detail from Lewis Evans, "Bowles's new pocket map of the following independent
states of North America," in Bowles's Universal Atlas (London: Bowles, Carington, 1784).
Lawrence H. Slaughter Collection, New York Public Library, Map Div. 97-6006[LHS 228].
Accessed on-line.
Tlns detml shows the three maJor Huron settlements between 1738 and 1743-Bms Blanc Island m
the Detrmt River, Pomte aMontreal across the nver from Fort Pontchartram (near the "Outawas"
VIllage), Junundat (Et10nnontout) at Sandusky (the small bay south west of Lake Ene), and
Muskmgum, or Conchake (m the bottom left-hand corner) Also shown are the lands "allotted for
the WIANDOTS," or Hurons, by the Six NatiOns lroqums

and more easily accessible to Bntish traders from Pennsylvama. 51 As the Marqms de La
Jonqmere, governor of New France, would later complam. "the Enghsh always have a
very considerable Commerce at Ossandousket [Sandusky]." 52 Indeed, begmnmg m the
early 1740s, the lrish-Pennsylvaman trader George Croghan operated a tradmg factory at
51

For the length of the tnp from Sandusky to Detrmt, see "A Journal of Account of the Capture of John
Pattm," reproduced m Howard Eavenson, "Who Made the 'Trader's Map?,"' Pennsylvama Magazme of
Hzstory and Bwgraphy, 65 4 (October, 1941) 427
52
"les Anglms font tOUJours un Commerce tres considerable a Ossandousket,"Copie de l'mstruct10n secrete
donnee aM de Celoron par M le marqms de La Jonqmere, 9 July 1750, CAOM, C11E, vol 13, fol 212
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the mouth of the nearby Cuyahoga River south of Lake Erie. 53 Some Hurons had
evenconsidered moving even closer to the British than Sandusky, either to the Ohio River
Watershed or to Seneca territory, to which the Senecas had invited them. Richardie noted
that the Iroquois and British had been playing on the Hurons' fear of the Ottawas "to
attract them to one or the other nation," and that many Hurons seemed inclined to "listen
to nothing but their terror and the words of the English and Iroquois." 54 Even
Sastaretsy-who supported moving to the St. Lawrence Valley-alluded to this
possibility in his message to Beauharnois. The leader noted that, if Beauharnois failed to
grant his request, the Hurons "might take a part which you [Beauharnois] would perhaps
not approve." 55 Nodding to AngBirot's British-aligned position, Potier scawled the note
"janus quirinus" next to his name in his 1746 census of the Huron community; by
invoking the two-faced Roman god, Potier suggested that AngBirot maintained a
duplicitous attachment to both the French and to the British. 56

53

Nicolas Wainwright, "George Croghan and the Indian Uprising of 1747," Pennsylvania History, 21:1
(Jan. 1954): 23. Cartographer John Mitchell called Cuyahoga "The seat of War, the Mart of Trade, & chief
Hunting Grounds of the Six Nations, on the Lakes & Ohio." Mitchell, A Map of the British and French
Dominions in North America, 1755, Newberry Library, VAULT oversize Ruggles 259.
54
"Etoient Entierement determines a ne rien Ecouter, que leur frayeur et des paroles angloises et
Irqouoise," "l'anglois et !'Iroquois profitoient des allarmes des hurons pour les attirer aupres de l'une ou
l'ature Naiton (131v)"; Resume de lettres de Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et La Richardie,
1738-1741, CAOM, CllA, vol.75, fols. 130-30v, 131v.
55
"il poura prendre un party que vous n'aprouverts peut-etre pas si vous rejetties sa parole," ibid., fol.
133v.
56
Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 239. An ethnic
component also overlaid this dispute about Huron diplomacy and real estate. While the leaders of two
hontaxen, Sastaretsy representing the Deer, and Tayachitin, representing the Wolves, supported removal to
the St. Lawrence Valley, Ang8irot, leader of the Turtles, opposed it in favor of Sandusky. To be sure,
many Turtles, like Nicolas Orontony and Otiok8andoron, remained at Detroit and loyal to the French while
some Deer and Wolves may have joined Ang8irot's British-aligned group. Potier aPierre-Joseph Celoron
de Blainville, 8 Sept. 1750, in ibid., 637. Yet the disagreement among the principal leaders of the
hontaxen points to at least the possibility that larger social and ethnic considerations fed the conflict. That
Nicolas Orontony, another Turtle leader, eventually joined Ang8irot's group and took an even harder
stance against the French than had Ang8irot likewise confirms that impression. Potier, "Recensement des
Hurons," Texte II, in ibid., 260.
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Although many contemporary French observers and subsequent historians have
seen this controversy as evidence of Huron disunity or "dysfunctional factionalism," the
debate reflected a pragmatic and very functional response to the challenge that the
Hurons faced in 1738. By forming different groups which worked to build consensus
among the various Huron interest groups, the Hurons could fully explore the range of
options open to them. As Jon Parmenter observes about the Iroquois, the Hurons
demonstrated an "openness to innovative attempts to build consensus around a particular
initiative," which "ultimately facilitated a far greater degree of cohesion" within the
Huron community. 57 The groups led by Sastaresty and AngBirot, then, were not too
separate communities in the making, but simply two interest groups pursuing the good of
the entire Huron community. AngBirot' s move to Sandusky and his courtship of the
British should not be read, in this light, as a renunciation of Sastaresy and the other
Hurons, but as an attempt to explore an alternative geopolitical policy which would best
serve Huron interests. His dealings, ultimately, were not British-aligned any more than
Sastaresty's were pro-French. Both positions were explicitly pro-Huron. 58 This
controversy conformed to a longer Huron tradition of decision-making in which different
groups explored different alternative solutions to the problems facing the Hurons. The
Hurons had reacted to similar challenges at the tum of the eighteenth century by forming
a pro-Iroquois/British group led by LeBaron and Cheanonvouzon which settled at St.
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My thinking on Huron factionalism is indebted to Parmenter's work on the Iroquois communities in
Iroquoia, the St. Lawrence Valley, and, later, the Ohio Valley. Parmenter, The Wood's Edge, 87; "At the
Woods' Edge".
58
This formulation is shamelessly borrowed from Peter MacLeod's description of the Miamis during this
period ("Une conspiration generate," 35-36).
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Joseph, and French-aligned group led by Kondiaronk which remained at
Michilimackinac. 59 Those groups had reached consensus and moved Detroit by 1704.
Attempting to win support for their relative positions, then, both AngBirot and
Sastaresty maneuvered politically. AngBirot' s opposition to removal created a problem
for Sastaretsy and Tayachitin. Without the consent of each hontaxen, the Hurons could
make no decision of such magnitude. Deftly navigating the complicated and
decentralized Huron political system, Sastaretsy deployed a sophisticated two-pronged
political strategy. He sought first to isolate and marginalize AngBirot as the leader of the
Turtle hontaxen, while simultaneously promoting another leader, Nicolas Orontony, as
the true representative of that hontaxen. Such maneuvering would give him at least the
perception of consent from each hontaxen and allow him to proceed with his plans. Once
the Hurons had moved, AngBirot and the others would thus be forced to follow their kin
to the St. Lawrence Valley.
In order to marginalize AngBirot, Sastaretsy called upon the support of his ally,

Father Armand de la Richardie, known to the Hurons as OndechaBasti, or the "beautiful
country." 60 Dismissing the stubborn AngBirot as a "drunkard" and a "dangerous and
pernicious person," Richardie sought to actively undermine his authority, both among the
Hurons and the French. More seriously, the Jesuit, and presumably Sastaretsy, barred
AngBirot from attending Huron councils and ignored AngBirot' s supporters. 61
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Boucher, "The Legacy of Iouskeha and Tawiscaron," 261-68, 282.
Ondecha8asti translates into French as "le Grand Terre" (Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in
Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 261; Richardie to the Hurons, 29 Dec. 1746, in ibid., 622).
61
"le seul yvrogne An8irot" Extract of letter from Richardie to Saint-Pe, 26 Aug. 1740, CAOM, Cl1A,
vol. 74, fol. 268v; "un Sujet dangereux et pernicieux" Copy of a Letter from Beauharnois to Richardie, 14
June 1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 154v. Years later, Potier also mentioned that Ang8irot was a "drunkard"
(bibax) . "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Pierre Potier, 239.
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While marginalizing Ang8irot, Sastaretsy simultaneously sought to promote the
Turtle elder, Nicolas Orontony, as Ang8irot's replacement. Although Orontony was a
"great chief' of the nation and listed as a "consideree" in 1747, he was apparently not the
leader of the Turtle hontaxen. 62 Yet he, unlike Ang8irot, the rightful claimant to that
authority, supported Sastaretsy and Tayachitin and their plan to move to Montreal, and
Sastaretsy therefore sought to install Orontony as the de facto leader of the Turtle
contingent. In the winter of 1738-1739, Sastaretsy sent Orontony to Detroit to ask
Nicolas Joseph des Noyelles, commandant at Detroit, for permission to settle in the St.
Lawrence Valley "on the part of the whole village." 63 The following spring, Sastaretsy
and his allies crafted a message to be sent to the governor, once again asking him to
remove them to the region. The heading of this missive, delivered to the governor in July
of 1739, claimed to be the "Words of Sastaretsy, Tayatchatin and Orontony to be sent to
the General." 64 By all accounts, Ang8irot, and not Orontony, led the Turtle hontaxen.
He, and not Orontony, had the authority to speak for his people. By ignoring him and
presenting Orontony as the legitimate representative of the Turtle hontaxen, Sastaretsy
and Tayachitin sought to stage a coup d'etat. Moreover, they entrusted the delivery of
these words to none other than Orontony himself, whom they "put in charge of their
affairs." 65 Purportedly speaking for the "whole nation" and "all the elders"-a palpable
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"grand chef de cette nation," Extract of a letter from Nicolas Joseph des Noyelle to Beauharnois, 1 Feb.
1739, CAOM, CllA, 71:103v; Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de
Potier, 260.
63
"de la part de tout son village," "Extract of a letter from Nicolas Joseph des Noyelle to Beauharnois," 1
Feb. 1739, CAOM, C11A, vol. 71, fol. 103v.
64
"Resume of the Letters of Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan, and La Richardie," 1738-1741,in
ibid.,vol. 75, fol. 133.
65
"Nicolas charge de leurs affairs," "Resumee of the Letters of Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan,
and la Richardie," 1738-1741, in ibid., 134.
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lie-Orontony accordingly brought the message to Montreal in the summer of 1739 and
spoke directly with Beauharnois. 66
In entrusting the message to new headman, Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, and Richardie

sought to accomplish two ends. Not only did they minimize Ang8irot's influence and try
to replace him with Orontony, but they also sought to tie Orontony more firmly to their
party by granting him authority to speak for the whole nation. This attempted coup by
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin sought to place a pretender, Orontony, at the head of the Turtle
hontaxen. This may explain the French sobriquet for Orontony: the "Regent." 67 In
European political culture, a regent not only reigned during the minority of a monarch,
but also during his or her absence. Orontony therefore appeared to exercise authority for
the absent Ang8irot. Like regents in contemporary European political science, Orontony
exercised authority that he did not in fact possess. 68
Sastaretsy's ploy worked at first. Beauhamois had responded to the initial, 1 Oct.
1738, message by granting the Hurons leave to come settle in the St. Lawrence Valley,
for which the Hurons enthusiastically thanked him. 69 When Orontony arrived the
following summer, Beauharnois reiterated his promise to "receive them with great
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"toutle village Etoit dans ces Sentimens," "Paroles de Beauharnois aux Hurons de Detroit," 12 June
1741, in ibid., vol. 75, fol. 150v; "de tous nous anciens," "Paroles de Hurons ... , [1740]," in ibid., vol. 74,
fol. 72-26 (quote on 74); Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, CAOM, CllE, vol. 16, fol. 225.
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Potier, "Recensement des Hurons," Texte II, in Toupin, Les ecrits de Potier, 241.
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ARTFL Project.
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Beauharnois au rninistre, 6 Oct. 1739, CAOM, CllE, vol. 16, fol. 224, "Resume of the Letters of
Noyelles, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan, and La Richardie," 1738-1741, CAOM, C11A, fol. 75, fol. 134.
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pleasure" and would "cede them the land" near Montreal. 7 Finally in the spring of 1741,
Beauhamois issued a formal invitation for the Hurons to come settle in the St. Lawrence
Valley. He sent his nephew, the Chevalier de Beauharnois, to Detroit with a large
contingent of Canadian Iroquois from both Oka and Kahnawake, as well as Hurons from
the settlement of Lorette. 71 In a speech to be delivered by the younger Beauhamois,
Onontio told the Hurons that their "complaints, and apprehensions had reached their
father Onontio's ears" and that he therefore offered to shield them in the "sanctuary of a
father who cherished them." 72 The "principal chiefs"-Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, and
presumably Orontony-who had all continued to support the move, received the message
enthusiastically. 73 Although nearly all the Huron warriors were away from Detroit
fighting the Chickasaws, the Huron elders promised to discuss the matter when the young
men retumed. 74 They even sent three representatives-one for each "band," or
hontaxen-to Montreal to chose lands for the future Hurons emigrants. 75
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')e les recevois avec grand plaisir, Et que je leur cederois la terre que j'avois," Beauharnois au rninistre, 6
Oct. 1739, CAOM, C11E, vol. 16, fol. 225v.
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"Paroles de Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle France, aux
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University of Michigan, 2009), 44-45.
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By the time Chevalier Beauharnois arrived at Detroit, however, the delicate
consensus to move to Montreal had already begun to collapse for several reasons. First
and foremost, the Hurons' reconciliation with the Ottawas made the removal to Montreal
much less pressing. In the aftermath of the joint campaign against the Chickasaws in
1741-the same campaign which had crippled the Chevalier de Beauharnois's missionthe Hurons and Ottawas met and finally reached an accommodation. 76 With the hostility
between the Hurons and Ottawas gone, the Hurons had less incentive to seek asylum in
the St. Lawrence Vallley. As Pierre Jacques Payen de Noyan, the post's commandan,
pointed out, "in banishing the fear, the desire of moving away was also banished." 77 At
the same time that relations improved with the Ottawas, relations with the Canadian
Iroquois had apparently dimmed. The Canadian Iroquois had been cool to the Hurons'
plea from the beginning. Before May 1740, a Canadian Iroquois headman from
Kahnawake had apparently made "threats" about the Hurons' relationship with Flatheads,
and this had "taken from them [the Hurons] all taste for coming to settle near them [the
Kahnawakes]." 78 Moreover, when the Canadian Iroquois escort arrived at Detroit, they
told the Hurons that there were not enough resources in the St. Lawrence Valley to
sustain the Hurons and actively discouraged them from moving. 79 If these changes were
not enough, Richardie apparently turned against the plan when he learned, erroneously,
that the Sulpician missionaries at Oka had begun making space for the Hurons to move
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Hocquart au ministre, 11 June 1742, CAOM, CllA, vol. 77, fols. 281-82; Beauharnois au ministre, 17
Sept. 1743, ibid., vol. 79, fols. 108-14v.
77
"en Banissants la crainte aaussi Bani le desir de s'eloigner," Payen de Noyan au ministre, 20 Aug. 1742,
ibid., vol. 77, fol. 352.
78
"les menaces d'Entatsogo, chef de Sault S. Loi.iis, faites a L'occasion de la Paix des hurons avec les tetesplates, paroissoient leur avoir ote le gofit de venir s'Etablir aupres d'Eux," Beauharnois to the Minister, 1
Oct. 1740, ibid., vol. 74, fol. 81 v.
79
Payen de Noyan au ministre, 20 Aug. 1742, ibid., vol. 77, fol. 352.
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there. Fearing that his charges would be wrested from his order and given to the rival
Sulpicians, Richardie lobbied the Hurons not to move to the St. Lawrence Valley. 80
In response, many Hurons, particularly the "young people," instead suggested that

the Hurons settle on Grosse lle, an island in the Detroit River. The island, about ten
miles from Fort Pontchartrain, would be sufficiently far away from the Ottawas, Ojibwas,
and Potawatomis, they believed, to keep the Hurons safe. 81 As early as April 1741 the
commandant at Detroit, Payen de Noyan, reported that the Hurons "are divided," with
"some wanting to Establish themselves at the gosse ysle," while "the others do not want
to Hear any talk but of Montreal." 82 Ang8irot, although he probably still would have
preferred to move to Sandusky rather than to Grosse lle, saw this changing political
climate as an opportunity to finally scuttle the plan to move to Montreal. When the
80

Beauharnois au ministre, 9 Sept. 1742, ibid., vol.75, fol. 121-125v. Although Richardie seemed willing
for the Hurons to move to Kahnawake, where the Jesuits ran the mission, he had vociferously opposed the
idea of moving to Oka because the Sulpicians had jurisdiction there. In a not-so-coded message, he told his
Jesuit conferee that "people ... from the Lake ... are not good in my books, as you may think," and noted that
the Hurons "are not pleased with the Indian observances of the place where they are to be settled." "Indian
Affairs at Detroit in the Years 1738-1741," MPHSCR 34:172, 200. Hearing a rumor that the Sulpician
superior, Frangois Piquet had cleared lands atOka, the missionary concluded that he and the Chevalier de
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from a Letter from Richardie to Father Janauy," Dec. 1741 in ibid., 210-11. Accordingly, when the
Chevalier de Beauhranois arrived at Detroit the following summer, he correctly sensed that the missionary
was undermining him. Chev. Beauharnois au Marquis de Beauharnois, 2 Aug. 1741, WHC, 17:355;
Richardie to Father Jaunay, Dec. 1741, CAOM, C11A, vol. 75, fol. 123v; Universite Laval, Les pretes de
Saint-Sup/ice au Canada: Grands figures de leur histroire, 1657-1759, (Quebec: Universite Laval, 1992),
181. Embarrassed at having committed the Crown's resource to a failed endeavor, Beauharnois railed
against Richardie and the Jesuits in general and unsuccessfully tried to have the priest removed from
Detroit. See Beauharnois au ministre, 9 Sept. 1742, CAOM, CllA, 75 : 121-125v; 2 Nov. 1742, ibid, fols.
241-42v; 12 Nov. 1743, in ibid., fols. 349-50v; 7 Sept., 1742, ibid., vol. 79, fols. 108-10v. The governor,
seeking to deflect blame from himself, chose to minimize the other, equally pressing, reasons for the
Hurons' change of heart and instead to tap into anti-Jesuit currents in European culture.
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The island was three or four leagues from the fort, or about ten miles (Beauharnois to Richardie, 14 June
1741, MPHSCR, 34:204).
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Richardie blamed this change of heart on what he deemed Beauharnois' sluggish response to the Hurons'
plea. Beauharnois had indeed put off removing the Hurons in hopes that he could reconcile the Ottawas
and Hurons by inviting the Hurons to fight the Flatheads and thereby to erase the lingering bad feelings
between the two nations ("ils sont divises de Sentiments, les uns voulant s'Etablir dans la gorse ysle, et que
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"Resume ... , 1738-1741," CAOM, CllA, vol. 75, fol. 137).
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Chevalier de Beauharnois arrived at Detroit and Sandusky in the summer of 1741,
therefore, he found Ang8irot as "obstinate as ever." No matter how many presents the
officer offered, Ang8irot remained unmoved.
In the shifting political and diplomatic climate, Ang8irot's position won out. By
April 1742, Father Richardie marked the "Entire opposition especially among the young
people" to the removal, although the principal chiefs still supported the plan. 83 Two
Hurons, who had gone to trade at the British post of Oswego that summer told some
Senecas that they "would not descend" to Montreal and that their missionary "had placed
them on grosse isle." 84 Hearing these rumors in late June, Beauhamois assembled the
three Huron elders, who had remained in Montreal since the previous fall, and angrily
reproached them for their nation's inconsistency. Reminding the Hurons that they had
repeatedly asked him to remove them, the governor rhetorically wondered why Sastaretsy
and the other "elders have left the decision of all things to the young people." 85
Between 1738 and 1742, then, the Hurons had conducted a serious debate about
the future of their community and had exposed serious dissension within their ranks.
Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, and their supporters had attempted to outflank Ang8irot by
presenting Orontony as the true representative of the Turtle hontaxen. In response,
Ang8irot argued against the removal to Montreal and, when the conditions changed in his
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"une Entiere opposition surtost dans les jeunes gens, quoyques les 4 principaux Chefs persistent toujours
dans les memes sentiments et soient tous prests a obeir aux ordres qui leur fera donner," Hocquart au
ministre, 11 June 1742, ibid., voL 77, fols. 277-83.
84
The Senecas reported this to Beauharnois on 17 July 1742, suggesting that they had spoken with the
Hurons in question sometime in June and that the Hurons had made their final decision around that time.
"Paroles des Sonnont8ans aMonsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois Gouverneur general de la Nouvelle
France," CAOM, C11A, vol. 77, fols. 205-205v.
85
"Paroles de Beauharnois a trois chefs hurons de Detroit descendus avec le chevalier de Beauharnois," 28
June 1742, CAOM, CllA, voL 77, fol. 162.
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favor, convinced the "young people" to oppose the movement. While AngBirot had not
convinced the majority of the Huron to move to Sandusky, he had prevented them from
moving to the St. Lawrence Valley and had maintained at least the possibility of a British
alliance. Both Sastaretsy and AngBirot had proven adept at creating consensus and
manipulating Huron politics to their ends.
Despite disagreements over where, and with whom, to live, the Hurons never
rejected their unity. Indeed, following the failure of the Montreal plan, the Hurons
unified once again. Most of the Hurons, including AngBirot, returned from Sandusky to
the new Jesuit mission located, not on Grosse lie as initially suggested, but on Bois Blanc
lie, ten miles downstream from Fort Pontchartrain (see Map 3). 86 Although a rumored
attack by some Ojibwas sent the greater part of the Hurons to exile in Sandusky in the
winter and spring of 1743, reassurances from the Ottawa headman, Kinosaki, convinced
"nearly all" the Hurons to return to Detroit that summer. 87 Moreover, the Hurons joined
one another to go to war against common enemies; nearly all the Huron warriors
participated in a campaign against the Chickasaws in the summer of 1741 and others
launched raids in the following years. Reconciled with their Anishinabeg neighbors and
settled in a new mission, the Hurons had overcome their differences by the summer of
1743.
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Beauharnois to the Minister, 2 Nov. 1742, CAOM, C11A, 75 :241-42v. Ang8irot, who had recently
died, was mentioned as having had a longhouse in the smaller of the two Huron villages located at the Bois
Blanc mission around 1747. Potier, "Recensement des Hurons,' Texte I, in Toupin, Les icrits de Pierre
Potier, 248.
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"Paroles de Kinousaki aux hurons Etablis aSandoske portee par six chefs Outa8acs," 5 May 1743,
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Figure 14: Detail From
Charles-Nicholas Bellin. "La
riviere du Detroit depuis le
lac Sainte-Claire jusqu'au
lac Erie," 1764. From
Archives of Ontario,
Toronto, C 78, AO 6699.
Accessed online.
This detail shows the two sites
occupied by the Detroit
Hurons between 1738 and
1753, after leaving their
original village Gust north of
the river out of view). They
first occupied Isle au Bois
Blanc Island (the small island
in the bottom left-hand
corner), then the Point au
Montreal (Immediately to the
left/west of "Villages des
Outaouais" mdicates the
Huron village and mission).

III. "a general conspiracy": The Hurons and King George's War, 1744-1748
Huron internal relations might have remained auspicious had it not been for the
ill-timed death of the Holy Roman Emperor in 1740. The controversy over who would
succeed Charles VI triggered a war between France and Great Britain as well as other
European states, the War of Austrian Succession, which spread to North America in
1744. King George's War, the American component of that conflict, reached Detroit in
August of that year. The commandant, Paul-Joseph le Mayne, Baron de Longueuil,
called a council at which he invited the Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Ottawas, and Hurons-his
"four invincible arms"-to immediately attack the British merchants in the Ohio Valley
and Britain's "brother the Flathead." Playing on the nations' loyalty to Onontio,
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Longueuil wondered "what would become of me in this conjuncture if my Children held
Themselves as Simply spectators of my quarrel with the English?" 88
Longueuil's invitation to war both renewed the conflict within the Huron
community and changed the terms of that controversy. Since Cheanonvouzon' s day, the
Hurons had maintained an ambiguous relationship with the British, and British-aligned
and pro-Seneca sentiment remained a latent position in Huron foreign policy. They
traded with them regularly at Oswego (some had been there in the summer of 1742) and
stayed on peaceful, if distant terms, with them, while maintaining relationships with the
Senecas and Flatheads, both had ties to the British. As recently as the summer of 1743,
the Hurons, probably annoyed at the rising prices and scarcity of French trading goods,
had sojourned to Albany to speak with the commissioners there. 89 The three
representatives, probably representing each of the three hontaxen, renewed the "Antient
Treaty" between the Hurons and Great Britain and showed them a large wampum beltthe same that the commissioners had given Cheanouvouzon's emissaries in 1703. 90 That
the Hurons had kept the belt-which depicted the Hurons connected to the Covenant
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" les quatre bras invincibles," "son frere le tete-plate," " si mes Enfans Se tiennent Simples spectateurs de
mon demele avec L'anglois," "Conseil tenu par Mr de Longuei.iil Commandant pour LeRoy au Detroit, aux
4. nations de Son Poste, au Sujet dela declaration de laguerre contre L'anglois," [1744], ibid., fol. 134v.
Although this address was misdated, the references to King George's War and the identification of
Longueuil as commandant points to a date in 1744. The conference took place before 1 Sept., because
Longueuil mentioned it in a letter to the governor and probably took place around August, when an habitant
noted that he had provided a cow for a "war feast" lfestin de guerre"). Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas,
7 Nov. 1744, NYCD, 9:1111; "Fournitures faites par moy Jean Baptis bondist [Bondy] pour le Service du
Roy Suivant les ordres de Monsieur Chevalier de Longueuil," 31 Juillet 1745, CAOM, C11A, 83 :298.
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The British blockade of French shipping had created an acute shortage of goods, recognized not only by
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MacLeod, "Une conspiration generale", 1, 32, 57-67.
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Chain-demonstrates the lingering attachment of at least a group of Hurons to the
British, which became problematic with the renewal of war in 1744. 91
Since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the tentative and grudging peace between the
French and British in North America facilitated the Hurons' ambiguous geo-strategic
situation: the French had not asked the Hurons to fight the British since 1713, although
the Hurons had regularly raided British allies like the Flatheads and Chickasaws. In
August 1744, however, Longueuil and Beauhamois rendered such ambiguous neutrality
less tenable and intensified the debate between those Hurons who supported British
alignment and those who wished to remain within the French orbit. As had the dispute
over how to respond to the Ottawa threat in 1738, the controversy about whether either to
support the British and live at Sandusky or to support the French and remain at Bois
Blanc Island once again exposed disagreement within the Huron polity and the same two
groups reemerged. In the context of an Anglo-French conflict, however, the stakes were
much higher and the rhetoric more charged. Indeed, the debate reached its apogee in
1747, when Orontony and other dissenters allegedly tried to destroy Detroit.
Nonetheless, the debate within the Huron community was not whether to remain united,
but how a united community should position itself in a rapidly changing world.
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin once again led the French-aligned group, who
supported remaining at the Bois Blanc Island and fighting the British and Flatheads.
During the council, the Sinago Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, pointedly offered the war belt to
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The Hurons' British-aligned position was not, as Peter MacLeod suggests, simply a response to the
shortage of French goods in the region during the war. That position had a much longer lineage and
involved a significantly different vision of how the Hurons would position themselves in a shifting world
("Une conspiration generate, 67, 152).
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Sastaretsy and asked him to be its "guardian." Although the Huron leader initially
demurred-perhaps an indication of the indecision within the Huron ranks-Kinosaki
insisted and Sastaretsy accepted the belt. 92 In the spring of 1745, several Huron parties
set out from Detroit to attack the Flatheads and British. 93 Huron warriors also joined the
Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas in a campaign on the Carolina frontier later that
summer. Although the foray had limited success, two Hurons parties refused to "return
[to Detroit] without doing anything" and remained until they finally succeeded. 94 In the
spring of 17 46 the Hurons hosted a war feast at Bois Blanc for the Potawatomis, Ottawas,
and Ojibwas and then left to fight the Chickasaws and Flatheads. 95 That summer a large
contingent of Hurons joined an army commanded by Fran<;ois-Pierre de Rigaud de
Vaudrueil, son of the longtime governor, and participated in the sack of Fort
Massachusetts. 96 The Huron warriors loitered around Montreal during the following fall
and winter, occasionally participating in raids on the British frontier. 97
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While Sastaretsy and other Hurons supported war against Great Britain, a second
group, once again led by Ang8irot, but now joined by Orontony, slowly emerged after the
beginning of war. 98 Based at Sandusky, where at least a few Hurons had remained since
the general exodus in the fall of 1738, this group openly courted British favor. If this
option had been attractive in 1738, it seemed even more so now. Although the war had
not reached North America until1744, the War of Austrian Succession had begun in
1740, and the British navy had severely crippled France's ability to ship trading goods to
New France. 99 Indeed, Longueuil complained that the British had "reddened the ocean

°

with my Blood." 10 Consequently the prices of these goods rose, when they could be
found at all. By 1744, the scarcity of goods at Detroit and Niagara had driven the "far
Indians" like the Hurons to shop at Oswego. 101 When the Hurons returned the following
year, the British commandant of the post, Lt. John Lindesay, was ready for them. He
bluntly told the natives that the French would soon be completely unable to supply their
needs and that they should regard the British "as the only ones who will be able to
fournish them with merchandise." The peoples of Detroit had obliged the British

vol. 85:193, 292v, 228-228v, 306-307; vol. 86: 214v, 218, 224v, 225v; vol. 87:6-6v; vol. 115: 260-70v,
vol. 117 :210v, 261,263, 372,373, vol. 118: 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59.
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commandant and were "leaving continually" to go to Oswego. When confronted, the
Detroit natives told Longueuil that "Goods Were too dear here and at Niagara." 102 As
these Hurons later explained to the Irish trader, George Croghan, the French had charged
so much for trading goods that the Hurons "cou'd not buy them." 103
Making a gamble that the French would indeed run out of goods and perhaps even
succumb to British arms-which the British assured them would happen-this second
Huron group began dealing directly with the British. Many of them moved to the Huron
settlements in the Ohio Valley, particularly at Sandusky, in order to deal more easily with
British traders, who frequented the spot. In addition to visiting Oswego in 1744 and
1745, these Hurons began conspiring with the Iroquois to reject the French alliance
altogether and to join the Covenant Chain. The British had distributed "subterranean
belts" throughout the pays d'en haut to encourage the natives to "declare themselves
against the French." 104 This message had apparently reached the Hurons because
Longueuil sent them an urgent message in March 1746 asking them not to listen to either
the Senecas or the British, who were "sowing terror" among the peoples of the pays d' en
haut. He begged them to return to Detroit that spring and meet with him. 105 Yet
Longueuil' s effort failed: some Hurons appear to have fought alongside the British or the
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"L'anglois leur declare qu'ils doivent les regarder. .. comme les Seuls qui pourront leur fournir des
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Flatheads in the autumn of 1746. The French rewarded the Detroit Kiskakon leader,
Mikinac, for deterring his warriors from attacking "five huron prisoners" who arrived at
Detroit in November 1746. 106 Father Richardie, who had retired as superior of the Bois
Blanc mission that summer and moved to the Jesuit mission at Jeune Lorette (near
Quebec), alluded to the Hurons' dealings with the British at the end of 1746. Sending a
message with some Hurons from the Lorette settlement who went to Detroit, he pleaded
with the Hurons to "listen to the message [of the Governor] there where you are. Don't
listen to any other." 107 Yet the Hurons had already listened to, and heeded, the messages
coming from the British and Iroquois.
In moving to Sandusky and dealing directly with the British, the Hurons joined a

larger movement taking root in the Ohio Valley in the 1740s. Delawares and Shawnees
from the Susquehanna Valley had been moving into the region in increasing numbers
since the 1720s and reached "a flood stage by midcentury." 108 Members of the Six
Nations Iroquois, especially the Senecas, also moved to the region in search of game.
Often referred to as "Mingos," these Ohio Iroquois effectively extended the influence of
the Six Nations into the region and claimed authority over their neighbors. 109 Many of
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these new settlers in the Ohio Valley lived in cosmopolitan villages which the royalist
French disparaged as mongrel "republics" existing outside of any recognizable political
order. 110 The presence of these groups set the stage for the last phase of the AngloFrench rivalry in continental North America during the 1740s and 1750s.
The Hurons' prefatory dealings with the British paled in comparison to the failed
attempt by Orontony and other discontented Sandusky Hurons to attack Detroit in May
1747. Orontony apparently heeded the British wampum belts and Seneca encouragement
and believed the British warnings about New France's imminent collapse. 111 In the
winter of 1746-1747, while some Hurons were in Montreal from where they launched
raids against the New England colonies, Orontony and his people decided to attack Fort
Pontchartrain, where they planned to assassinate at least Father Potier and Commandant
Longueuil and perhaps all the French people at the fort. Accordingly, in early May
Orontony and some Huron warriors killed five French traders at Sandusky and left for
Bois Blanc Island, where they arrived on 20 May, ostensibly to celebrate the Vigil of
Pentecost on the following day. 112 According to later reports, Orontony and his followers
planned go to Fort Pontchartrain the following day, Sunday, to celebrate the holiday and
map of the middle British colonies in America," 1754; Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 13 Nov. 1763,
NYCD, 7:573; "Enumeration oflndians within the Northern Department," 18 Nov. 1763, ibid., 583. For
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110
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remain there Sunday night. The Hurons apparently slept in the French fort frequently and
the French, as yet unaware of the murders at Sandusky, had no reason to suspect
Orontony' s motives. In the middle of the night, the warriors would awaken and massacre
the unwitting French people entirely, then bathe the fort in "fire And Blood." 113
Unfortunately for Orontony, a loyal Huron woman overheard the conspirators
discussing the plan on Saturday night and immediately told one of the lay Jesuit brothers
at the mission. 114 Father Potier hastened to Fort Pontchartrain, where he arrived at
midnight, and breathlessly told Longueuil of the anticipated plot. 115 Having discovered
the conspiracy, Longueuil had all the French people assemble in the fort and, addressing
the natives with "prudence and Firmness," prevented the deliberated attack. 116 Although
the French had thwarted the plot, the failed coup set off alarms throughout the pays d' en
haut and the French, convinced that the British had turned their allies against them, saw
would-be conspirators behind every tree. Continued rumors of conspiracies from around
the Great Lakes and actual attacks, such as the murder of a trader by Ojibwa warriors and
raids on the cattle of Detroit, convinced the French that there was "a general Conspiracy
of the black skin against the White." 117

113

"mettre tout a feu Et Sang," "Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart)," CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fols.
74-75 (quote from 74v); Jose Dubois Berthelot de Beaucours," Memoire de Canada en 1747," ibid., fols.
16-16v; Madame Jorbert de Longueuil au rninistre, 2 Nov. 1747, ibid., vol. 89, fol. 252v.
114
Beaucours, Memoire de Canada de 1747, CAOM, CllA, fol. 87, fol. 16.
115
Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), ibid, fol. 75; Pierre Potier, Journal, Gazette de Potier, AJC,
BEL1-17/03-05-08A, pg. 43.
116
"La prudence et La fermete," Madame Jorbert de Longueil au rninistre, 2 Nov. 1747, CAOM, C11A,
89 :252v; "Memoire de Canada de 1747 par Beaucours, gouverneur de Montreal," ibid., vol. 87, fol. 16.
117
"une Conspiration generalle de la peau noir contre la Blanche," Beaucours, Memoire, ibid., vol. 87, fol.
16; For the Ojibwas' looting, the murder of the habitant, Pierre St. Onze dit Martineau, and evidence of a
larger conspiracy, see ibid., vol. 87, fol. 16v; "Enterrement de Pierre St. Onze," 31 Aug. 1747, RPD,
1:439 ; Journal (de la Gallisoniere et Hocquart) in CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fols. 179, 180 ; "Indian Letter to
Gov. Thomas," 16 May 1747, Pennsylvania Archives, 1' 1 Ser., 1:741. For evidence of anti-French activity
elsewhere in the pays d'en haut, see "Journal of Occurrences," 1747, NYCD, 10:119, "Occurrences in

209

Orontony' s failed coup sharpened the divisions between the "faithful" Frenchaligned Hurons who remained at Detroit and the "rebellious" British-aligned Hurons who
lived at Sandusky and later on the Muskingum River in Ohio. Led by Sastaretsy and
Tayachitin, the "loyal," or Detroit, Hurons-amounting to about half of the populationcharted a path that affirmed their loyalty to the French and sought to win Orontony and
his band back to Detroit. 118 Sastaretsy and Tayachitin immediately denounced the attack
and declared that they had "no part" in Orontony' s attack and pledged unconditional
loyalty to the French. 119 Afraid to remain at the exposed Bois Blanc Island, these leaders
and about half of the Huron population set up a temporary encampment adjacent to Fort
Pontchartrain-figurative and literally attaching themselves to the French-and later
settled at the Pointe au Montreal, directly across the river from the fort. 120 Longueuil
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even employed the Hurons as retainers to defend the weakly garrisoned fort, providing
food and repairing weapons for the Hurons at the Crown's expense. 121 Several of these
loyal warriors went to war against the French foes, the Chickasaws. 122 Sastaretsy and
Tayachitin, along with thirteen other French-aligned Hurons elders, left Detroit in midJune to address the governor directly. 123 Although Sastaretsy died soon after their arrival
in Quebec, Tayachitin and the others addressed the new governor, Roland-Michel Barrin
de La Galissoniere, in early August. Tayachitin maintained that his people, and those of
Sastaretsy, remained "good children" and asked for pardon for Orontony and the errant
Hurons. 124
Although Tayachitin also died before he could leave Montreal, both his and
Sastaretsy' s successors continued their policy of French alliance and appeasement of
Orononty. 125 Sometime in September, "two Huron Chiefs," presumably the heirs of
Sastaretsy and Tayachitin, met with Longueuil, the Potawatomis, and the Ottawas at
Detroit. These "seemingly faithful" Hurons pledged their loyalty once more and agreed
to visit Orontony at Sandusky. 126 The following April, the French-aligned Hurons met
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with representatives of other nations around Detroit and joined them in swearing their
"fidelity and obedience" to Onontio. This time, however, they went a step further and
pledged to defend their French allies from any would-be attackers. They would treat
such aggressors-even if they happened to be Hurons-as a "common enemy." 127 Once
again, Huron representatives from the "Sastaredzy band" visited Montreal in July 1748.
Once again, they denied any part in Orontony's dealings. As proof of their continued
loyalty, they offered to send the warriors in a campaign against the British. 128 These
Hurons reportedly agreed to strike against the renegade Miamis. 129
In stark contrast to the group led by Sastaretsy and Tayachitin, Orontony and his
people not only fully embraced the British cause, but actively recruited other nations to
do the same in the months following the attack. Some four hundred of these "rebel"
Hurons returned with Orontony to Sandusky after the conflict. In July William Johnson
noted that these Hurons had "cut off all communication" between the western posts and
Montreal. 130 The next month they received British traders who, according to Longueuil,
supplied Oronotny and his followers with ammunition and arms. 131 Later that month
some Cayugas told Sir William Johnson that the "Chienondadeys," or the Sandusky
Hurons, were "resolved to Destroy Niagara" (the French trading post) which they viewed
as an "Impediment in their way to Oswego" (the British entrep6t). 132 By September a
British factor observed that the "Inguns att this side of Lake Eary is Makeing war very
127
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Briskly Against the French." 133 That autumn, Conrad Weiser reported that these Hurons
had sent a "Black Belt" to the Delawares, Shawnees, and Susquehannas, to "cut off a
French Settlement to the South of Lake Erie," probably Niagara. 134 They also gave them
the five scalps they had lifted from the French people at Sandusky. 135 Around the same
time, Theata or Tahake, a leader of the Orontony group, visited the British and brought
back messages from them for the Hurons. 136 The following winter, traders from
Pennsylvania visited Orontony twice at Sandusky. 137
In addition to courting the British directly, Orontony sought to bring neighboring
nations into his anti-French coalition. According to Louis La Come, a French officer,
Orontony and his people served as a "conduit" for the "Solicitation of the English." 138 As
early as April of that year, the Hurons were actively engaged in attracting the
Kahnawakes and the people of Oka to the British alliance. 139 They continued these
efforts following the attack. In August, Orontony intercepted at Sandusky a Shawnee
delegation headed to Detroit. He persuaded them not to continue to the fort, and only a
single delegate went to the post to meet Longueui1. 140 The commandant of Kaskaskia
likewise learned that a Huron representative, "a firm Scoundrel," had traveled to the

133

George Croghan to Thomas Lawrence, 18 Sept. 1747, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1:770.
The "Jonontadyhagas," were from "Deoghsagronty," or Detroit. "Council held at Philadelphia," 6 Nov.
1747, Hazard, Minutes from the Provisional Council of Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania,
136.
135
"Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," CAOM, CllA, vol. 87, fol. 204v.
136
"Continuation du journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart) concernant ce qui s'est passe d'interessant
dans la colonie," Oct.-Nov. 1747, ibid., fol. 99.
137
"Journal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," ibid., fol. 198.
138
La Corne au ministre, 1 Oct. 1747, ibid., vol. 89, fol. 236. The governor and intendent also claimed that
Orontony sought to facilitate British settlement south of Lake Erie. "Journal (de La Galissioniere et
Hocquart)," 1747-1748, ibid., vol. 87, fol. 177.
139
"Colonel Johnson's Speech to the Indians and their Answer," 25 April1747, NYCD, 6:359.
140
"Journal (de La Galissioniere et Hocquart), 1747-1748," CAOM, CllA, 87:176v.
134

213

Shawnee settlement of Scioto to further "Their bad designs toward the French." 141
Orontony also received a delegation of Miamis, whom he encouraged to join the British
alliance and whom he informed that Detroit had already been destroyed. Some of these
Miamis, led by the headman La Damoiselle, "allowed themselves" to be seduced by
Orontony and formed a British-aligned village of their own at Pickiwillany. 142 The
Hurons even convinced some Ottawas to establish themselves along the Miami River,
where they could trade with the British. 143
Orontony further amplified this divergent trajectory by moving from Sandusky to
Conchake, a village at the head of the Muskingum, where he would be more convenient
to the British and more distant from the French (see Map 2). Conchake was well suited
to Orontony' s needs. While Sandusky was reachable from Detroit in two or three days,
the journey from Detroit to Conchake-some one hundred miles south of Sanduskytook closer to two weeks. 144 Accordingly, Orontony and his village could escape the
watchful eye of the French. Located in the Ohio River watershed, the Hurons could
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expect regular visits from British traders from Pennsylvania and frequent contact with
other groups, such as the Shawnees settled at nearby Scioto, the British-aligned Miamis
at Pickiwillany, and the Ohio Iroquois at settlements such as Cuyahoga. 145 Orontony
asked the Ohio Iroquois permission to move further into the Ohio Valley, and sometime
in late January or early February 1748 Orontony and his people left Sandusky and
sojourned to Conchake. 146 By 1751, Christopher Gist noted that some one hundred
"Wyendott" families inhabited the town, which he called Muskingum, and that George
Croghan maintained a trading post there. 147 This Huron-British intimacy even produced
a child, a little boy named Nicolas born to an unknown English father and a baptized
Huron mother in 1751. 148 Both metaphorically and geographically, Orontony had moved
his people further from the French and closer to the British.
Orontony's dealings with the British culminated in a September 1748 meeting at
Conchake. Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian agent, along with traders George
Croghan and Andrew Montour, arrived at Conchake and held a council with the
"Wondots" on Sept 6. As they had in 1743, the Hurons displayed the belt which the
Hurons had long ago given to Cheanonvouzon's delegates and reminded the British
representatives of the "Treaty of Friendship" the two nations had completed long ago.
145
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The Hurons, according to Weiser, were "mightily pleas'd" that they regarded them as
"Brethren of the English." To consolidate this new friendship, the Senecas, Onondagas,
Hurons, and Britons met and formally solemnized the Hurons' entrance to the Covenant
Chain. As the Seneca speaker put it, the Hurons, having left the French, would "now join
us, & our _Brethren, the English & you to become one People with us." The Seneca man
then presented them with a belt from the British with which he symbolically tied the
Hurons to the British, Six Nations, and other nations of the Ohio Valley. 149
By September 1748, then, the crisis within the Huron community had become
more serious than ever. The Detroit Hurons had vowed to support and defend the French
force against any attack, thereby committing themselves, in theory, to fighting their
Huron brothers, while Orontony had conspired with the Hurons' neighbors in the Ohio
Valley to attack the French. In addition to their figurative estrangement, the two parties
had literally moved farther apart from one another and closer to their respective allies.
The Sastaresty/Tayachitin group had moved from Bois Blanc Island to a new mission on
Pointe a Montreal, just across the river from Fort Pontchartrain, and the Orontony group
had left Sandusky for Conchake, near the Pennsylvania frontier and in proximity to
Logstown and other British posts. Orontony's band had even informed the Iroquois that
they "no longer saw themselves as Hurons ... but as Iroquois." 150 A few years later,
Otiok8andoron related his fears about his "false brothers." 151
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This growing estrangement was not lost on local observers. The Kiskakon
Ottawa headman, Mikinic, for example, observed toward the end of 1747 that the
Sandusky Hurons had become "a separate part" of the Huron nation. 152 Marking this
rupture between the two Huron groups, French observers likewise began to embrace a
taxonomy of divergence. They differentiated between the Hurons of Detroit-"those
who remain faithful to the French," and the Sandusky Hurons whom they termed
"evildoers," the "fugitive hurons," the "rebels," and the "nicola"ites." 153 At the same time,
these observers grew pessimistic about the possibility-and even the desirability-of the
Sandusky Hurons' return to Detroit. Father Pierre Potier, Richardie's replacement at
Detroit, concluded that "Nicolas and his adherents ... will always persist in Their schism."
Moreover, in the improbable case that the Sandusky Hurons would return, the missionary
feared that they would ruin the faithful disposition of the Detroit Hurons and "reignite the
land." 154 Clear lines had been drawn between the Sandusky and Detroit Hurons and the
smart money held that reunification was unlikely.

IV. "Our mats are reunited": Resolution, 1749-1753
In many ways, by 1748 the Hurons appeared to have divided into two separate

groups living in two separate places and following two incompatible trajectories. By then
the Hurons had been engaged in a serious controversy for a full decade. Between 1738
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and 1743 elements of the Huron polity had angrily disagreed about where best to settle
and how to orient themselves diplomatically. The resumption of war between France and
Great Britain in 1744 only intensified the controversy and defined the sides more clearly.
This escalation culminated in Orontony' s failed strikes and subsequent dealings with the
British. Yet if the groups had become more ossified, the Huron community had not yet
completely divided into two irreconcilable entities. Indeed, the boundaries between the
groups remained fluid, and many Hurons remained profoundly ambivalent in their
loyalties. Moreover, the Hurons demonstrated a stubborn desire to remain united in the
years and months following 21 May 1747. Unwilling to simply divide and go their
separate ways, each group instead struggled to win the other over to its position and once
again to operate as a single, integrated community. These attempts resulted in the return
of nearly all the remaining "rebel" Hurons to Detroit, and the subsequent abandonment of
the Huron settlements in the Ohio Valley. This period should be read, therefore, not as
the moment of ethnogenesis of two distinct groups, but of a determined and earnest
controversy within a robust and well-integrated community. The Hurons' persisting
durability testifies to the internal coherence within native groups.
From the beginning, the lines between the Conchake Hurons and those of Detroit
had always remained ambiguous and the two groups had never really operated as closed
and fixed entities. Hurons from both camps easily passed back and forth between both
Detroit and the Ohio Valley, especially Sandusky. AngBirot and Orontony even
maintained houses at Detroit as late as the winter of 1746-1747, and Orontony lived two
doors down from Sastaretsy. Sastarety's mother-in-law, moreover, lived at the Sandusky
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settlement. 155 In the months following the failed attack, the French knew about
Orontony' s dealings during these months in surprising detail, suggesting that Hurons
continued to travel easily between the settlements and passed information along to their
missionaries and the French officers. 156 Moreover, many Hurons seemed to be genuinely
ambivalent about where their loyalties lay and therefore did not easily fit into either
camp. The fact that Father Potier described Ang8irot as "janus quirinus" also suggests
that the leader's position was ambiguous and ambivalent, not rigid and irreconcilable. 157
George Croghan believed that if the British failed to supply Orontony sufficiently, the
Hurons would "Tum to the French" once again. 158 After Orontony' s failed attack, the
French frequently testified to this ambiguity, expressing concerns that the "seemingly
loyal" Hurons were actually serving as spies for Orontony and that they might at any
moment betray the French. 159 Although these fears were perhaps exaggerated, they
nonetheless suggest that lines between the two groups had not yet hardened completely.
If contemporary French observers could not readily distinguish between the "faithful"
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and "rebellious" Hurons, perhaps those lines were not as clearly demarcated as they
sometimes seemed.
Not only had the two groups been ambiguous and fluid, but the Hurons showed a
resolute commitment to reunite the fractured Huron community. These efforts
differentiated the Ohio Huron communities from those formed by the Iroquois in the
region. According to Jon Parmenter, migration served as a means of diffusing potentially
destructive dissent for the Six Nations. Parmenter argues that discontented Iroquois
frequently left their villages in Iroquoia to settle in the Iroquois settlements in the St.
Lawrence and Ohio valleys. These splinter communities continued to communicate and
cooperate with the Iroquois Confederacy, however, and in fact facilitated the projection
of Iroquois influence far from Iroquoia. 160 Yet the Hurons, who numbered somewhere
between six and eight hundred people compared to perhaps 6,400 Iroquois, could ill
afford to lose such a substantial part of their population. Such a split would have
severely compromised the Hurons' ability to survive as independent and to retain th~ir
hard-won autonomy. With their population divided into two, the Ottawas would have
dominated the Hurons remaining at Detroit (as they had when they lived at
Michilimackinac), and the Ohio Iroquois would have subsumed the Conchak:e Hurons. In
fact, the British had given the Hurons "over in [the Iroquois] charge," and the Iroquois
claimed to be "fathers and brothers." Although settlement at nearby Sandusky would
allow the Hurons to remain socially and politically unified, settlement at Conchak:e would
have only diffused Huron power instead of extending it.
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Rather than accept division as a means of keeping peace and of extending Huron
influence, therefore, leaders of each side pursued a campaign to win the others to their
camp. The Detroit Hurons, for their part, immediately sought to rehabilitate Orontony
and to bring the Hurons separatists back to Detroit. Knowing the regard that Orononty
and his supporters had for Father Richardie, the Hurons who descended to Montreal in
the summer of 1747 convinced Gov. La Gallisoniere to send the priest to Sandusky to
meet with the rebels. Interestingly, the Hurons asked for Richaride to "reestablish
tranquility in this Nation," suggesting that the conflict was an interior crisis for the
Hurons as much as a diplomatic crisis for the French. 161 Accordingly, Richardie arrived
in October 1747. 162 After the death of the elder Sastaretsy in August 1747, the new
Sastaretsy went to Sandusky to invite Orontony to speak with Longueuil. Although
Sastaretsy finally convinced Orontony to come to Detroit, where the leader surrendered
the belts he had received from the British, a strategic attack by a handful of Hurons and
Iroquois on some Frenchmen near the fort successfully scuttled these talks. 163
Undeterred, Sastaretsy sent deputies to Conchake in the spring of 1748 and again invited
the errant Hurons back to Detroit, and succeeded in bringing back seventy men with their
families. 164 Thereafter Sastaretsy and Richardie continued to lobby the Conchake Hurons
to return to Detroit. 165
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These efforts by the loyal Hurons and Richardie soon began to bear fruit. When
Conrad Weiser passed through the Ohio Valley later in 1749 he heard that "the Wondots
[Hurons] had a mind to go back again to the French." Although he later concluded that
this news was unfounded, the rumor nonetheless suggests that some of the Conchake
Hurons had doubts about remaining in the Ohio Valley and had contemplating returning
to Detroit. 166 In September, shortly after Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville led an
expedition of St. Lawrence domicilies and French soldiers through the Ohio Valley,
Potier noted that "some families" from Orontony's band had "settled at the mission." 167
Richardie even boasted that "the rebels were beginning to come to repentance" and that
Orontony was losing supporters "every day." 168
Orontony also toiled to attract the Hurons of Detroit to Sandusky and later
Conchake. The Sandusky leader, Theata, visited the British in the summer of 1747 and
returned to speak to the Detroit Hurons., which had a "very bad Effect," on the loyal
Hurons. 169 When he spoke to Conrad Weiser the following September, Orontony told the
Pennsylvanian that the rest of his nation had been "left behind at another Town a good
distance off'-meaning Detroit-but that he hoped those Hurons "wou'd follow" him
and denounce the French alliance. 170 In September 1749, Theata visited either Oswego

166

Weiser, "Journal," 1748-1749, in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:28.
"Q[uelque] families qui se sont ranges ala mission," Potier to Marcol, 29 Sept. 1749 in Toupin Les
ecrits de Pierre Potier, 629; "Copie de !'instruction secrete donnee aM. de Celoron ... par M. le marquis de
La Jonquiere," [1749], CAOM, C11E, vol. 13, fols. 212-15; William J. Eccles, "Celoron de Blainville,
Pierre-Joseph," DCB, vol. 3 [on-line].
168
"le pere La Richardie m'a dit que les rebelles commencoient a venir a rescipiscence, et que la bande de
Nicolas diminuoit tousles jours" Jean de Bonnecamp, "Relation du voyage de la Belle riviere fait en
1749," in JR, 69:192.
169
"un tres mauvais Effect," "Continuation dujournal (de La Galissoniere et Hocquart) concernant ce qui
s'est passe d'interessant dans la colonie," Oct.-Nov. 1747, CAOM, C11A, vol. 87, fol. 99.
170
Weiser, Journal, 1748, in Thwaites;Early Western Travels, 1:30.
167

222

or Albany. Giving Theata a belt to present to Sastaresty, the British officials asked the
Huron leader to invite the "faithful" Hurons to come trade at Oswego. 171 According to
one French officer, the Hurons who "had remained faithful until now" had accepted this
belt and planned to join Orontony at Conchake in the autumn. 172 The Conchake Hurons
apparent! y believed this as well. In January 1751 they confident! y asserted that the
"other Part of the Wyendott Nation would desert the French" and "join their Brethren" at
Conchake. 173 Gist, Montour, and Croghan met with these Hurons again the following
year. Noting that the Huron nation still remained divided in its loyalty, Gist hoped that
Conchake Hurons would "endeavor to bring over your brethren." 174 These continued
efforts, and the possibility of complete Huron defection to Conchake, demonstrates that
there was an ongoing debate within a cohesive Huron community. At one point, Celoron,
the new commandant of Detroit, even suggested that the Conchake Hurons might come
back to Detroit in order to "dethrone sasetaredzy" and to corrupt the heretofore faithful
Hurons. 175 These attempts by both groups to win over the other demonstrate that neither
had accepted the division of their nation. Despite their differences, they thought of
themselves as one nation.
After the death of Orontony in the summer of 1750, these negotiations reached a
critical juncture. The departure of the charismatic figure and the purported ringleader of
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the Huron mutiny created a diplomatic opportunity and gave the Detroit Hurons hope that
they could reconcile with their brothers at Conchake. While Orontony had French blood
on his hands and had invested everything in his British-aligned stance, his successors
might prove better able to reach an accommodation. Accordingly the Detroit Hurons
launched a diplomatic mission to convince the Conchake Hurons to return to Detroit. The
"2 principal chiefs" of the Detroit Hurons-Sastaretsy, and OtiokBandoron, or Babi, a
leader of the Turtle hontaxen-accompanied by several other Huron elders and Father
Richardie, left Detroit in early September to meet with the Conchake Huron elders and to
winter in the Ohio Valley. 176 When the party reached the site of Tanouatekiori on the
Vermilion River, a day and half journey from Conchake, the Detroit Huron elders left
Richardie, who had been warned that the Conchake Hurons intended to kill him, and
continued on to Conchake. Once Sastaresty, OtiokBandoron, and the other Hurons
arrived at Conchake, they planned to hold councils with the Conchake Hurons for a few
days and then repair to Tanouatekiori to meet with Richardie. 177
Sastaretsy and Richardie, however, made little progress until a critical misstep by
the British turned the tide toward the Detroit Hurons. Sometime in November or early
December, some British traders had ransacked the longhouse belonging to Atironta at
Sandusky and stolen a blanket, deerskins, and a broken musket. When news of the crime
reached Conchake, it galvanized the community and created a "general Consternation
among the Hurons." 178 Indeed sentiment had shifted so dramatically against the British
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by January 1751 that few of the "great men" bothered to come meet the Pennsylvania
Indian Agent, Christopher Gist, at Conchake. 179 Making the most of this opportunity,
Father Richardie convinced not only the longhouse led by Aritonta but five other
influentiallonghouses to abandon the treacherous British and to return to Detroit. 180 As a
result, a "large party of fugitive Hurons" arrived at the Jesuit mission at the Pointe au
Montreal the following summer. In June and July, several French habitants at the fort
supplied goods and services, at the Crown's expense, to the "four families returned to the
Mission." 181 More Conchake Hurons followed in the summer of 1752, and Longueuil
heard that they all planned to return that summer. 182
After the defection of these families in 17 51, the Conchake Hurons found their
position increasingly untenable. Although the British had proved energetic and attractive
allies during King George's War, the end of hostilities and the return of the French into
the region made their separate existence in the region less tenable. Following the end of
hostilities in 1748, Gov. Galissoniere sent a detachment of 230 French and native soldiers
into the Ohio Valley to reassert French claims to the region. The army, led by Celoron ,
also sought to "chase the Hurons who had assassinated some Frenchmen" and to "whip
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Home" the Miamis at Pickiwillany and the Hurons at Conchak:e. 183 The French also
established a fort at Sandusky at the same time. 184 Although the British reported that the
Hurons ofConchak:e had dismissed Celoron's mission "as ajest," the natives clearly
found it troubling. In an angry message to governors of the British colonies, the Hurons
charged that the British, contrary to their word, had not included the Hurons in the treaty
at the conclusion of King George's War. As a result, the French "are always threatening
us," and the Hurons "dare not" stray too far from their village. They implored the
British, therefore, to "have us included in the Peace." 185 Unwilling to provoke another
war with France, the British did nothing but reassure the Hurons of their good intentions
and wish them luck. 186
Even more intimidating than Celoron's mission, the French organized another
campaign against the Conchak:e Hurons' neighbors, the Miamis of Pickiwillany, in the
summer of 1752. 187 Although that mission faltered, a number of Ottawas from
Michilimackinac and Potawatomis from Fort St. Joseph did decisively strike the Miami
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settlement. 188 When the British did nothing to protect their Miami allies from a Frenchinstigated attack, the Hurons finally turned against the British alliance. Exasperated by
the British abandonment, they sent a curt message to the governor of Pennsylvania in
1755 telling them they had left Conchake. 189
If the French threat had not been menacing enough, the Conchake Hurons also
faced the prospect of a poor harvest and a smallpox outbreak in the spring and summer of
1752. The harvest had been particularly bad in the autumn throughout the pays d'en
haut, but especially in the "southern posts." 190 Weakened by hunger and suffering from
malnutrition, the peoples of the pays d' en haut faced an outbreak of smallpox in the
spring of 1752. At Detroit alone, the disease had killed fourteen Ottawas, including the
Sinago Ottawa headman Kinosaki, around the same number of Potawatomis, and at least
one Huron woman, before the end of April. The Ottawa headman, Mikinic, furthermore,
refused to attack Pickiwillany in autumn 1751 for fear of the disease. 191 The disease
apparently persisted throughout the summer, killing a native slave in September of that
year. 192 This hunger and disease apparently hit the Hurons of Conchake especially hard.
In 1755 Chaussegros de Lery noted that a hundred and twenty Hurons had perished in a
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single summer, presumably that of 1752. 193 Such losses were dramatic for the "rebel"
group, which probably did not number more than four hundred at the time. In June and
July of 1753, Father Potier interred six different Hurons, who had perished "at
Conchak:e," in the mission cemetery. If the Hurons continued to practice the Feast of the
Dead, then these Hurons had likely died the previous year and their cleaned bones were
now being interred. 194 Celoron hoped that the disease might "contribute a great deal" to
the Conchake Hurons' return. 195
The Conchak:e Hurons therefore faced some unpleasant realities. They had lost
the charismatic Orontony in 1750 and an important part of their population in the
following year. The British and Iroquois, moreover, seemed unwilling or unable to
satisfy their promises to protect the Hurons. The French remained intent on rooting the
British out of the Ohio Valley and on either reabsorbing or entirely destroying the
Pickiwillany and Conchake communities. 196 The Detroit Hurons likewise continued to
refuse to join their brothers in Conchak:e. Now they had lost a serious portion of their
population to disease. Without British support and with continuing pressure, the
Conchak:e Hurons could do little but concede that their position was untenable and seek
reconciliation with their brothers at Detroit.
The messages that Celoron and Mikinac, the Detroit Kiskak:on Ottawa leader, sent
in the winter of 1752-1753, therefore found receptive ears at Conchak:e. Speaking
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through the Turtle Huron elder, Theata, Celoron once again invited the Hurons to return
to Detroit. The officer promised that "when [the Conchake and Detroit Hurons] no
longer make but one single nation," then "Nothing bad would happen" to them. 197
Moreover, if they returned to Detroit, he would ensure their safety ensconced "in the
Arms of you father ononthio and [those] of your brothers the outaoais, pouteouatamis and
Sauteux." 198 The Hurons could expect to see their children grow and their wives live at
peace. Mikinic sent a message during the same winter. Noting that it pained him to see
the Hurons divided into two parties, the Ottawa leader implored the Conchake Hurons to
return. Since the entire episode had been sparked by the controversy between the
Ottawas and Hurons, Mikinic's assurance that the Conchake Hurons would find peace
and tranquility at Detroit carried added weight. Such promises resonated among a people
battered by threats of war, famine, and disease. As a result the Conchake Hurons testified
to the "joy which they felt intensely" upon receiving this message. 199
On 3 May 1753, accordingly, Huron elders from both Conchake and Detroit met
with Celoron, the Ottawas, and Potawatomis at the commandant's house at Detroit.
Speaking for the Conchake Hurons, Theata told the assembly that it was a "Beautiful"
day for he only had "Good Things to say." 200 At long last, Theata announced, the
Conchake Hurons had "Returned for forever," never again to "abandon their village" at
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Detroit. 201 Although the Huron community had long been "divided into two," they now
proclaimed that "we no longer differentiate our nation which now only makes one Body."
The Huron "heart" had been mended. 202
Responding to the Hurons speech ten days later, Celoron and the Potawatomis,
Ottawas, and Ojibwas all testified to their joy in seeing the Conchake Hurons returned to
Detroit. Celoron figuratively widened the reed mat-a metaphor which denoted hometo make room for the Conchake Hurons at the Pointe au Montreal village. The
commandant also offered to "Entirely Erase" any past unpleasantries between the two
nations and strongly cautioned them to abandon the British interest. The Hurons must
"Reject all the poisoned discourse that the English have made to deter them from
returning near to me." As a token of their renewed loyalty to Onontio, Celoron presented
them with a flag to fly over their village. The commandant poignantly asked the Hurons
to trade the King's Colors of Britain-which the Hurons had flown at Conchake-for the
white banner of French Bourbons.Z03 Echoing Celoron, the Potawatomis and Ottawas
presented strings of wampum to "plug up their ears" from listening to British lies and
encouraged them adhere only to Onontio's "wi11." 204
The Hurons concluded the conference by asking Celoron to send Charles
Chauvin, the longtime blacksmith at the Huron mission, and the Huron interpreter to
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Conchake to "Raise the road" for the Hurons from Conchake back to Detroit. 205 By
October, most of the Conchake Hurons had settled at the Huron mission at Pointe au
Montreal, and the reunited village had sent war parties against Onontio's enemies, the
Chickasaws and, ironically, the Flatheads. 206 As a result, French engineer and officer
Joseph-Gaspard Chaussegros de Lery found only two longhouses occupied by some
Iroquois at Conchake in 1754 and the derelict "pits and vestiges of the village." 207 In
fact, by 1761 the Huron community at Detroit numbered around eight hundred, a number
consistent with or even a bit higher than estimates from the mid-1730s, suggesting the
majority had returned to Detroit?08 The Huron community had been reunited.
Although some of the Hurons continued to live at Sandusky after 1753, they did
not constitute a separate people from the Huron village at Detroit, as many have
supposed?09 Instead the settlement served as a satellite outpost that was socially and
politically connected to the Detroit settlement. Passing through Sandusky with his Huron
masters in 1755, the captive Pennsylvanian, Charles Stuart, described a Huron
geopolitical strategy which was centered at Detroit and spread far into the Ohio Valley.
205
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The Detroit settlement on the Point au Montreal served as the "ChiefWondot [Huron]
Town," while Sandusky was the "Head Quarters of the Wondot Hunters during the
Winter Season." Radiating from this latter settlement, the Hurons maintained several
other smaller camps placed a day's travel apart from one another inhabited by a handful
of Huron people? 10 These settlements were not separate Huron communities, but Huron
nodes or outposts integrated with the Detroit community. As Stuart's own passage from
western Pennsylvania through Huron settlements in the Ohio Valley demonstrates, Huron
people constantly traveled between these villages in the years following 1753, as they had
in the preceding years. The Hurons, in fact, seemed to be a people in constant motion
during this period, and frequently travelled between posts-a three day voyage. 211 These
communities also remained politically connected. As late as 1775, the Hurons at
Sandusky told Virginia rebel authorities that the "King of the Wiandots and wise
men .. .live at Detroit" and proclaimed that they would be "ruled by them in our
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determinations." 212 As James Smith, another British captive, explicitly confirmed in
1758, the Hurons at "Sunyendeand [Sandusky] and those at Detroit were connected." 213
This geopolitical strategy served Huron interests well. 214 Economically, the
settlements reduced pressure on the Hurons' resources at Detroit and opened up access to
fresher soils and new hunting grounds. Indeed, the Hurons had begun to complain of the
encroachments of French settlers on their lands and the scarcity of resources around
Detroit. 215 Politically, these Huron outposts allowed the Hurons to keep contacts with
their allies in the Ohio Valley, the Shawnees, Ohio Iroquois, and Delawares, and of
course the British. They also facilitated the movement of Huron people and information
from the Ohio Valley to the Huron leaders at Detroit. Such an arrangement allowed the
Hurons to remain apprised of events throughout the region and to project their influence
over a large swath of the region. This strategy would serve the Hurons well following the
fall of New France in 17 60.
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V. "The Huron Name": Huron Identity
By the time the Conchake Hurons limped back to Detroit in 1753, their nation had
been racked by continual controversy for fifteen years. The fear of further Ottawa
violence had exposed a rift between French and British supporters, which the resumption
of war between those two nations only exacerbated. Orontony and his warriors had tried
to attack Detroit and kill the inhabitants there, and his move to Conchake and further
courting of the British only confirmed the distance between the two groups. All of the
original participants-the elder Sastaretsy, Tayachitin, Ang8irot, and Orontony-were
dead and buried. And yet, in spite of all of this turmoil, both groups had remained
committed to reconciling with one another, and to reunification. When it became clear
that the Detroit Hurons would not move to Conchake, Theata and the other Hurons had
moved back to Detroit, rather than integrate themselves into another nation, such as the
Shawnees at nearby Scioto, the Miamis at Pickiwillany, the Iroquois, or even the
Flatheads.
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They had in fact been invited to do so before on several occasions and

French observers thought they would join the Ohio Iroquois, but they had declined these
invitations? 17 The Conchake Hurons' decision to return to Detroit demonstrates the
nature of the decade-long debate in which they had engaged. Different Huron groups had
pursued very different alternatives but had done so within the context of a coherent
Huron community. No matter how much they may have disagreed or how heated their
216
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disputes became, the Hurons always affirmed their loyalty to other Hurons. Ultimately
the Hurons' unity-their strength-derived not from the lack of division but from their
ability to contain potentially devastating disagreements.
The key to this fractious integrity lay in a powerful Huron identity. A set of
forces created a durable sense of Huron exceptionalism and unity which bound the
community together and contained the groups, diverging interests, and ancient ethnic
loyalties that otherwise might have divided the Huron community. In particular, a sense
of Iroquoian linguistic and cultural superiority (enhanced and made more important in the
presence of Algonquian and Siouan peoples), a long-term commitment to Christianity,
and a shared narrative of suffering and sojourn combined to fuse the Hurons into a single,
integrated community, while the practices of clan exogamy buttressed this unity. This
identity was not timeless or fixed, but supple and durable. Huron identity changed over
time, but it continued to provide a touchstone for the people whom the French called
Hurons.
The first constituent of this Huron identity was a set of broad Iroquoian cultural
assumptions and practices and, of course, language. To be sure, the refugees who first
composed the Huron community in the seventeenth-century-the Tionontates, Neutrals,
and various Hurons-possessed a wide range of cultural expressions and beliefs.Z 18 Yet
they also possessed crucial similarities-overlapping matrilineal clans, a heavy
investment in horticulture, mutually intelligible Iroquoian languages, and similar
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settlement strategies, hierarchies of authority, and gender norms-which allowed them to
construct a common Iroquoian culture and identity. Exposure to other non-Iroquoian
peoples they encountered after 1649 further enhanced this sense of Iroquoian
commonality. In contrast to the significant cultural differences separating them from
Siouan and Algonquian speakers they encountered, the differences between the different
southern Ontario Iroquoians seemed less and less meaningful. This sense of cultural
commonality and superi01ity created a sense of Huron solidarity and cultural kinship
critical for the creation of a stable community. The Hurons were quicker to acknowledge
cultural and political kinship and to intermarry with distant Iroquoians like the Iroquois
and the Huron community of Jeune Lorette near Quebec, than their immediate
Algonquian-speaking neighbors, testifying to their sense of Iroquian exceptionalism and
cu1tura1 supenonty. 219
°

0

The Hurons' long-term commitment to Christianity also provided a critical
marker of Huron self-conceptions and contributed to a sense of commonality. Not only
the Detroit Hurons, who remained at the Jesuit mission, but even the British-aligned
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Conchake Hurons remained committed to Christianity. 220 These Hurons allowed the
Jesuits to winter near Sandusky during the 1740s.

221

Even Nicolas Orontony continued to

embrace Christianity. Mere months after his attempted attack on Detroit, he had Potier
solemnize his marriage to a Huron woman in November 1747, although Longueuil
demurred that the sacrament was a sacrilege. 222 After his death in 1750, moreover, Potier
interred him at Detroit. 223 The Pennsylvania Indian agent, Christopher Gist, noted that
they mistook him for a minister and asked him to perform baptisms and marriages for
them. One Huron showed him "a kind of Almanack" by which he kept track of the
Sabbath and told them that he "always observed" the holy day. 224 In 1764, the Hurons
told the British that "we are Baptized" and expected to live eternally. 225 George Croghan
confirmed that the Hurons retained "a particular attachment to the Roman Catholic
religion." 226 As had the distinctly Iroquoian Christianity among the Iroquois Catholics in
the St. Lawrence Valley, Huron Christianity provided an ideological and ritual unity
among the Hurons. 227
A shared history of common suffering and mutual support, finally, gave these
cultural and linguistic commonalities meaning and allowed the Hurons to formulate a
shared narrative of what it meant to be Huron. This people had faced a crisis of biblical
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dimensions. After having been forced into exodus by the Five Nations, they had
wandered through what seemed to them a wilderness of strange peoples and strange
lands. Once they had escaped the wrath of the Iroquois, they provoked the ire of the
Sioux. They had endured a rocky relationship with their Ottawa allies. They had fought
against the Foxes and Mascoutins, the Dutch and the British, the Catawbas and
Chickasaws. They had loved and married one another, quarreled and laughed with one
another, and lived day-by-day in the presence of their fictive and real kin. All of this
provided a basis of trust and kinship among the Hurons and allowed them to write a
narrative, a collective history, of what they had endured and how they had relied on one
another. For a century after the Huron dispersal, the people who had come to be known
as Detroit Hurons had relied on each other, had suffered alongside one another, and had
remained united. It is no surprise, then, that they chose to reunite in 1753.
If a sense of Iroquoian exceptionalism, Christianity, and a shared Huron story
provided the basis of a Huron identity, the practice of clan exogamy-epitomized by the
institution of the longhouse-supplied the practical means and the technology of that
unity. 228 The practice of marrying outside of one's clan found its expression in the Huron
institution ofthefamille or cabanne, which referred to those related people who lived in
the same longhouse. Because of the Hurons' matrilineal, matrilocal, and exogamous
customs, these longhouses were, by necessity, integrated units which involved peoples
from different clans. Because the Hurons were matrilineal and matrilocal, the women in
228
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each longhouse all belonged to the same clan, as did their children. Because of the
Hurons' exogamous tradition and matrilocality, the men living in the longhouses
belonged to different clans from their wives. Each longhouse, then, contained many
related women and children from the same clan and men from different clans. Elders
from the Deer and Wolf hontaxen clan even lived in the same longhouses as those of the
Turtle hontaxen?29
In a very real way, then, the longhouse brought together people from different

clans into one integrated institution and actual, inhabited space. They therefore tied the
different Huron clans, and separate hontaxen, into one and made it difficult to imagine a
division within the Huron polity. If clan identity continued to mean something, so did
loyalty to one's household. Ties not only of intermarriage but cohabitation in these
integrated longhouse units provided the mechanism of Huron cohesion. 230
These components combined to create a sense of belonging and loyalty to the
Huron community. The Hurons were, as the French never tired of pointing out, an
extremely proud and haughty people, a fact which little endeared them to their native
neighbors. 231 The Hurons themselves testified to this loyalty as well. In 1707, they
rejected an invitation by the Senecas to move to Iroquois territory because they feared
that their existence as a distinct people would be subsumed and "the Huron name [would]
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become extinct." They again rejected such invitations in 1739 and 1750. 232 Thirty years
later, when Sastaretsy requested permission to live close to Montreal, he stipulated that
they did not want to be "mingled with other nations." 233 When the Conchake Hurons
finally returned in 1753, they likewise testified to the bonds that held them together.
They noted that their previously intact "body" had been divided but that it now had been
healed once again. 234
Nor was this the first time that the Hurons had survived such a dispute over
whether to support the English or the French. In the 1690s, the pro-Iroquois and Britishaligned leader Le Baron, and his successor, Cheanonvouzon had articulated an explicit
pro-Iroquois and British stance, while their rivals, Kondiaronk and the current Sastaretsy,
had favored French alliance. Just as Ang8irot and Orontony had moved to settlements to
Sanduske and Conchake, Le Baron and Cheanonvouzon had moved from
Michilimackinac to the Miami settlements on the St. Joseph River in order, others
surmised, to facilitate their interactions with the Iroquois and English. Kondiaronk and
Sastaresty, like Babi and the latter-day Sastaresty, had remained at the French post and
had supported French-sanctioned raids. In the 1690s, as in the 1740s, the two sides had
quarreled bitterly, and Kondiaronk even warned the Miamis that Cheanonvouzon planned
to betray them. Yet in 1704, after Kondiaronk' s death, Cheanonvouzon had effected a
reconciliation and both had settled once again in the same village near Fort Pontchartrain.
The defection of about forty Huron families to the Shawnees, who lived in the Ohio
232
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Valley, in 1740s, might have also reflected an ongoing debate about Huron foreign
policy. Each time they had countenanced dividing and each time they had come back
again. The Hurons displayed a desire to remain united and an ability to contain
factionalism without division.

Conclusion

My reading of the episode-of a period of factional controversy within a unified
community, and of Huron persistence in the face of long odds-deviates from other
interpretations of that story, and those differences have important consequences for how
we understand the history of early America. The most sustained analysis of the event
comes from an essay written by anthropologist James Clifton in 1983. Clifton asserts
that Orontony' s defection signifies the moment of a decisive ethnogenesis of a new
group-the Wyandots of Sandusky-which formed a separate community from the
Huron community at Detroit. Using Potier's census from the winter of 1746-17 47,
Clifton noticed that both of the main leaders of the British-aligned Sandusky/Conchake
group-Ang8irot and Orontony-and many of those living at Sandusky, and later
Conchake, belonged to Turtle hontaxen. Next he observed that there had not been any
Turtle clan among the Tionontates before the Iroquois invasion in 1649 and that these
Turtles must have come from outside the Tionontates. Noting that the British-aligned
group sometimes used the name Wyandot, the autonym of the members of the Huron
Confederacy, Clifton concluded that the Turtles must have thus been composed primarily
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of the descendents of the Huron Confederacy and Neutral tribes, rather than of the
Tionontates.
Therefore, Clifton read Orontony's defection from the Detroit community and
failed attack as the decisive moment of "ethnogenesis"-or "re-ethnogenesis"-of a
long-dormant Huron identity which had remained separate from the Tionontate part of
the community and resented Sastaretsy's domination of Huron politics? 35 These Hurons
thereafter claimed the mantle of the defunct Huron Confederacy and proudly styled
themselves as "Wendat" or "Wyandot" to distinguish themselves from the Tionontates
who remained near Detroit. These groups later became the distinct communities of the
Sandusky Wyandots and Detroit Hurons?36 Richard White likewise suggests that
Orontony rebelled against the French in 1747 to "underline his own independence from
the Huron-Petuns" of Detroit. 237
Yet Clifton's characterization of Orontony' s defection has serious flaws. Given
the traditions of intermarriage between Huron clans, for instance, the idea that a portion
of the population could remain discemably distinct and separate from the rest after nearly
a century of intermarrying seems unlikely. Evidence suggests, moreover, both that the
Tionontates and members of the Huron Confederacy used the autonym "Wendat" before
1649 and that the purportedly "Tionontate" portion of the population called themselves
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"Wendats" as well, even if the French called them Hurons. 238 More importantly, Clifton
underplays the significant communication and interaction between the allegedly
separatist Hurons and those who remained loyal to the French. Clifton seemed entirely
unaware of the May 1753 conference and White only mentioned it passing. The fact that
nearly all of the Hurons returned from Conchake and joined their compatriots at Detroit
seriously undermines Clifton's reading of the event. If the Hurons had continued to
interact after the Orontony' s defection, if each side tried to coax the other to reunite, and
if they eventual did reunite, then Clifton's assertion of Huron division rings false.
The consequences of the Hurons' survival reach far beyond the Huron community
and beyond Detroit itself. For White and Clifton, the Hurons' dissolution and division
demonstrated the corrosive power of imperialism and the inherent weakness of native
polities. In the face of imperialism, the Hurons had been devastated by disease and had
been chased hundreds of miles from their homes. Finally, imperial rivalries between
France and Britain had broken the weak bonds that had tied the community together and
had broken the Hurons into even smaller fragments. Their story seems to confirm the
narrative of dissolution and shattering of native peoples throughout North America. Yet
if the Hurons did persist in spite of all of this, if they did continue to be Huron, if they
could overcome these serious divisions and remain a united people, the story reads much
differently. Instead of seeing the Huron community, and others like it, as weak and
238
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degraded, we should rather see them as cohesive and supple enough to survive the
admittedly disastrous effects of colonialism. If even the Hurons-perhaps the most
embattled people in the pays d'en haut next to the Foxes-survived as a united and
distinct polity, other nations must have as well. The pays d' en haut, then, was peopled by
a number of distinct nations who pursued their own goals and who interacted with the
French, and sometimes the British, if and when it suited their current needs.
Although the Hurons' internal crisis is the best documented, it was not
exceptional. Other nations responded to the resumption of hostilities between the British
and French in similar ways, and, like the Hurons, ultimately affirmed their commonality
and membership in robust, distinct communities. The Ottawas living at Detroit, for
example, developed different groups which favored the French and British. While the
Sinago Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, adamantly supported the French, the Kiskakon leader
Mikinic appeared inclined toward the British. Like Sastaresty and the French-aligned
Hurons, Kinosaki and his followers swore their allegiance to the French, and Longueuil
supplied provisions for them. 239 Yet Longueuil suspected that Mikinic, along with
Ottawas and Ojibwas from Saginaw "would declare themselves against us." 240 Mikinic' s
wife, whose name the French did not deign to record, had in fact visited the British at
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Oswego and returned to Detroit with two British flags and wampum belts. 241 He
reportedly claimed in council that he would decapitate Longueuil, "devour his heart and
drink his blood." As had the Huron groups, the dispute among the Ottawas generated a
serious controversy. Seventeen years later the Sinago leader Pontiac reported that he had
confronted Mikinc and told him that, if he wished to kill the French "he would have to
begin with me and my men" who would defend the Frenchmen. 242 Yet the Ottawas had
quickly resolved their disputes. Soon after the conflict, the Ottawas of Detroit, joined by
their Ottawa and Ojibwa kin from Saginaw, professed their unity and support for the
British. By 1748 Longueuil counted Mikinac as "a trusty Outaouas chief." 243 The
Miamis likewise confronted and overcame similar factional disputes during this period?44
The bonds connecting the Ottawas and Miamis, like the bonds connecting the Hurons,
could not be cut so easily.
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CHAPTER FIVE
"Elder Brother ... in My Heart": The Local Context of Pontiac's War

On 11 May 1763, the Detroit Ottawa Pontiac visited the Hurons and demanded
they join his campaign to oust the British from the post. 1 The Ottawa leader had already
invited the Hurons to participate earlier that spring and they had unceremoniously
rejected the offer. 2 Now, Pontiac insisted they join and threatened to "cut them to pieces"
if they refused. 3 Remonstrating against the Ottawas' threat of violence and presumption
of authority over them, some of the Huron warriors suggested that they attack the
Ottawas instead of the British.4 Ultimately, however opposed they were to Pontiac's war
with the British, the Wendats had little choice but to consent to Pontiac's demand.
Pontiac's coalition-composed of Ottawa, Potawatomie, and Ojibwe, and even some
Huron warriors-vastly outnumbered the Hurons. As the Huron leader Theata lamented,
even if the Hurons tried to flee Detroit, Pontiac's forces would "fall upon us and kill our
wives and children and then compell us to assist them." The Hurons therefore grudgingly
1
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2
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conceded to Pontiac's demands, promising to join the siege of Detroit after they had
celebrated Mass the following day.

5

As the Hurons would later complain to anyone who

would listen, they had been "compelled to take up arms against Detroit by the Outawas." 6
The confrontation on that May day was simply the most recent skirmish in a
months' long struggle between the two nations, which itself was part of the generationslong struggle between the Hurons and Ottawas for status in the region. In demanding that
the Hurons join the campaign and demonstrating the Ottawas' superior strength, Pontiac
sought to force the Hurons to acknowledge the Ottawas' status as elder brothers and to
restore the order at Detroit. In resisting those attempts and working to undermine
Pontiac's campaign, these Hurons asserted their autonomy and independence from the
Ottawas. The drama, therefore, followed a familiar pattern of interaction between the
two nations dating at least to their time at Michilimackinac, nearly a century before. In
1763, just as they had in 1706 or 1738, the two inseparable allies struggled to assert
power over one another. Conditions had, of course, changed through the years and
different stresses and issues precipitated conflict at different times. But the long-running
dynamic proved durable. Much had changed at Detroit, but much remained the same.
The most recent Huron-Ottawa power struggle had been triggered by the fall of
New France in 1760 and the subsequent British occupation of Detroit and the rest of the
Great Lakes Region. Particularly, a dispute over how to respond to a set of grievances
against the British pitted the old rivals against one another yet again. As the first section
below describes, the Ottawas, who had been old and enthusiastic allies of the French,
5
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6
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reacted angrily and violently to disrespectful British behavior. Seeking to oust the British
from the region to allow the French to return, Pontiac turned to his Anishinaabe allies
throughout the Great Lakes in order to accomplish his ends, as his predecessors had done
when threatened by external threats.
Unlike the Ottawas, however, the Hurons had less reason to oppose the British
and more incentive to support the new regime, as I discuss in the second section. Due to
their long association with both the Iroquois and the British, the Hurons were able to
claim an unprecedented degree of autonomy and authority after the fall of New France.
By 1758 the Hurons had positioned themselves as mediators between the nations of the
Great Lakes and the Anglo-Iroquois alliance. As a result, most, but not all, Hurons
refused to participate in Pontiac's anti-British campaign in the spring and summer of
1763. These differing reactions set up a power struggle between the Hurons and Ottawas,
which I describe in the third section. Insisting that the Hurons acknowledge Ottawa
seniority, Pontiac demanded that the Hurons participate in his campaign. Determined not
only to assert their autonomy but to defend their newfound ascendance, the Hurons
doggedly resisted these attempts. The conflict, like many before, was a fight for seniority
at Detroit to determine, as Cadillac put it many years before, whether the Hurons or
Ottawas would the "elder brothers" at Detroit. 7
The story of Huron-Ottawa conflict during Pontiac's War tells us much about
both the nature of the alliance between these peoples, which predated and long outlived
this conflict, but also something about how colonialism worked at Detroit. In the first
7
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instance, the conflict demonstrates, once again, that the vagaries of colonialism had not
shattered the Hurons or Ottawas into feeble shards. Colonial pressures had not succeeded
in breaking the barriers between the two communities, and had, in fact, sharpened those
boundaries. The exchange between the peoples also testifies to the durability of the ageold dynamic between the two peoples. The Hurons and Ottawas had long cooperated
against common foes and had lived together at Chequarnegon Bay, Michilirnackinac, and
finally Detroit-even in nearly adjacent villages since the 1750s. Still they had nurtured
a determined rivalry and looked for opportunity to prevail over their neighbors. Even
during one of the most celebrated examples of pan-Indian cooperation in American
history, the Hurons and Ottawas bickered about who would rule at horne. Not even the
unifying threat of a common enemy-which had unified the nations against the Iroquois
in the seventeenth century and the Foxes more recently-could overcome the hostilities
between the nations. This is not to say that this relationship was unchanging or stuck in
time, only that this dynamic continued to operate according to a familiar logic in new
circumstances.
Moreover, the Huron-Ottawa conflict demonstrates the degree to which
longstanding local concerns and relationships between native communities shaped
Pontiac's War and, by extension, the exercise of colonial power in the Great Lakes
region. The Huron-Ottawa rivalry affected every phase of the conflict, from its
beginning to the final reconciliation between the combatants and the British. The
relationship between the British and the peoples of Detroit, as had that between the
French and those peoples, was shaped by the Huron-Ottawa relationship. And that
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relationship was premised upon the Anishinaabe alliance which allowed the Ottawas to
wield power in the region, and the Huron-Iroquois friendship which allowed the Hurons
to claim enhanced status after 1760. In short, the relationship between the colonized and
the colonizers was conditioned by and circumscribed within a set of relationships among
native peoples.

I. "welcome to our Country": The British Occupation of Detroit

When British soldiers arrived to take possession of Detroit in early December
1760, a few months after the French had surrendered Montreal to the British and signed
articles surrendering New France to British forces, they found the peoples of Detroit
welcoming. Although the nations had supported the French during much of the Seven
Years' War, they had begun to waver as French military fortunes turned and the French
proved unable to supply them with powder and merchandise. 8 When the French
abandoned Fort Duquesne in 1758 and surrender of Niagara in 1759, the peoples of the
region began openly negotiating a separate peace with the British at the newly renamed
Fort Pitt. 9 Promising the natives unprecedented riches in the case of French defeat, the
Britons pledged that "all the Rivers were to run in Rum, that presents from the great King
were to be unlimited, [and] that all sorts of goods were to be in utmost plenty and so

8
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cheap as a Blanket for two Beavers." 10 The peoples of Detroit, who had often traded with
the British at Oswego and who now suffered severe shortages due to the blockade of
British posts, defected from the French and pledged neutrality in further hostilities.
Accordingly they not only allowed the British to take of possession of the post
unopposed, but celebrated the change. Meeting George Croghan near the mouth of
Detroit on 27 Nov., the Hurons, Ottawas, and Potawatomis "bid us welcome to their
Country."

11

In the following months, they sold venison to the commandant for the

garrison, and organized war parties against the Cherokees when the British invited them
to do so. 12 In January of 17 61, the new British commandant of the post, Donald
Campbell, found the peoples of the region "well pleased and seemingly reconsiled [sic] to
the change of Govemment." 13
The honeymoon, however, proved short-lived. The peoples of Detroit and the rest
of the region had apparently expected the British to administer Detroit on the same terms
that the French had. Specifically, the natives expected the British to treat them as
honored allies rather than subjects; they wanted them to continue offering cheap trading
goods, distributing annual presents to each nation, and providing liquor. Yet the British

10

"A Court of Inquiry Ordered to Take the Depositions of the Following Persons Taken by the Savages in
the Summer," 1763, CCOD, 662.
11
"Croghan's Journal, 1760-1761" in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:104-5, 110-13, at 113; Donald
Campbell to Henry Bouquet, 2 Dec. 1760, in Louis Waddell, ed, The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Vol. 5,
"September 1, 1760-0ctober 31, 1761» (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission,
1984), 41.
12
"Croghan's Journal1760-1761," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:117, 119; Campbell to Amherst,
23 Jan. 1761, CCOD, 33; Campbell to Amherst, 14 Feb. 1761, ibid., 40; Campbell to Amherst, 10 March
1761, in ibid., 51; Gladwin to Amherst, 26 Jan. 1763, ibid., 290. Regarding the Cherokees, see Croghan,
"Journal," in Thwaites, Early Western Travels, 1:116-17; Donald Campbell to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, 22 Mai
1761, CCOD, 73; Meyer to Bouquet, 30 September 1761, Waddell, Bouquet Papers, 5:787; "Niagara and
Detroit Proceedings, July-September 1761," WJP, 2:498; Gladwin to Amherst, 26 January 1763, CCOD,
291; Johnson to Amherst, 19 June 1763, ibid., 525.
13
Donald Campbell to Jeffrey Amherst, in ibid., 34.

251

quickly signaled that they had no intention of continuing the French practices or fulfilling
their promises to the nations of Detroit. Eager to trim his budget in the aftermath of the
war, Sir Jeffrey Amherst insisted that the commandants of Detroit and other officers in
the region curtail their presents to the natives. The commander frequently refused to
"purchas[e] the good behavior of the Indians, by presents." 14 The traders, according to
Pontiac, peddled shoddy goods on the natives for higher prices. 15 Donald Campbell,
moreover, banned the sale of liquor to natives in early 1761, prompting the same dismay
and outrage the French had encountered when they tried to do the same. 16 A Briton who
had been held captive by the Ottawas listed the "prohibition of rum" as the Ottawas'
"chief complaint" against the British. 17 When Thomas Hutchins, a British officer,
declined to supply the natives with an annuity in gunpowder, as the French had always
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done, he found that the natives "think it very strange that this Custom should be so
immediately broke off by the English." 18
Not only did the British communicate their disregard for the natives by failing to
satisfy these expectations, they often treated the natives with open contempt. While Capt.
Campbell had treated them as generously as he could, his replacement, Major Henry
Gladwin, neglected and mistreated the natives. According to later testimony, Gladwin
not only failed to distribute gifts to the natives but also "call'd them hags and o{ Names,
telling them to get along & go about their business, & would not hear them." 19 Pontiac
himself complained that the British had "endlessly" asked the natives how they "dared to
speak" and reminded them that they, the British, were "the Masters of all these lands, &
of all that which was your [French] father's." 20 Such declarations, combined with the
neglect of traditional protocol, alienated the natives and British. They interpreted these
grievances, quite logically, as evidence of British disregard for native people.

Wh~reas

Onontio had regarded the natives as indispensible allies and respected friends, Amherst
saw them as racial inferiors and expensive liabilities. 21
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By 1761 the peoples of the nations had begun grumbling about what they
perceived as an abrogation of their expectations. In September the Hurons, acting on
behalf of all the nations, pressed Johnson to address the poor trading conditions at
Detroit. 22 The Ottawas likewise addressed the superintendent "chiefly on the begging
order. ,m That frustration remained the next summer when Campbell reported that the
nations of Detroit "grumble & even threaten us." 24 An Onondaga man reported to
Croghan that a large number of nations had convened at the Ottawa village at Detroit and
met with unnamed Frenchmen from Michilimackinac. Croghan's informant concluded
that these nations were "Meditating Something Against Us." 25 Rumors from
Michilimackinac also indicated trouble in that area?6 By the spring of 1763, and perhaps
earlier, Pontiac and the Ottawas had conferred with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Ohio
Iroquois to launch a coordinated strike against the British. Angered at the British and
encouraged by the message of the Delaware mystic, Neolin, natives from Sault Ste. Marie
to Fort Pitt and from Niagara to Green Bay colluded to strike against the British?7

II. "Dogs Clothed in Red": The Anishinaabe Challenge to British Rule
By at least the summer of 1762, these grievances had convinced Pontiac to drive
the British (whom he called "dogs clothed in red" in reference to the redcoated British
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regulars) out of the Great Lakes Region. 28 Onontio would then return triumphantly,
Pontiac believed, and restore the terms of the old alliance. Yet the Ottawa leader realized
that his people were "too weak" to defeat the British garrison at Detroit?9 Accordingly,
he held a council with the Potawatomis early in 1763 to ask for their help. 30 In so doing,
Pontiac did what his forebears had done whenever they felt Ottawa dominance was at
risk: he enlisted his Anishinaabe neighbors to help him reassert Ottawa hegemony in the
region. Pontiac's admission that the Ottawas could not carry out their plans without the
help of the Potawatomis, as well as the Ojibwas, and his invocation of the Anishinaabe
ties explain why they had been able to dominate affairs in the pays d' en haut during the
French regime. By themselves the Ottawas represented a powerful, but ultimately limited
force. They derived their clout in the region from maintaining close ties to Anishinaabe
people. The Ottawas were economically, strategically, and culturally situated in an
impressive regional network with Anishinaabe communities from Manitoulin, Sault Ste.Marie, and Michilimackinac in the north, Green Bay and St. Joseph in the west, and
Detroit and Saginaw in the east. Stitched together by common interest, culture, and
intermarriage, these Anishinaabe communities collaborated to deal with outside threatssuch as the Sioux, Foxes, and Southern Alliance-and moved goods throughout the
region. It is thus no surprise that when another external enemy-the British-arrived and
initiated a series of unwelcome reforms, Pontiac turned to his people's allies. Indeed
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Pontiac himself may have been the child of both Ottawa and Ojibwa parents. The same
intimacy and cooperation among the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas, which
Pontiac's own personal heritage demonstrates, made Pontiac's War possible. As British
observers frequently noted, Pontiac's coalition was primarily an Anishinaabe one-led
by Anishinaabe leaders like Pontiac and carried out by Anishinaabe warriors. James
MacDonald, a lieutenant present at Detroit during the siege reported that the conspiracy
had been generated "particularly by the Ottawa Nation." 31
Pontiac and the Ottawas had not been eager to see the French go and had never
really reconciled themselves to the Britons' arrival. During the war, they had provided
energetic support for the French allies. Louis Antoine de Bourgainville identified the
Ottawas, along with the Ojibwas and Potawatomis as the "most attacked to our interests,
never having dipped their hands in the blood of any Frenchman." 32 At Fort Duquesne in
1757, for example, Pontiac had made a full-throated defense of the French alliance. He
severely reprimanded George Croghan for claiming, incorrectly, that the British had
already taken Quebec and his neighbors who had been foolish enough to believe the Irish
trader's lies. 33 During the siege of Fort Niagara in 1759, Ottawa warriors defending the
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French installation vowed to "die with their [French] father." 34 Later that year, the
Ottawas were poised to torture and kill an English prisoner, when a Huron man
intervened to save his life. 35 Even in the waning moments of the French regime, many
Ottawas refused to abandon Onontio. While some Ottawas had decided to support the
British by the end of 1759, the nation was "devided, some remaining in the French
Interest." 36 Early the next year, an Iroquois man who had long lived with the Hurons at
Detroit reported that the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and a few other nations were contemplating
an attack on the Iroquois and the British that year, and felt certain that the Ottawas would
defend Detroit from the British. 37 In August 1761, an Ottawa man told ... Gamelin, a
French merchant, that "Detroit would be destroyed in a few days." 38 Clearly, the Ottawas
remained loyal to Onontio long after the Hurons had embraced the British. As Pontiac
said shortly before he led a coalition against the British in 1763: "I am French, and I want
to die French." 39
British conduct after 1760 did nothing to endear themselves to the Ottawas.
Pontiac was personally insulted by British behavior. Pontiac accused the British traders
'

of charging double what the French merchants had, denying them credit, and foisting
shoddy wares on them. Moreover, the British had "insulted" the Ottawas. Instead of
"bewailing" the deaths of prominent native peoples as the French had, Pontiac claimed,
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Gladwin only "laughs at me." 40 When the Shawnees and Delawares spread Neolin's
prophesy and invited the Ottawas to join an anti-British campaign, then, the Ottawas
proved more than willing to join the coalition.
To build his anti-British coalition, Pontiac relied largely on the networks of
kinship and culture that bound Anishinaabe peoples living in the critical nodes of
Michilimackinac, Saginaw, St. Joseph, and Detroit. Before Pontiac could reach out to his
Anishinaabe neighbors, however, he first had to convince his own people-the Detroit
Ottawas-to join the fight. Despite the coronation of Pontiac as the Detroit nation's
"greatest Chief (or King as they are pleased to call him)" and "over-chief' by European
observers, Pontiac lacked the authority to command his community to act. He had to
build consensus among not only his fellow Sinagos at Detroit, but also the Kiskakons
living at the Ottawa village.

41

Though close neighbors, members of the two Ottawa tribes

living at Detroit had often competed for status. 42 The defection of the Ottawa leader
Mahiganne, who informed Gladwin about Pontiac's attempted coup and thereby probably
saved Detroit from capture, indicates the difficulty that Pontiac had in creating consensus
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even among his own people. 43 Nonetheless, he won over a sufficient "Number of Men"
. nation
. to move 10rwar
C"
d .44
among h IS
Once he had convinced the Detroit Ottawas to join the anti-British campaign,
Pontiac began building a regional alliance through his Anishinaabe connections. As we
have seen, he first turned to his Potawatomi neighbors for help at least by the spring of
1763, and the Detroit Potawatomis, led by the leader Ninivois, joined the campaign.
Although Robert Navarre, a French notary at Detroit who chronicled the conflict,
indicated that the Potawatomi leader only consented because "Pontiac was his superior
chief and treacherous" and the Potawatomis themselves later claimed that Pontiac had
"obliged" them to participate, the Potawatomis apparently joined the coalition willingly. 45
They shared the Ottawas' grievances against the British and a stake in preserving
Anishinaabe dominance in the region. Accordingly, Ninivois hosted a conference of the
conspirators at the Potawatomi village on 5 May, and the Potawatomi warriors
participated eagerly from the beginning of the siege. 46 When Pontiac asked Gladwin to
allow Donald Campbell to attend a meeting outside the fort, he left two Potawatomi men
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as sureties for their safety, indicating the degree to which the Potawatomis were
implicated in the proceedings. 47
In addition to supporting the siege at Detroit, the post's Potawatomis also worked
to enlist the "rest of their Nation at St. Josephs" in the anti-British campaign. 48 As the St.
Joseph Potawatomis later testified, the Detroit Potawatomis had "solicited us often to join
them" in attacking the British. 49 Although the Potawatomis living at St. Joseph initially
resisted these efforts and even "declar' d great deal of Friendship for the Garrison" in
mid-May, the Detroit Potawatomis finally convinced their "Relations" at Fort St. Joseph
to join in the campaign by the end of the month. 5° A delegation of Detroit Potawatomis
arrived at St. Joseph on the morning of 25 May and informed their kin that the siege had
begun at Detroit. Later that day a party of Potawatomis, including a leader named
Washee (Washashe) entered the British fort to meet with Francis Schlosser, the
commanding officer. On cue, these Potawatomis seized Schlosser while other warriors
stormed the fort and killed ten of the thirteen British soldiers billeted there. 51 After
sacking Fort St. Joseph, many of the Potawatomi warriors travelled to Detroit with their
relatives and captives and participated in attacks on the post. Some of these Potawatomis
came to Detroit "to join the Potawatomis of Detroit" in June. 52 Seventy more
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Potawatomi warriors arrived later that summer. 5 3 After Pontiac lifted the siege in the late
summer of 1763, some Potawatomis remained with the Ottawas, with whom they formed
a "flying camp."

54

Potawatomi warriors loitered around Detroit much of the following

winter and spring, hoping to "take a Scalp if possible." 55 Thus their later protestations
that the Ottawas had forced them into the campaign against their will, the Potawatomis
seemed to have eagerly supported their Ottawa cousins against the British.
Pontiac also convinced his Ojibwa neighbors, the Mississaguas and Sauteux
settled around Lake St. Claire, and even those living on the Thames River near Lake Erie,
Saginaw Bay, and Sault Ste.-Marie, to join the siege at Detroit. On 5 May, just three
days before he first tried to surprise the British fort, Pontiac told the Potawatomis and the
pro-French Hurons that he had "sent wampum belts and messengers to our brothers, the
Chippewas of Saginaw, and to our brothers, the Ottawas of Michilimackinac, and to those
of the Thames River to join us." 56 The very next day, Ojibwas from the vicinity of Lake
St. Clair attacked a small detachment, took the Englishman John Rutherford captive, and
tortured, killed, and, according to Rutherford, ritually cannibalized two Englishmen. 57 In
so doing, the Ojibwas became the first nation to initiate violence against the British
during the conflict. Some of these warriors from the Lake St. Clair villages came to
53
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Detroit before the middle ofMay. 58 These "Saulteurs" had met with Pontiac and had
together asked the French habitants for aid and supplies to support their cause. After
Pontiac had spoken, they testified that they "approve[ d) the words of the OutaOas" and
promised to "always hold the hand of our [French] father." 59
Together with Pontiac, the Lake St. Claire Ojibwas had also sent "Belts of
Wampm" to their real and fictive kin around Saginaw and Sault Ste. Marie and
Michilimackinac in May, informing them of the "Rupture with the English" and inviting
them to participate. 60 On 15 May Navarre learned that Pontiac expected
"reinforcements ... from the Chippewas of Grand [Thames] River" (in southern Ontario
near Lake Erie) to arrive imminently. 61 Those reinforcements, a hundred and twenty
Mississauga warriors led by the leader Sekahos, arrived sometime around 21 May, and
almost fifty more arrived in early June. 62 At about the same time, the Saginaw Ojibwa
leader Wasson (Warsong) arrived at Detroit with even more warriors. 63 The Ojibwa
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communities around Michilimackinac and Sault Ste. Marie also heeded the call to arms.
The Ojibwas surprised the garrison at Michimackinac on 2 June and took the commander
George Etherington hostage. 64 Later that month, some Ojibwa warriors from the Sault
came to Detroit, where they reinforced Pontiac's army. 65 Although the headman
Kinonchamek publicly chastised Pontiac for his brutality during the siege, and especially
for damaging French habitant property, some of these northern Ojibwas apparently joined
Pontiac's army. 66 "Seventy Soutones [Saulteux] or Chippawas" joined the others in late
July. 67 Charlotte, a "French savage" sent by Pontiac to the French in the illinois Country,
alleged that a thousand Ojibwa warriors had arrived in 200 canoes sometime in August.
Although Pontiac surely inflated this number in order to impress the French and convince
them to send a French army to Detroit, the number suggests the Ojibwa's key role in the
siege. 68 By Navarre's estimates, the Ojibwa warriors outnumbered Ottawa fighters 320
to 250, and Pontiac feared alienating a "nation superior in numbers to his own." 69 These
warriors participated in every stage of the siege, and, after it ended, many of these lived
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with Pontiac in his settlement on the Maumee River. 7 Contemporary observers
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frequently identified both the Ojibwas and the Ottawas as the chief instigators and
executors of the violence. 71 Daniel Claus, an Indian department official stationed in
Montreal, reported in August that he could "find none but the Chipeways at Missilmk and
those of the same Nation & Ottawas at Detroit, are concerned in the present Breach." 72
Of the 870 warriors that Navarre estimated had amassed at Detroit in early July,
all but fifty Hurons belonged to an Anishinaabe community. The siege of Detroit was,
for all intents and purposes, an Anishinaabe project begun for reasons particular to the
Anishinaabe peoples and carried out by them. Granted, non-Anishinaabe groups in the
Great Lakes Region, like the Miamis and Weas, staged attacks on forts near where they
lived, but their involvement seemed incidental compared to that of the Anishinaabe.
Many Miamis lived closer to Detroit than some of the Ojibwa and Potawatomi
participants, after all, but none apparently cooperated in the assault of Detroit.
If the Anishinaabe acted in concert to remove the British from the Great Lakes
region, they did not act in lockstep. Playing out a familiar dynamic, the Anishinaabe
peoples acted with remarkable solidarity, but nonetheless acted as autonomous and
sovereign nations. Despite being heralded as the "head chief of all the northern nations,"
Pontiac failed to convince some of his neighbors to join his coalition, and even those who
did continued to act as autonomous peoples. 73 Although Pontiac persuaded the Ojibwas
from Michilimackinac, Sault-Ste.-Marie, and Lake St. Clair and the Potawatomis from
both Detroit and Fort St. Joseph to participate in his anti-British campaign, he utterly
71
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failed to convince others to join him. The Mississauga Ojibwas living near Toronto, for
example, refused to join their Anishinaabe cousins during the conflict and remained loyal
to the British. 74 Some Saginaw "Indians"-presumably Kiskakon Ottawas-likewise
disclaimed participation in the hostilities, telling Gladwin that their people "had not
enter'd into the War." 75 More seriously and likely more poignantly, Pontiac could not
convince his fellow Ottawas living at the Jesuit mission at Arbre Croche, near
Michilimackinac, to join his cause. When Pontiac sent a wampum belt to the
Michilimackinac Ottawas, the headman Bindanowan "scarcely looked on, & imediately
threw away," or at least claimed to have done so. 76 Even threats from the Ojibwas, who
had accepted Pontiac's invitation, could not budge the resolute Michilimackinac Ottawas.
When they learned that the Ojibwas from Sault Ste. Marie had attacked Michimackinac,
the Ottawas reacted angrily and intervened to save the British survivors. In July these
Ottawas and their Jesuit missionary visited Detroit, where they angrily reproached
Pontiac and his people for having struck against the British. 77
Even those Anishinaabe peoples who had cooperated with Pontiac pursued their
own course and acted independently from Pontiac. Emissaries from the Sault Ste. Marie
Ojibwas, for example, visited Pontiac during the siege and chastised him for the brutality
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of the siege there, particularly the damage to French habitant property and lives. 78 The
Ojibwas and Ottawas, furthermore, feuded in early June. After the French killed one of
Wasson's nephews on 4 July, the Ojibwa leader blamed Pontiac for his "ill look [luck]"
and for having "caus'd them [the Saginaw Ojibwas] to enter into the War." 79 To appease
Wasson, Pontiac grudgingly surrendered the former commandant, Donald Campbell,
whom the Ottawas had held hostage since early May. When the Ojibwa leader promptly
killed Campbell, a well-liked and valuable captive, the Ottawas were "enraged ... and
resolved upon having satisfaction." Rutherford thought that there might be a "war"
between the Ottawas and Ojibwas, while Jehu Hay, a British lieutenant serving at Detroit
who kept a journal chronicling the crisis, reported that the groups had "quarrel' d and
were going to separate." 80 When the siege stalemated and the tide began to turn against
Pontiac in July, furthermore, the Potawatomis defected from Pontiac's camp. Claiming
that Pontiac had "hurried" them into the rebellion and "obliged" them to participate, they
sought to distance themselves from the Ottawas. 81 They repeatedly met with Gladwin in
July, pleaded for forgiveness, and turned over the loot and the prisoners they had taken. 82
Six Sauks who lived with the Potawatomis later alleged that the Potawatomis had only
pretended to make peace in order to ransom one of their leaders whom the British had
detained. 83 Yet the Potawatomis' willingness to conduct diplomacy without the Ottawas,
discuss a separate peace that excluded Pontiac, and blame the entire affair entirely on the
78
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Ottawas demonstrates just how far Anishinaabe solidarity stretched. The Potawatomis,
like the Ojibwas, remained independent from Pontiac and the Ottawas.
Once again in the spring and summer of 1763 the Anishinaabe peoples had
responded to a common cause of concern in the region. They had called on ties of
kinship stretching across a wide geographic span to act in their shared interest and to
defeat a foreign interloper. Once again those peoples had acted not as a monolithic
whole, but as a collection of closely related and allied but ultimately autonomous
peoples. This dynamic, worked out decades and even centuries before 1763, made
Pontiac's War possible. Yet this Anishinaabe cooperation against the British also set up
a confrontation between the old rivals, the Hurons and the Ottawas. While the
Anishinaabe peoples had good reasons to oppose and little incentive to support the
British, the Hurons had every reason to support them: their newfound regional
ascendency owed everything to their exceptional connections to the Iroquois and British
Gust as the Ottawas' former dominance had been a product of their connections to the
Potawatomis and Ojibwas). The disruption of the status quo at Detroit therefore sparked
another Huron-Anishinaabe conflict which became intertwined with the larger struggle
between the British and the anti-British coalition.

III. "the Head of the Ottawa Confederation": The Hurons and Pontiac
At the same time he invited the Potawatomis to join his campaign, Pontiac also
asked his Huron neighbors to join the conspiracy. While some Hurons led by Sastaretsy
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and Take consented, others firmly refused to do so. 84 Speaking for the Huron majority,
the turtle hontaxen elders Babi and Theata dismissively returned Pontiac's war belt
without "caring to listen" to his proposals. 85 These Hurons' curt dismissal of Pontiac's
plan reveals their attitudes toward the British and highlights a fundamentally different
reaction to the fall of New France from the Ottawas. While the Ottawas were never
much impressed with the British newcomers and welcomed Neolin's anti-British
prophesy, the Hurons seemed quite reconciled with the British occupation of Detroit and
quite ambivalent about the prospect of a return to French rule. In fact, as one Onondaga
man told Sir William Johnson in July 1761, "many of the Ottawas were not yet well
inclined toward us, but that the Wiandots seemed to be entirely our [Great Britain's]
friends." Early that summer, the Hurons had even thwarted a Seneca plan to form an
anti-British coalition, and they been "vastly pleased" when the Onondaga informant told
them that other five nations had no part in the Seneca conspiracy. 86
Ultimately, the Hurons proved better inclined toward the British than the Ottawas
and other Anishinaabe peoples because the advent of British rule had been an marked
84
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boon for the Hurons. Their old friendship with Iroquois had led to a mediated but
meaningful relationship with the British, which had begun in the seventeenth century and
intensified since the 1740s. Because the Hurons enjoyed this relationship and the
Ottawas and others did not, the British chose to treat the Hurons as their representatives
at Detroit and in the region, a move which greatly enhanced the Hurons' status and
influence in the region. In 1761, in fact, Johnson told the Hurons at Detroit that "he
looked upon them as the head of the Ottawa Confederacy," in which he included most of
the peoples of the eastern Great Lakes Region. 87 These Huron heads of the titular Ottawa
Confederacy in fact dominated diplomacy in the region between 1759 and 1762. This
special relationship and the Huron ascendency it made possible ensured at least partial
Huron support for the British in 1763 and 1764. It also ensured that Pontiac's struggle
with the British would be bound up and invested with the long Huron-Ottawa rivalry.
This is not to say that the Hurons had no grievances with British rule. They had
just as much reason to complain of the high prices, the neglect of protocol, and the
dismissive British attitudes as the Ottawas, and some Hurons led by Sastaretsy even
accepted Pontiac's war belt. Yet, unlike the Ottawas, the Hurons also had incentive to
support British rule. The Hurons, beneficiaries of the transition from French to British
rule, had good reason to support the British and the new political order they represented,
even if they, like the other nations of the pays d' en haut, resented some of the British
practices. In the sophisticated calculus of geopolitics, the promise of Huron ascendency
over the Ottawas at least partially compensated for these grievances. For this reason,
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many Hurons declared neutrality and actively collaborated with the British against the
Ottawas and Pontiac.
The Hurons owed their newfound ascendency at Detroit to their unusually close
relationship with the Iroquois and the British. A large and "very Curiously wrought"
wampum belt that the Hurons presented to Conrad Weiser in 1748 symbolizes both the
intensity and dynamic of that relationship. According to Weiser, the belt displayed seven
human figures "holding one another by the Hand." The Hurons explained that the figure
on one end represented the "King of Great Britain," that the middle five figures
represented the five original nations of the Haudensaunee alliance, and that the last figure
represented the Hurons. Two parallel lines ran under the figures along the length of the
belt. 88 The Hurons told Weiser that the governor of New York and the Five Nations had
given them the belt some fifty years before to symbolize the covenant which the Hurons
had just made with the Iroquois and the English. 89 The belt, in other words, was the one
that the Lord Cornbury had given the Huron delegates at the 1702 council at Albany.
The device-which the Hurons had carefully curated for fifty years-eloquently
symbolizes not only the intimate connection that the Hurons, uniquely among the nations
of the Great Lakes region, enjoyed with the Iroquois and British, but also the central
dynamic of that relationship. The Hurons' relationship with the British had always been
mediated by and inextricable from their relationship with their Iroquois cousins. The
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"Ancient Chain of Friendship," as a Huron speaker later put it, existed "between our
Ancestors the Six Nations & you [the British]." 90 As the Hurons oriented themselves
toward the Ohio Valley between 1738 and 1763, their relationships with both Iroquois
and the British grew exponentially.
The key to the Hurons' relationship with the British rested, as it always had, on
the close identification between the Iroquois and Hurons, an identification which
increased after 1738. The latest Sastatesty testified eloquently to this intimacy when
commandant Fran<;ois Marie Picote, sieur de Belestre, invited the nations of Detroit to
strike the Six Nations people in the Ohio Valley in March 1758. When some of the
nations agreed to the attack, Sastaretsy-presumably the man who had taken the title
when the previous Sastaretsy died in 1747-reacted angrily. Grabbing the belt that
Belestre had presented, he chastised his neighbors for so easily betraying the Iroquois.
The Huron leader rhetorically asked how "1, whom am Flesh and Blood of the Six
Nations and in whose Towns Number of our Friends & Children are living and settled,
declare War against them." He then reminded his neighbors that they, too, were allied
with the Six Nations and implored them to reject the "French Hatchet." Sastaretsy
handed the belt, meaningfully, to the Miamis, fellow members of the decayed Southern
Alliance with the Hurons and Senecas, who likewise rejected the belt. 91
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Sastaretsy's angry reaction to Belestre's invitation and unwillingness to attack the
Six Nations testifies to the long-term and exclusive relationship between the Hurons and
the Iroquois, especially the Senecas. Reaching back to Cheanonvouzon's time, and even
into the late seventeenth century, the Hurons had enjoyed social intimacy and diplomatic
cohesion with the Six Nations which the other peoples of Detroit had been unable to
match. The "great affinity" that Clairambault d' Aigremont had noted between the
Hurons and Iroquois in 1708 had persisted well after Cheanonvouzon' s death in 1707, but
the conflict between the Hurons and Ottawas in 1738 intensified the relationship even
further. 92 Shortly after that conflict, the Ottawas, well aware of the Iroquois' and
Hurons' intimacy, implored the Six Nations to remain neutral in the affair. 93 Yet the
Senecas invited the Hurons to join them once again and the Hurons seemed ready to do
so in the winter of 1738-1839. 94 Father Richardie noted that he had to use all of his
influence to dissuade the Hurons from moving to Seneca territory. Hoping to take
advantage of this alliance in the summer of 1739, Orontony stopped at Niagara on his
way to Montreal where he invited the Iroquois to hold a council with him, and later met
with the St. Lawrence Valley Iroquois. Gov. Beauharnois suspected that the headman
intended to enlist Iroquois support against the Ottawas, since the Hurons were naturally
"proud, and they only search for opportunities to avenge themselves." 95 Shortly after the
Hurons heard that the "Nations of the lakes" planned to attack the Hurons in 1743,
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Sastaretsy visited the Seneca village of Sonnontuan to warn them and perhaps to ask for
assistance. The Senecas repaid the visit and thanked the Hurons later that year. 96 As they
had for so long, the Hurons turned to the Senecas for help when they faced external
threats.
The Hurons' reorientation toward the Ohio Valley in the 1740s and 1750s, which
corresponded with a similar reorientation among the Six Nations, especially the Senecas,
further cemented the alliance. The establishment of settlements south of Lake Erie
allowed the Hurons to develop ever more regular and intimate contact with the Senecas
and other Iroquois settlers filtering into the region from the east and north. Sandusky, for
example, was easily accessible from the mostly Iroquois settlement of Cuyahoga, and the
Iroquois and Hurons regularly passed back and forth between these settlements. 97 The
French noted that several "vagabond Iroquois" had joined with the Hurons who lived at
Sandusky in 1747, and Father Potier noted that Senecas and other Iroquois lived in the
Huron settlements south of Lake Erie. 98 The French trader Joseph Guoin noted that the
Hurons and Iroquois had been present at Sandusky in late 1754. 99 James Smith, an
Englishman taken captive at the beginning of the Seven Years' War and later held by
Kahnawake Iroquois living in the Ohio Valley, described the frequent contact between
his adopted people and the Hurons living at both Detroit and the Sandusky settlements.
One of his adopted Kahnawake brothers, for example, was married to a Huron woman,
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and his family regularly hunted and visited with Huron people in the Sandusky and
Cuyahoga areas. 100
Situated together, the Hurons, especially Orontony and his band, cooperated
closely with the Ohio Iroquois, as well as those of the Six Nations themselves. 101 The
French in fact blamed the Iroquois for the Hurons' apparent rebellion against Onontio in
1747. After Orontony's failed strike on Detroit in 1747, the Huron leader claimed to be
"no longer Hurons, but Iroquois" and asked the Iroquois for permission to settle in their
territory. The Six Nations, and the Senecas specifically, had allowed the Hurons to settle
at Conchake-an area the Iroquois claimed-and the Iroquois had "received [the Hurons]
as our own flesh." Such remarks were more than mere rhetorical flourishes. They
attested to a powerful connection between the Hurons and Iroquois which was rooted in
their cultural and familial ties and expressed through close political and diplomatic
cooperation. The Hurons continued to visit and conduct policy in coordination with the
Iroquois, especially the Mohawks, during the Seven Years' War and even into Pontiac's

100

James Smith, "An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Colonel James
Smith ... during His Captivity with the Indians, in the Years, 1755, '56, '57, '58, and '59," in Samuel G.
Drake. Ed. Indian Captivities, or Life in the Wigwam, (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby and Miller, 1852), 190-91,
225.
101
Parmenter argues that the Iroquois immigrants to the Ohio Valley remained powerfully linked to those
who remained in Iroquoia and remained part of a larger Iroquoian world. "At the Wood's Edge: Iroquois
Foreign Relations, 1727-1768» (Ph.D. Diss. Dept. of History, University of Michigan, 1999), 8. 119.
102
"Journal of Indian Affairs," 29 May 1757, WJP, 9:780; "Johnson to Croghan," 14 May 1760, in ibid.,
10: 147. The Hurons particularly cooperated with the Mohawks during Pontiac's War. The Mohawk man
Aaron, whom Donald Campbell described as "the Mohauk who is now a Wiandot" enjoyed considerable
sway among the Hurons before, during, and after the siege. He may have been the unnamed Iroquois man
that George Croghan noted had lived among the Hurons at Detroit for fourteen years in 1760. Campbell to
Bouquet, 21 June 1761, in Waddell, Bouquet Papers, 5:570, Croghan to Johnson, 24 Oct. 1762, WJP,
3:915; Ermine Wheeler-Voeglin, Indians of Northwest Ohio: An Ethnohistorical Report on the Wyandot,
Potawatomi, Ottawa, and Chippewa or Northeast Ohio, (New York: Garland, 1974), 42-43; Croghan's
Journal, in Wainwright, ed., Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 370-71; [Hay], "Diary of

274

Although other nations, such as the Ottawas and Ojibwas, also increased their
contacts in the Ohio Valley in this period and some married Iroquois spouses, they never
managed to develop the kind of relationship that the Hurons and Iroquois enjoyed. 103
The Ottawas tacitly attested to the Hurons' exceptional relationship with the Iroquoisand the Ottawas' lack of such a relationship-when they "called the Wyandotts to a great
Council" in April1760. At the conference, the Ottawas "complain'd heavily" about the
Iroquois conduct during the siege of Niagara the proceeding summer. The Ottawas'
erstwhile Iroquois allies had not only killed several Ottawas, including two "Great
Captains," but they had failed to come and cover the dead. The Ottawas therefore
suspected that the Iroquois "had some further design against them in Conjunction with
the English," and noted that, if the Iroquois failed to come to "Condole with them" within
the next two months, they would go to war with the Iroquois and their British allies. In
July of that year, some "Deputies of the Wyandotts" arrived at the Iroquois Confederation
council at Onondaga carrying calumets and wampum belts "from 10 Different Tribes of
Indians" in order to "renew their ancient Friendship" with the Iroquois. 104
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The Ottawas' actions clearly indicate that they viewed the Hurons as mediators
between the Iroquois and "all the Nations to the Westward." 105 In summoning the
Hurons to a council and issuing an ultimatum, the Ottawas hoped that the Hurons would
relay their concerns directly to their Iroquois cousins and proctor a reconciliation between
them. The Hurons did just this when they traveled to Onondaga deputized to conclude a
peace between the offended Ottawas (and other nations) and the Iroquois the following
July. The Ottawas simply lacked the contacts with the Six Nations that the Hurons
enjoyed, as the Iroquois treatment of the Ottawa captives demonstrates in the first place.
That an Iroquois man who had lived with the Hurons at Detroit for the last fourteen years,
perhaps the Mohawk man Aaron, relayed this message to George Croghan, further attests
to the proximity of the Hurons and Iroquois, which the Ottawas had long resented and
coveted and which had so frequently sparked conflict between the two nations.
As it had since 1702, the Hurons' relationship with the Six Nations facilitated
their contact with the British, and, as the Huron-Iroquois alliance grew in the 1740s and
1750s, the Hurons enjoyed more frequent contact with British officials and traders in the
Ohio Valley. The Iroquois who had symbolically linked hands with the Hurons in the
kaswentha belt, after all, had also clasped hands with the British. In 1743, shortly before
the beginning of King George's War, the Hurons ventured once more to Albany. The
commissioners noted that "Three Janondadee Sachems" arrived in July of that year, most
likely indicating that they representatived each of the three hontaXen and hence the
entirety of the Huron nation. When the Hurons produced the belt that the British and Six
Nations had given them in 1702, the commissioners affirmed that the belt symbolized the
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"Everlasting Peace between this Govt the 5 Nations & their [the Hurons'] Nation." 106
This meeting encouraged Orontony and his followers to openly support the British when
war broke out the following year. As detailed in the previous chapter, the Hurons met
regularly with British representatives and, probably with British encouragement, planned
an attack on Detroit and encouraged other nations to join in the campaign against the
French. Testifying to the growing contact between the Hurons and British and
symbolizing the growing alliance between them, a Huron woman gave birth to the child
of an Englishman in 17 51. 107
The Hurons consolidated their exclusive relationship with the British during the
Seven Years' War by honly tepidly supporting the French cause and by maintaining
contact with the British throughout the conflict. Although they purportedly accepted the
French war hatchet and frequently fought for the French during that conflict, the Hurons
maintained a flexible and pragmatic position during the war. When Henri Belestre, the
new commandant of Detroit, prompted the Hurons and other nations to join a French
campaign into the Ohio Valley in August 1754, the natives ominously and evasively
replied that "We will see what will happen." 108 The following year they articulated the
same strategy in a message to the colony of Pennsylvania. Travelling to Philadelphia in
the company of some Iroquois in August 1755, the Hurons informed the British that the
principal Huron leaders could not attend the conference for fear that the French would
suspect them. Yet, they promised that the "old Men" would soon "tum their Faces
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towards" the British. They also noted that, "If you should get the better of the French and
come into our parts," the British would "find us your Friends and we will join you." 109
The Hurons thus revealed their Janus-faced and quasi-neutral status-they were
simultaneously unwilling to alienate the French by travelling to Philadelphia, but were
quick to assure the British of their friendship in case the British "should get the better of
the French." As some Weas complained of the Hurons and the Iroquois during the siege
of Niagara in 1759, they "constantly made fine promises [to the French] without ever
doing anything" against the British. 110 Such behavior allowed the Hurons to maintain a
delicate balance: they did just enough to appease the French without thereby alienating
the British.
In the latter phases of the war, the Hurons took a more explicitly pro-British
position. As the French military position declined and French merchants proved unable
to supply their native allies, the Hurons signaled their full support of the British. During
the winter of 1756-1757, a "Tynondady [Tionontate] Indian" named Anias and other
Hurons lived in the Mohawk village near Fort Johnson, and Sir William provided them
with weapons and merchandise and even consoled the death of a Huron girl. 111 In early
1759, following the French defeat at Fort Frontenac and the abandonment of Fort
Duquesne in 1758, the Hurons accepted belts from the Cayugas enjoining them to remain
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neutra1. 112 That summer the Hurons regularly visited the British at Fort Pitt, and some
may have lived there for parts of the year. These Hurons served as spies for the British,
particularly for the Indian Agent George Croghan, passing regularly from Detroit to the
French fort of Venango to Fort Pitt to report on the intentions and relative strength of the
French force in the region. 113 Huron representatives met with Croghan in July and
August of 1759 to work out a preliminary peace agreement, and the Hurons took the lead
in chastising a Delaware man for "spiriting up the Indians to continue the War against the
English." 114 In October 1759, just over a month after the fall of Quebec, several
"Weyondotts who live near Fort D'Troit" visited Fort Pitt and explained that they had
participated in the war only by "necessity" and that they "were obliged to come [to war]
by French Measures." In the following months, Huron parties arrived frequently to
surrender British captives and to trade for the necessities which Onontio could no longer
provide for them. 115 Even before the fall of Quebec in September 17 59 and Montreal in
1760, the Hurons had effectively abandoned the French war effort and had negotiated a
separate peace with the British. Testifying to the Anglo-Huron relationship, a British
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official noted in 1759 that "tho' engaged in the War against us," the Hurons "have a
regard for the English." 116
By the end of the Seven Years' War, the Hurons had perfectly positioned
themselves geopolitically to take advantage of French defeat and British victory. For
decades their relationship with their Iroquoian cultural cousins had afforded them
protection and guaranteed access, albeit indirectly, to the British. The Hurons had
intensified these relationships in the 1740s and 1750s and had proven their loyalty to the
British even while supporting the French in the Seven Years' War. When the French
surrendered Montreal in 1760 and the British took control of the region, therefore, the
Hurons gained an unprecedented seniority at Detroit. The Hurons enjoyed a trust and
familiarity of the now ascendant Iroquois and British which their neighbors simply
lacked. Between 1759 and 1761 they translated that relationship into a position of
heretofore unknown influence, which Cheanonvouzon had long ago dreamed of.
The implications of French defeat for the Hurons' political fortunes were evident
even before that defeat was final. When the nations of Detroit and others in the pays d' en
haut made overtures to the British in the summer of 1759, they naturally turned to the
Hurons to facilitate a peace. In July Huron representatives presented themselves to
Croghan at Fort Pitt and delivered a message from nine nations, including the Ottawas,
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis, who had met at Detroit that summer and had "impower[ed]
the Weyondott Deputys to treat for the whole at this meeting." After these promising
preliminaries, the Hurons pledged to return to Detroit and report Croghan's words to the
"Nations the[y] represent." The following month, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and
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Miami representatives met with the British and Delawares at Pittsburgh. Once again, the
Hurons had the honor of speaking "in behalf of themselves, and the other Western
nations," who only spoke to confirm what the Hurons had already said. 117 When the
Hurons, Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis met with Gen. Robert Monckton, the
commander of British forces in the southern provinces, to conclude a more formal peace
at Pittsburgh in August 1760, the Hurons had the privilege of speaking first at the council
and spoke, as was now becoming common, "in Behalf of the rest." 118
The Hurons displayed this newfound authority when the British officers who had
just taken possession of Detroit met with the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Hurons on 4
December 1760. The Huron leader took the lead and spoke for the Ottawas and
Potawatomis, who formed "one People" with the Hurons. The speaker thereby
articulated a new, and surely contested, vision of protocol and precedence at Detroit. Just
as Onontagan had claimed that the Hurons and Ottawas formed only "one body" and
pretended to speak for the Hurons some sixty years earlier, the Huron speaker now
claimed that the Hurons spoke for the unified peoples of Detroit. As the Potawatomis
explained the following day, their "Uncles the Wyendots spoke to you for all" of the
nations because they had "more Understanding in Council Affairs than us." The
Potawatomi speaker thereby acknowledged Huron seniority, even referring to them by
the honorific title of "uncle," and acquiesced to Huron judgment in diplomatic affairs.
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The Hurons, after all, knew the British and Six Nations better than the Potowatomis or
Ottawas. Their "greater Understanding" derived from the Hurons' long-term relationship
with those people. Once again producing the "Belt [which] was delivered us by our
Brethren the English & Six Nations when first you came over the great Water" and which
they had presented to the British in 1743 and 1748, the Hurons reminded the British and
Six Nations of their "Old Friendship." 119 In doing so they made an explicit argument
about the antiquity of their relationship with the British and a case for the Hurons' loyalty
to the British Crown and their reliability as allies. No one else at Detroit could
convincingly make that argument. Although some Ottawas did marry Iroquois women
and some lived in the Ohio Valley, they never enjoyed the relationship with the Iroquois
that the Hurons did.
The Hurons' leadership in these councils and their role as mediators speak not
only to their unique relationship with the British and Iroquois but to the power and
authority which that relationship bestowed upon them. Even the Ottawas, long the
Hurons' rivals for status and authority at Detroit, now asked the Hurons to conduct
diplomacy for them and, we can imagine, grudgingly "impowered" them to mediate
between the British and Iroquois, allowed them to speak first in councils, and even to
speak in their name. 120 That the Ottawas would surrender their right to speak for
themselves to the Hurons demonstrates that something profound had changed in the pays
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d'en haut. By carefully cultivating relationships with the Iroquois cousins over several
decades and forging a close relationship with the British from the 1740s onward, the
Hurons had positioned themselves perfectly for a post-French world. When the British
replaced the French in 1760, the Hurons claimed a position of seniority and prestige over
their pays d' en haut neighbors.
The titles used in these councils further signaled the Hurons' new ascendance at
Detroit. Representatives invariably referred to the Hurons by a more elevated honorific
title than they did the Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and others present. At the August
1759 conference, for example, the Delaware man whom the British called the Beaver
addressed his words to the Delawares' "Uncles the Wayondotts [Hurons], and you our
Cousens of the several other Western Nations," including, among others, the Ottawas,
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis. 121 Almost exactly a year later, the Hurons, Ottawas,
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas met with the Beaver, as well as representatives of the Six
Naitons and Monckton. Addressing the council, the Beaver again identitfied the Hurons
as "Uncles the Wyandots," but now demoted the "Ottowas, Cheepowees [Ojibwas], &
Pottowattmies" from "Cousens" to "Grandchildren." The following day an Iroquois
headman identified the same audience as his "Brethren the Wyandots, & Nephews of all
the Other Nations." 122 These familial categories, of course, had tremendous currency
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among the native peoples of North America. While "brother," and presumably "cousin,"
signified rough equality between two peoples, the term "nephew" connoted a subservient
status in a society in which maternal uncles assumed control over their sisters' children.
While "Grandchildren" did not carry the same implications for these peoples as it did for
patriarchal Europeans, it nonetheless indicated a lesser status. In all these cases,
therefore, the speakers suggested that the Hurons occupied a superior status to the
Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas. To the Delawares, the Hurons were honored elders
(uncles), while the other nations were the Delaware's equals (cousins) or subalterns
(grandchildren); the Iroquois counted the Hurons as equals (brothers) but designated the
Anishinaabeg as inferiors (nephews or grandchildren).
The Ottawas and others were of course free to disagree about Huron seniority and
they certainly did (even though they did recognize the Delawares as "our Grandfathers").
But this language, repeated in front of Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwa audiences,
suggested a new and alternative ordering of social and political relations at Detroit, which
the British themselves embraced. In this new vision, the Hurons enjoyed seniority among
the peoples of Detroit thanks to their contacts with the Iroquois and British. They were
the "head" of a confederacy that included the Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and other
nations in the region.
If the Hurons had won a new precedence at Detroit by 1760, they consolidated it
in June 1761, when two Seneca delegates arrived at the post purportedly to condole the
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death of the Detroit warriors killed during the siege of Niagara. 123 Recognizing Huron
seniority and attesting to their close kinship, the Senecas went to the Hurons first and
stayed with them in their village. To demonstrate their position of authority in matters of
diplomacy and their centrality at Detroit, the Hurons subtly controlled events. After
delaying the council for a few days during which the Huron leaders remained too
intoxicated to conduct diplomacy, the Hurons refused the Iroquois' suggestion that they
convene the council at Sandusky and instead insisted that it be held at the Huron village
at the Point au Montreal, thereby dictating the time and place of the proceedings. 124
When the Hurons and Iroquois finally met with the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis
on 3 July, the Iroquois deputies addressed themselves "particularly to the Wiandots
[Hurons]" and confessed that "We look upon you as the head of all the Nations here, &
know [that] ... all the Other Nations will follow your Example." 125 Accordingly, they
asked the Hurons to join them in attacking the British throughout the Great Lakes region.
Although some of the Hurons seemed inclined to join the Iroquois, they eventually
decided against it and convinced their neighbors to do the same. They instead informed
Campbell of the conspiracy. 126 Later that month the Hurons invited the Shawnees to
meet with the British and publically chastised them for having heeded the "bad Councils
of the Six Nations." The Hurons then recommended their Shawnee friends "in the
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strongest Manner to be friends of the English." Later that month they likely advised the
Delawares not to "listen to the bad Councils of the Six Nations." 127 The following year,
the Hurons once again informed the British about an alleged anti-British conspiracy
spearheaded by the Shawnees, Iroquois, and several southern nations. 128
In not only declining the Senecas' offer, but informing Campbell of the plot, the
Hurons secured for themselves an honored place at Detroit. They had proven their
loyalty to the British, ironically at the expense of the Six Nations who had long facilitated
and mediated the relations between the British and Hurons. 129 Campbell thanked the
Hurons for the "good behaviour" and loyalty to the Crown. 130 Sir William Johnson, the
superintendent for Indian affairs, likewise commended the Hurons behavior, which
"entitle[d) them to our particular notice." 131 Visiting Detroit in person later that summer,
Johnson personally thanked the Hurons for their loyalty and affirmed their seniority at
Detroit. He greeted the Hurons first, before the Potawatomis, Ottawas, and Ojibwas, and,
when all the nations assembled in council on Sept. 9, the Hurons once again responded
first to Johnson's message. At another council on Sept. 16, Johnson bluntly told the
Hurons that he regarded them as the "head of the Ottawa Confederacy" and hoped that
the Hurons would maintain the symbolic "Council fire" which he had just ignited at
127
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Detroit. 132 Finally, before leaving Detroit Johnson spent the night of Sept. 17 at the
Huron village and held a separate, private council with them at which he gave them an
additional gift of trade goods. 133
Observers frequently testified to the Hurons' newfound authority. In a letter to
Johnson in July 1761, Campbell referred to the Hurons "whom you know leads the other
Nations here." 134 In a letter written the same day to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, the governor of
the British Province of Quebec, Campbell repeated that the Hurons "in all affairs of
consequence lead the other Indian Nations here." 135 And of course Johnson himself told
the Hurons at Detroit that "he looked upon them as the head of the Ottawa
Confederacy." 136 In similar words, the Iroquois representatives likewise recognized the
Hurons "as the head of all the Nations" at Detroit and believed that "all the Other Nations
will follow [their] Example." 137 Even the Detroit Potawatomis attested to Huron
seniority at Detroit noting that their Huron "uncles" possessed "more understanding in
Council affairs than us." 138 In 1763, another British officer noted that the Hurons have
"much influence over the rest of the [Ottawa] Confederacy." 139 Many years later, the
Anglo-American officer Daniel Brodhead told George Washington that the Hurons "are
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respected by the western Indians as much as the six nations are by the Northem." 140 The
Hurons had become, as one twentieth century historian called them, "the leading group"
at Detroit. 141
At length Cheanonvouzon's plan had worked. The Hurons had translated their
age-old alliance with the Six Nations into a position of power in the pays d' en haut. Not
only was there a new imperial order at Detroit after 1760, but also a new hierarchy
among the peoples of the post. This Huron ascendency proved important during 1762
and 1763. Although the Hurons had the same incentive to oppose British policies that led
Pontiac and the other Anishinaabe people to align against them, the Hurons also had
compelling reasons for supporting the British. French rule had meant Huron submission
to Ottawa seniority. British rule meant Huron ascendency over the Ottawas. Although
loyalty to Onontio and impatience with the British led Sastaretsy and other Hurons to
support Pontiac, the promise of British-backed Huron seniority convinced others to
support the British. Meanwhile, the Ottawas, who had not enjoyed such a relationship
with the Iroquois or British and who were invested in French rule in a way that the
Hurons simply were not, had less reason to tolerate British behavior. In fact the British
promotion of Huron status at Detroit proved yet another reason for the Ottawas to oppose
British rule. Not surprisingly, the Ottawas and Hurons not only responded differently to
Pontiac's War, but also fought bitterly over status during Pontiac's War.
The Hurons' ascendency in the aftermath of the fall of Niagara did not lead to
unanimous Huron support for the British, of course. Since at least the 1740s, pro-French

°Col. Daniel Brodhead to Gen. George Washington, 7 May 1779, Thwaites and Kellog, The Revolution
in the Upper Ohio, 311.
141
McConnell, "The Search for Security," 363.
14

288

and pro-British Huron factions had struggled to build consensus within the community.
Many Hurons had supported the French during the Seven Years' War even if others
remained ambivalent. As late as 1758 one Huron vowed that he would "live and Die"
with his Onontio. 142 With just as much cause to be angry at British trading policies as the
Ottawas and a tradition of loyalty to the French, Sastaretsy and the "bad (mauvaise)
band," as the pro-British chronicler Robert Navarre called them, promised Pontiac that
they would do "whatever he wished." 143 These Hurons participated in the siege from the
beginning, contributed to the sacking of Presqu'lle and Sandusky, and may have fought
in the Battle of Bloody Run in late July. 144 After the siege, the anti-British Hurons fled to
the Maumee River and Sandusky, where they formed a "nest of thi[e]ves." 145 As had the
same debate nearly twenty years earlier, this division between pro-French and pro-British
Hurons led to an intra-community struggle. Theata and the pro-British Hurons-the
"good (bonne) band" in Navarre's reckoning-even feared, or at least claimed to fear,
that the pro-French Hurons might attack them, and sought to convince them to abandon
Pontiac's alliance. 146 The pro-British Hurons succeeded in convincing many of the
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hostile warriors to return in the summer of 1764, and as late as 1766 they still sought to
reconcile a few holdouts. 147
Yet the Hurons' internal struggle for power between Sastaretsy and Theata took
place within the context of their larger struggle with the Ottawas (which in tum took
place within a larger struggle between the British and native peoples of the Great Lakes).
Whatever their internal disputes may have been, the Hurons renewed an argument with
the Ottawas that they had rehearsed for at least a century. Each nation sought to augment
their position; the Ottawas by effecting Onontio's return and Ottawa seniority, and the
pro-British Hurons by defending their new prerogatives. This new conflict, prompted by
significant changes and occurring in drastically changed conditions, echoed the same
issues which the Hurons and Ottawas had hashed out since at least the 1670s.

IV. "Elder brother in my heart": The Hurons, Ottawas, and Status at Detroit
By the time Pontiac delivered his ultimatum to the Hurons on 11 May 1763, the
peoples of Detroit had witnessed a profound political and diplomatic revolution. As they
often had since 1649, questions over status sparked conflict between the Hurons and
Ottawas. When the British had toppled Onontio, the Ottawas' had lost their favored
place atop the hierarchy at Detroit, and the Hurons had gained unprecedented influence.
In the context of both recent changes and decades' long processes and relationships, the
Hurons' and Ottawas' reactions on that May day become more explicable and more
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meaningful. Pontiac sought not only to reinforce his army by demanding the Hurons join
the campaign, he also sought to make an explicit statement about politics and status at
Detroit. By demanding that the Hurons join his campaign, Pontiac asserted Ottawa
precedence over Huron affairs and sought to demonstrate to everyone involved-the
Ottawas, his Anishinaabe allies, the French habitants, the British officers, and especially
the Hurons themselves-that the Ottawas would broach no disrespect. As had
generations of Ottawa leaders, Pontiac relied on the Ottawas' superior numbers and
extensive regional ties to the other Anishinaabe peoples to demonstrate Ottawa power.
The Hurons' initial refusals to participate in the violence, the warriors' suggestion that
they attack the Ottawas rather than the British, their hesitance to do so even when Pontiac
threatened their lives, and their later attempts to undermine the campaign, furthermore,
corresponded to a century-long Huron desire not only to assert their autonomy from the
Ottawas but to regain the authority their people had long ago enjoyed in southern
Ontario. The Hurons did not, therefore, oppose the conflict because they, as Catholics,
rejected Neolin's message of spiritual renewal, but because they had good political
reasons to oppose the movement. 148
To the disappointment of the young Huron warriors, the conflict did not result in
violence between the Hurons and the Ottawas as it had in 1706 and 1738; the Hurons
dared not attack Pontiac's impressive Anishinaabe coalition. Instead the struggle took
the form of a no less determined and serious diplomatic and political struggle between the
148
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Ottawas and the Hurons. Beginning in 1762 and continuing through the summer of 1764,
Pontiac sought to demonstrate Ottawa sovereignty over Huron affairs by repeatedly
demanding that his numerically weaker neighbors recognize Ottawa seniority and join his
campaign. For Pontiac, in other words, Huron participation in the siege became a symbol
of Ottawa governance in the region, and continued Huron resistance became an
undeniable and unacceptable challenge to his and his people's authority. The majority of
the Hurons responded to these demands impudently. Refusing first to accept Pontiac's
invitations in 1762 and early 1763, the Hurons only joined the campaign under duress in
May 1763 and abandoned it after two days. Thereafter, they actively sought to
undermine the siege. In the months following the siege and throughout 1764, the Hurons
played a part in reconciling former combatants with the British and thereby reducing
Pontiac's ability to continue the war. This section first places the Hurons' recent
ascendance in the context of traditional Ottawa seniority, then describes the power
struggle which that inversion of status engendered.
The exchange at the Huron village that day therefore represented only the most
recent exchange in a long and tumultuous dynamic the precedents of which had been set
decades before 1763. After a century of intimate contact and cooperation, the Hurons
and Ottawas remained distinct and autonomous from one another and sought to pursue
their own advantage. Their rivalry demonstrates the degree to which longstanding local
concerns shaped Pontiac's War and, by extension, the exercise of colonial power within
the Great Lakes region. The Huron-Ottawa rivalry affected every phase of the conflict,
from its beginning to the final reconciliation between the combatants and the British.
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The relationship between the British and the peoples of Detroit, as had that between the
French and those peoples, was shaped by the Huron-Ottawa relationship, which in turn
was shaped by the Anishinaabe alliances and the Huron-Iroquois nexus. That colonial
relationship can not be separated from the interlocking relationships which helped to
constitute it, and Pontiac's War can not be understood apart from the Huron-Ottawa
struggle.
The renewal of Ottawa-Huron conflict ended a period of relative peace and
cooperation between the two groups. After the 1738 crisis the trajectory of the HuronOttawa dynamic had swung again toward peaceful cohabitation. The Hurons and
Ottawas had finally reached a truce in 1741 in the aftermath of a joint Huron-Ottawa
campaign against the Chickasaws. The Hurons had signaled their loyalty and reliability
by participating in the warfare, and cooperative violence against an external enemy had
once again affirmed the ties which bound the Ottawas and Hurons together, as had the
Iroquois wars in the seventeenth century and the Fox Wars between 1712 and the 1730s.
Testifying to the newly repaired Ottawa-Huron relations, the Kiskakon Ottawa leader
Mikinic had promised Ottawa protection for the Hurons and had convinced them to
return to Detroit in the spring of 1743. Kinosaki, a Sinago Ottawa, likewise confirmed
this reconciliation at the August 1744 meeting between Longueuil and the Detroit
nations. By offering the war hatchet pointedly to Sastaretsy and demanding that the
Huron take it, Kinosaki signaled that he trusted the Hurons, even if the incident carried
implications of Ottawa power and an implicit threat if the Hurons failed to comply.
Mikinic's efforts, finally, had been instrumental in convincing the Conchake Hurons to
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return to Detroit in 1753. When the Hurons met with the Ottawas and other nations in
1753, Mikinic pledged to reunite "your heart with ours." By then the Hurons had moved
to a new village site at Point au Montreal, directly across the river from Fort
Pontchartrain. This village was only a mile from the Ottawas', close enough that an
Anglo-American captive detained in the Huron village could hear the Ottawas
carousing. 149 This proximity suggests an intimacy and mutually trust between the nations
which had been seriously tested in 1738 and thereafter.
Yet the shift in local politics after the fall of New France ensured that this
harmony would not last. To understand fully how Pontiac and other Ottawas experienced
the Hurons' new ascendency-and to explain his anti-Huron and anti-British animuswe must understand the vaunted position they held during the French regime and the
secondary status they enjoyed in the new British regime. Consider, for example, the
August 1744 council held by the Detroit commandant, Paul-Jospeh leMoyne, Baron de
Longueuil and the four nations of the post. After inveighing against the wickedness of
the British, the commandant held a wampum belt aloft and turned to the Ottawas. "My
eldest son the Ottawa," he told them, "It is to you that I address myself first." 150 When he
finished, an unnamed Ottawa war chief began singing a war song and the other nations
then followed his example. Finally, the Sinago Ottawa leader, Kinosaki, took the
wampum belt and addressed the Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas. "My brothers, as it
is not possible to Cut this belt so that we can each have a part, I think that you will not

149

Smith, "Journal," in Drake, Indian Captivities, 219.
"Monfils aine L'outaoliais, C'est-a-toi le premiers a quije m'adresse," "Conseil tenu par Mr de
Longueliil Commandant pour LeRoy au Detroit, aux 4. Naitons de Son Poste, au Sujet dela declaration de
laguerre contre L'anglois," [1744], COAM, CllA, vol. 18, fol. 134v.
150

294

disapprove if I give the entire [belt] to our brothers the hurons." 151 Although the Hurons
at first demurred, Kinosaki insisted and the Hurons accepted the belt. 152
Longueuil, Kinosaki, and the Hurons, as well as the Potawatomis, and Ojibwas,
had therefore dramatized Ottawa precedence at Detroit. Longueuil had, by speaking to
the Ottawas first and referring to them as Onontio's "eldest son," explicitly recognized
Ottawa seniority at the post. By taking the lead in singing and forcing the Hurons to be
custodians of the war belt, Kinosaki furthermore had affirmed Ottawa leadership and
reminded the Hurons, Potawatomis, and Ojibwas of Ottawa seniority in such affairs.
And, by finally acquiescing to Kinosaki's demands, Sastaretsy and the Hurons tacitly
acknowledged the Ottawas' authority. The conference therefore dramatically illustrates
the political status quo at Detroit in 1744. The Ottawas, the most numerous and the best
connected nation at Detroit, enjoyed a privileged position at the post and commanded the
deference, if not the submission, of their neighbors. Although the Ottawas had long been
the most powerful nation at Detroit, the 1740s and 1750s represented a golden age of
Ottawa leadership in the region. The careers of two Detroit leaders, the Sinago Kinosaki
and Mikinic, the headman of the Detroit Sinagos, demonstrate the Ottawas' influence in
the region.
Representing the two Ottawa subnations who lived at the Detroit village, the
Sinago leader, Kinosaki, and Kiskakon headman, Mikinic, positioned themselves as
indispensable statesmen in the pays d' en haut in the final decades of French rule and
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thereby ensured Ottawa precedence at Detroit. 153 Both men played active roles in the
Huron-Ottawa conflict between 1738 and 1743, 154 as well as the crisis of French
authority between 1747-and 1753. 155 In recognition of their influence among the peoples
of the region and loyalty to Ononio, the French showered the men with gifts and tokens
of their authority. 156 Attesting to their loyalty and leadership during the crisis of 1747,
the governor even paid the habitants of Detroit to provide the materials and build
western-style houses for each Ottawa headman and to fill them with furniture. 157 Even
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the Hurons, normally loathe to recognize Ottawa authority, acknowledged the authority
these men commanded. When the Conchake Hurons returned to Detroit in 1753, they
addressed Mikinic by the honorific "father" which, if it did not imply subjection, at least
signaled the Hurons' respect for the man. They likewise promised that they "would
never forget the name of the dead nor the Sentiments of Kinousaki," who had died shortly
before the conference. 158 Finally, the Hurons allowed that the Ottawas possessed "a force
of Virtue that we do not have." 159 In so doing, they publicly attested to the Ottawas'
seniority and, at least outwardly, accepted their place as junior brothers in Onontio' s
family.
This, then, was the legacy Pontiac inherited when he became a senior Ottawa
chief, probably soon after the death of Kino saki in 17 51. 160 As Cadillac had proclaimed
in 1707 and Longueuil repeated in 1744, the Ottawas represented the "eldest brother" of
the Detroit nations. 161 The Ottawas were, as scholars have recognized, New France's
"most important ally," "principal intermediary for the French," in the Great Lakes, and
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the "central nation of the alliance," and they expected to retain this status during British
tenure. 162 The British promotion of the Hurons as the "Head of the Huron Confederacy,"
therefore constituted both an inversion of status and an unacceptable slight to Pontiac and
the other Ottawas. Pontiac and his fellow leaders must have seethed as they watched the
Hurons speaking first in council, purportedly for the Ottawas, the Potawatomis accede to
Huron judgment, and the Hurons and British conferring privately. The erstwhile elder
brothers now listened as the Delawares, Shawnees, and Iroquois referred to them as
"grandchildren," and "nephews" while addressing the Hurons as the Ottawas' elders.
The Hurons claim in December 1760 that the peoples of Detroit lived "as one People" for
whom the Hurons spoke also surely nettled the Ottawas. 163 The exchange almost
perfectly mirrors one in Montreal in 1701, when the Ottawa leader Ontontagan claimed
that the Hurons and Ottawas shared "one body" and proceeded to speak in the name of
the Hurons. Ontontagan' s claim to speak for the Hurons in 1701 triggered an immediate
retort from Cheanonvouzon and, eventually, to an armed conflict between those
nations. 164 The Hurons's claim to speak for the Ottawas in 1763 was scarcely any more
palatable for Pontiac and the Ottawas.
The Ottawas resentment about the Hurons' new status probably encouraged them
to oppose British rule. The Ottawas expected the British to recognize them as the senior
nation at Detroit as the French had, just as they expected them to continue the French
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practices of distributing gifts and trading on advantageous terms. When the British not
only failed to recognize Ottawa authority but actively supported the Hurons, the Ottawas
reacted angrily. In order to restore their privileged place and to address the other
grievances, the Ottawas sought to return the French to Detroit. Although they never
explicitly registered their resentment of the Hurons' pretentious, the Ottawas behavior
nonetheless demonstrated their frustration and unwillingness to concede authority to the
Hurons. In response to this attack on Ottawa precedence at Detroit, the Ottawas feebly
sought to reassert their old precedence at Detroit. At the August 1760 meeting with Gen.
Monckton, the Delawares, and Six Nations, for example, the Ottawas sought to speak for
themselves and the Potawatomis. The minutes first record that a Huron man,
demonstrating the Huron's newfound ascendency, arose to speak "in Behalf of the rest"
of the nations gathered. Yet after he had finished, the Ottawa headman Missinago
claimed to speak "in Behalf of themselves and Pottowattimies." 165 This claim, made just
moments after the Hurons had purported to speak for the Ottawas, reads as a rebuttal to
Huron claims of seniority. An Ottawa speaker again asserted Ottawa dominance in 1761
when he claimed to "speak on the part of all our Confederacy here present," perhaps
including the Hurons. 166 In 1763, the Ottawas also referred to the Delawares, who had
once referred to the Ottawas as "Grandchildren" and "Cousens," as the Ottawas'
"Nephews," thereby signaling their intent to reassert Ottawa authority in the Great
Lakes. 167 These dueling claims to represent the Detroit nations constituted a determined

165

"At a Conference held by The Honourable Brigadier General Monckton with the Western Nation of
Indians, at the Camp before Pittsburg, 12 day of August, 1760," in Pennsylvania Archives, 3:750.
166
"Minutes of the Proceedings ... ," 1761,in WJP, 2:487.
167
"Journal oflndian Congress," 15 Dec. 1763, WJP, 10:965.

299

argument about status at Detroit. The Ottawas' insistence that the Huron participate in
the siege of Detroit, moreover, signals the extent to which the campaign against British
excesses was also a campaign against Huron pretentious of authority.
This inversion of authority, as had similar inversions in 1649, 1706, and other
times, prompted a power struggle. The Ottawas, who were more invested in French rule
than the Hurons, saw their struggle both as a campaign to revenge the disrespect which
the British had shown them and an opportunity to reassert Ottawa authority. By using his
Anishinaabe connections to force the Hurons to participate in the campaign, Pontiac
would demonstrate who the true "Head of the Ottawa conspiracy" after all. More
importantly, the movement, as Neolin had promised, was destined to return the French to
the Great Lakes. When they did so, the Ottawas could expect to regain their old
authority. For Pontiac, in other words, Huron participation in the siege became a symbol
of Ottawa governance in the region, and continued Huron resistance became an
undeniable and unacceptable challenge to his and his people's authority. For the Hurons,
resisting the Ottawas' demands became not only proof of their continued autonomy and
independence, but also a way to ingratiate themselves to their British friends. As a result,
the two nations performed a delicate and highly ritualized dance. The Ottawas frequently
demanded that the Hurons join their struggle against the British, relying on their superior
numbers and connections with other Anishinaabeg to intimidate the Hurons. The Hurons
responded by refusing these demands when they could, grudgingly participating when
they were compelled to do so, quickly abandoning the siege, and finally working with the
British to undermine Pontiac and the Ottawas.
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The first indications of trouble came when Pontiac invited the Hurons to join his
campaign in the late winter or spring of 1763. Although Navarre claimed that Pontiac
demanded that the Hurons join his campaign because his force of Potawatomi and Ottawa
warriors was still not "large enough" to accomplish ends, this explanation rings false. 168
The Hurons in question only amounted to some sixty warriors and thus would have
represented merely fraction of the total force. Rather Pontiac's insistence upon Huron
compliance was a politically charged demonstration of Ottawa authority and a sustained
attack on Huron aspirations to autonomy and influence at Detroit. Pontiac needed the
Hurons to join the campaign less because he needed warriors and more because he sought
to demonstrate the Ottawa political and diplomatic dominance of the region. By forcing
the Hurons to participate, Pontiac reminded the Hurons of their place and, in the process,
sought to alienate the Hurons from the British friends.
Suffering under no illusion of Pontiac's intentions, the Huron leaders Theata and
Babi scoffed at Pontiac's suggestion. Although some Huron warriors did accept the war
belt, these two turtle elders, who had both played key roles during the crises of the 1740s
and 1750s, unceremoniously dismissed Pontiac's messengers without "caring to listen" to
his propositions. 169 If they had accepted the invitation, after all, the Hurons would have
not only implicitly acknowledged the Ottawas' influence in the region, but would have
removed the central prop to the Hurons' newfound ascendency: British tenure of the
Great Lakes region. Pontiac's extension of an invitation to the Hurons, and the Hurons
rejection of that invitation therefore signified something much more significant than
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whether the Hurons would participate in Pontiac's campaign. The exchange pitted two
alternate visions of diplomatic and political relations at Detroit: one which reasserted the
suzerainty of the Ottawa "elder brothers" over the Hurons, and another which defended
Huron ascendance as the "head of the Ottawa Confederacy."
The Hurons' casual rejection of Pontiac's invitation underlined the Hurons'
newfound autonomy and hence clearly nettled Pontiac. Accordingly, the Ottawa leader
once again tried to enlist the Hurons in his campaign. Meeting with the Hurons sometime
in early May, Pontiac informed them that he would soon begin the attack and demanded
the Hurons "give him an immediate answer." The Huron headmen, insisted that they
must first consult with their people and deferred their response, and Pontiac grudgingly
granted them two days to consider the proposal. As late as May 8, the day before
hostilities began at the fort, Pontiac remained "occupied with the Hurons and
Potawatomis who had remained in their villages." 170 Yet after fully considering
Pontiac's proposition, the Hurons once again elected to "remain neuter in the War," and
therefore did not participate in Pontiac's abortive attempt to surprise the fort on May 9. 171
Far from participating in the attack, the Hurons sought to undermine Pontiac's campaign.
On May 10, the "Wiandotes [Hurons'] Chiefs," presumably Theata and Babi, visited
Gladwin at the British fort on their way to a meeting with the Ottawas, where they
promised "to endeavor to solicitate and perusuade the [Ot]Tawas from committing
further Hostilities." Although Robert Roberts believed that Pontiac had "prevailed on
[the Hurons] to sing the War Song" after "counceling a long while" later that day, the
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Hurons appeared determined to persist in their neutrality given Pontiac's demand for
cooperation on the following day. 172
If Pontiac was already annoyed, the Hurons' latest insolence enraged him. Not
only had they failed to recognize Ottawa seniority at Detroit, but had even collaborated
with the British against his plans. Pontiac therefore visited the Huron village in person
on 11 May and issued an ultimatum. If they did not join the fight, Pontiac would order
his followers to attack the Hurons themselves. The Potawatomis likewise visited their
Huron allies either the same or following day and informed the Hurons that Pontiac had
likewise threatened them that "they were to die the next Morning, unless they [the
Potawatomis] Joined the Ottawas." The Potawatomis had finally decided to join Pontiac
and encouraged the Hurons to do so as well. Pontiac's threats reminded the Hurons of
their vulnerability and the long tradition of Ottawa dominance of Huron affairs. Still
disinclined to join the campaign, the Huron warriors advocated "attacking the Ottawas"
instead of the British. 173
At length Theata and Babi accepted the hopelessness of refusing Pontiac's
demands. Finding themselves "threatened and crowded so closely" by Pontiac's warriors
and admitting that they "were weak," the Huron leaders eventually consented to join the
Ottawas rather than risk the Ottawas' wrath. As Theata and Babi explained to their
warriors, they had little choice in the matter. Pontiac's forces, already numbering some
four hundred Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi warriors far outnumbered the Hurons'
sixty warriors then present. And even if the Hurons abandoned Detroit to escape Pontiac,
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they worried that the Ottawas and Potawatomis would "fall upon us and kill our wives
and children. 174" As the Hurons later pointed out, the British lacked the strength to
"assist [the Hurons] in case they shoulde be attack'd," and justifiably feared that the
Ottawas "should declare War against them." 175 Accordingly, the Hurons grudgingly
accepted the futility of resisting Pontiac's demands. They agreed to join the siege on
May 12 and joined the Potawatomi warriors, who had taken positions south of the British
fort.I76
The Ottawas and Hurons had therefore played out a familiar drama in early May
1763. By demanding that the Hurons join the campaign, Pontiac had thus demanded that
the Hurons recognize Ottawa seniority at Detroit. Pontiac, who had gathered an army of
several hundred warriors, had little need for the paltry force of sixty Huron warriors.
Rather Pontiac's insistence that the Hurons join the campaign had more to do with
political and symbolic considerations. Pontiac sought to show everybody-his allies, the
British, the Iroquois, and most of all the Hurons-that the Ottawas remained the elder
brothers at Detroit and that the Hurons would accept their position or face the same fate
as the hated British. To the Hurons, veterans of a long-running dispute with the Ottawas
over status, the message was abundantly clear. The Ottawas had asserted their seniority
and the Hurons must acknowledge it or suffer the consequences. By resisting Pontiac's
pretentious, the Hurons had denied that seniority and had instead asserted their autonomy.
Ultimately, however, Theata and Babi acknowledged an unpleasant truth that their
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ancestors had often been forced to confront. Although they could often act autonomously
and exert considerable influence, they remained a relative! y small community dwarfed by
their Anishinaabe neighbors who "crowded [them] so closely." 177 As had so many of
their ancestors, these Huron leaders acknowledged the Ottawas' might and acquiesced to
their demands. As the Hurons bitterly complained to anyone who might listen in the
following months, the Ottawas had "Compelled" them to fight. 178 But, as their ancestors
had, the Hurons continued to plot against the Ottawas.
Although Pontiac had forced the Hurons to join the campaign in the short term, he
had not resolved the issue. The Hurons continued to resist Pontiac's assertions of Ottawa
suzerainty at Detroit. Never enthusiastic supporters of the conflict, Huron warriors only
fought perfunctorily and soon abandoned the siege altogether. The Hurons participated
in the siege all day on May 12, but did not return on the following day. Instead they
attacked a barge commanded by Chapman, seized Chapman's merchandise, including
rum, and took several British survivors captive. Apart from participating in the capture
of Presqu'lle in June, once again under duress from the Ottawas, the Hurons refused to
participate in the hostilities.
By May 16, only four days after they had grudgingly joined Pontiac's campaign,
Theata and Babi sought to abandon it completely. On that day, Gladwin learned that the
Hurons "had withdrawn from the plot," and had left their fort. 179 A week later, on May
22, they therefore sent the long-time Huron interpreter, Jacques Baudry dit des Buttes dit
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Saint-Martin, to speak to Gladwin in their name. 180 Admitting that they had participated
in the siege and confiscated Chapman's goods, the Hurons wondered if Gladwin "wou' d
make Peace with them" if they surrendered their prisoners and made restitution for the
stolen merchandise. Yet the Hurons did not simply offer neutrality. They also offered to
install themselves at a "small Island" near the mouth of the Detroit River where they
could protect British vessels on their way to the fort. 181 Although Gladwin did not trust
the Hurons enough to approve of their move to the mouth of the river, he did promise to
"make Peace with them." He also asked them to "remain quiet, or use their Endeavors to
separate Pontiac & his followers." The following day, the Hurons responded that they
would "remain neuter" for five or six days and to try "by some Means" to alienate
Pontiac from his supporters. After those five days, on 27 May, the Hurons once again
sent Saint-Martin to speak to Gladwin. The interpreter reported that the Hurons were
"still resolv' d to remain Neuter" and that they would abandon Detroit altogether if the
Ottawas "oblig'd them to take up Arms." 182
At the same time, the Hurons also offered to "oblige Pontiac to come to their
Terms" in conjunction with the Shawnees and Delawares. 183 By doing so, the Hurons
sought once again to leverage their relationship with other nations into power over the
Ottawas and other Anishinaabe peoples. As had Cheanonvouzon with the Iroquois and
Miamis in the 1700s and Sastaretsy with the Iroquois and Flatheads in the 1730s, Theata
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and Babi sought to secure Huron autonomy from the Ottawas by appealing to powerful
allies. The Hurons had, after all, enjoyed an especially familiar relationship with the
Delawares and Shawnees, dating to their first forays into the Ohio Valley in the 1730s
and they hoped to use that friendship to their advantage. Although the gambit had little
hope for success since the Delawares and Shawnees proved just as hostile to the British
as Pontiac and had in fact initiated the violence, the Hurons' promise speaks to their
desire to use their diplomatic pull with Ohio Valley nations to assert Huron autonomy
and undermine Ottawa power.
While Navarre credited the French habitants, and especially Father Potier, for the
Hurons' defection, the Hurons had their own reasons for distancing themselves from
Pontiac. Navarre noted that Potier had held a council with the Hurons on May 14 in
which he implored the Hurons to remain neutral and refused to grant the sacraments to
any Huron who participated in the siege. 184 When the Hurons announced that they would
no longer participate in the campaign on May 16, therefore, Navarre credited the "efforts
of Father Potier" in securing their neutrality. 185 Yet Navarre almost certainly exaggerated
Potier's role in the Huron decision to leave the siege in order to demonstrate the loyalty
of the French habitants to the British Crown. Gladwin and the other British officers
suspected that the habitants had colluded, or at least encouraged, Pontiac's plot. 186
Therefore Navarre sought to demonstrate that Potier and the other French people at the
post remained loyal to their new sovereign by emphasizing the role that Potier had played
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in the Hurons' decision to abandon Pontiac. In reality, however, the Hurons had
consistently resisted the Ottawas' invitations and had only participated perfunctorily
when they did participate. The Hurons' decision to abandon Pontiac, then, owed more to
their aversion to Pontiac and to Ottawas' pretention of authority over the Hurons. Their
offer not only to remain neutral but to actively undermine the Ottawas' efforts likewise
suggests that the Hurons had their own reasons, quite apart from being denied
Communion, for opposing the Ottawas. The Hurons sought once again to gain the
advantage in their age-old struggle with the Ottawas for dominance at Detroit.
Although the bulk of the Hurons remained neutral through the rest of May and
into June, Pontiac once again sought to force the Hurons into hostilities with the British.
Around June 15, several war parties, including some Hurons, left Detroit for the British
post at Presqu'Ile, at the site of current-day Erie, Pennsylvania. 187 The native warriors
attacked the fort on May 20. During a cease-fire in the fighting, the Huron warriors told
John Christie, the commanding officer of the garrison, that they had been "compelled to
take up arms against Detroit by the Outawas." 188 The Hurons also offered to let Christie
and his garrison leave in peace if he surrendered the post. Although the Hurons reneged
on their promise, took Christie and his soldiers captive, and may have killed some, they
delivered Christie and some others to Gladwin soon after they returned to Detroit. 189
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While some Hurons participated in the assault on Presqu'lle under duress, Theata
and Babi sought to withdraw from the campaign altogether. Heretofore, the Hurons,
fearing Ottawa retribution for their overtures to the British, had dealt with the British
only through the mediation of their interpreter, Saint-Martin. As soon as the bulk of the
Ottawa warriors left to attack Presqu'lle, the Hurons felt emboldened to visit the British
fort in person and speak with Gladwin. 190 On June 16, the day after the warriors had
departed, the Hurons entered Detroit by a "false gate" and held a council with Gladwin.
The Hurons offered "many excuses" for their participation in the siege, most likely
arguing, as they would do ceaselessly in the months to come, that they only joined the
campaign when the Ottawas had forced them to. They noted, however, that they had not
taken part in the fighting for a month and asked Gladwin to grant them peace. Although
he made no firm peace with them, Gladwin presented the Huron leaders with a flag as a
"sign of union" between the Hurons and British. 191 This basic position-that they had
been forced into fighting by the Ottawas, but had only fought briefly and under duressthereafter became the official Huron line, repeated every time they met with British
representatives.
Encouraged by this meeting and by the Potawatomis' apparent pending defection
from the alliance, the Hurons resolved not only to make a separate peace with the British,
but also actively to undermine Pontiac's coalition. On July 7, shortly after the Hurons
who had participated in the attack on Presqu'lle returned to Detroit, the entire Huron
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village held a council and decided to meet with Gladwin the next day. 192 Arriving at the
British fort the following day, the Hurons once again disclaimed any responsibility for
the start of the hostilities. They claimed, somewhat disingenuously, that they had known
"nothing of this Affair at the Commencement" because Pontiac had not revealed his plans
until he had gathered a force sufficient to "overpower them." Even then, the Hurons had
only fired at the British for "one day" before leaving the siege. Gladwin accepted the
Hurons' explanation for their participation. 193 If the Hurons returned all the goods that
they had looted and the prisoners they had taken, the commandant told them, their "errors
would be pardoned and the past forgotten." The Huron delegates returned to their
village, where they reported Gladwin's promises. 194
True to their word, the Hurons returned to the fort the following day, 9 July, and
brought seven British captains, including Christie from Presqu'Ile. They also pledged to
bring in the merchandise they had looted from Chapman and others, down to the last
"needle." 195 Furthermore, the Hurons informed Gladwin that they planned to escape with
the Potawatomis and "build a kind of Stockade" on the Huron River, near the mouth of
the Detroit River, where they could defend themselves "against the Ottawas in case they
should declare War against them." 196 The plan, which the Hurons apparently tried to
enact in early August, demonstrates the enmity between the Ottawas and Hurons and the
always present possibility of violence between the Ottawas and the Hurons. Fully aware
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that they could not oppose the Ottawas alone, the Hurons reached out to the Potawatomis
for protection and for help implementing their plans for the region.
The Hurons' proposal also underscores the extent to which they found their
freedom to act circumscribed in 1763. The Hurons' protestations that they had
participated in the conflict only under duress from Pontiac was much more than selfserving spin. Pontiac, at the head of a large Anishinaabe army, vastly outnumbered the
Hurons. The Ottawa leader had directly confronted the Hurons and threatened to attack
them if they did not join the fight. Theata explained his reason for joining the siege by
noting that, if they refused to participate, they would have to "abandon our lands and flee
with our wives and children" and even then, they could not guarantee their own safety. 197
In July they were still considering leaving Detroit until British reinforcements arrived

who could "assist them in case they should be attack' d." They even suggested moving
with the Potawatomis to the Huron River south of Detroit where they could erect a
"Stockade ... to defend themselves against the Ottawa in case they should declare War
against them." 198 Moreover, as soon as threat of Ottawa reprisals dimmed, the Hurons
sought to reassure the British of their loyalty. When many of the Anishinaabe warriors
left in June, the Hurons contacted Gladwin. When the warriors left for good in
September, Babi likewise visited the British to assure them of their good intentions,
explaining that the Ottawas had theretofore blocked them from coming to visit the
British.
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The Hurons' determination to make peace with the British, which coincided with
Potawatomi overtures of peace toward the British, once again outraged Pontiac. On July
10, the day after the Hurons had turned their prisoners over to Gladwin, Pontiac came to
the Huron village to reassert Ottawa authority, as he had on May 11. Pontiac reminded
the Hurons of the Ottawas might and threatened them not to make peace with the British.
To drive home his point, he brought "fifteen of his best Warriors completely arm' d."
Unlike the meeting in May, however, Pontiac's show of force had "no effect" on the
Hurons. 199 Buoyed by their talks with Gladwin, the return of some of their warriors, and
the Potawatomis' wavering allegiance to Pontiac, the Hurons refused to acquiesce to the
Ottawa's demand. Instead they returned to the British fort the July 11, where they
surrendered the rest of their prisoners, as well as the goods they had pilfered from
Chapman and other traders. The Huron leader Babi even surrendered a native slave who
had been adopted into his family which, as Hay noted "was a very extraordinary thing, as
they seldom give up a Prisoner that is adopted." 200 As British lieutenant Edward Jenkins
observed, the Hurons seemed "very anxious to get out of the scrape which the Ottawas
and Chippewains [Ojibwas] have drawed them into." Satisfied that the Hurons had met
the terms of peace, Gladwin extended a provisional peace to the Hurons and promised to
recommend that General Amherst sign an official treaty with them. 201 Satisfied with the
Hurons defection, James MacDonald, noted that the British "had several Councils with
the Waindotes [Hurons] ... during the Siege." 202
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Although Gladwin thought that the Hurons might rejoin Pontiac's confederacy
again in late July, the majority of the Hurons honored their peace agreement with
Gladwin. 203 On July 26 the Hurons met with the Ottawa, Shawnee, and Delaware
delegates at the Huron village. Some of the Hurons apparently agreed to resume the
hostilities at the meeting?04 They even fired a few shots at a barge carrying British
reinforcements to Detroit, and some may have participated in the Battle of Bloody Run a
few days later. 205 Yet on July 27 Andre, a Huron leader from the Lorette community,
informed Gladwin that the Hurons "told the Ottawas that notwithstanding" their promise
to resume hostilities, "they wou' d not fight" 206 Anticipating the Ottawas' anger at this
latest refusal, the Hurons briefly moved to the relative safety of Grosse Ile in late July
and invited the Potawatomis to join them. Although Navarre interpreted this move as a
ploy to lure the British into a false sense of security, the Hurons likely moved in order to
escape the Ottawas. 207 Three weeks earlier, after all, the Hurons had told Gladwin that
they intended to move to the Huron River-which empties into Lake Eriet near Grosse
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lie-and build a stockade with the Potawatomis to defend themselves from the
Ottawas. 208
During the spring and summer of 1763, Pontiac had consistently tried to force the
Hurons to participate in his siege and, in doing so, acknowledge Ottawa suzerainty. The
Hurons, who had more reason to support the British, had successfully resisted Ottawa
attempts to force them to participate in the war. The Hurons were, as Gladwin admitted,
"less culpable" than the others, and had been "led into the War, and have done but little
Mischief. " 209
Having struggled over status the entire summer of 1763, the Ottawas and Hurons
continued their fight even after the Ottawas left Detroit to establish hunting camps on the
Maumee River in the fall of 1763. Although he expressed half-hearted regrets for his
action, Pontiac remained defiant and intent upon resuming his campaign against the
British, hopefully with French help, in the spring. Still determined to force the Hurons to
acknowledge Ottawa supremacy, Pontiac warned the Hurons not to make peace with the
British and actively patrolled the road to Detroit to keep them from visiting the fort. As
the Mohawk man, Aaron, told Sir William Johnson in early October, the Ottawas had
promised the Hurons "if they attempt to make Peace without their [the Ottawas'] Consent
or Advice they will directly destroy them, and that if they attempt to come to the [British]
Fort they will be considered by them [the Ottawas] as Englishmen." More explicitly, the
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Ottawas told the Hurons that, since they "liv' d near the English and lik' d them ... they
should perish with them.'mo The Ottawa leader thereby sought to restore the age-old
status quo at Detroit. He sought to remind the Hurons of their tutelage to the Ottawas by
prohibiting them from acting without his "Consent." He alluded to the Ottawas' superior
numbers by assuring them that he could "destroy them." 211 Pontiac maintained this
position as late as July 1764, after the Hurons had concluded a formal peace with the
British, when the Ottawa again "threaten[ed] to extirpate the Hurons for making their
Submission." 212 Yet the Hurons did not submit to the Ottawas' threats. The Hurons had,
as they had intermittently since their time at Michilimackinac, defied Ottawa attempts to
dominate them and chartered an autonomous course.
In contrast to, and in defiance of, the Ottawas, the Hurons not only maintained
their loyalty to the British in the fall and winter but even fashioned themselves as
ambassadors for the British to other nations in 1764. As soon as the Ottawas left the
Detroit region in the fall, the Hurons regularly returned to assure Gladwin of their
goodwill and loyalty. On Sept. 24, for example, Babi visited Gladwin at the fort and paid
"him his Respects." 213 The Huron leader explained that he would have come in sooner,
but the Ottawas and Potawatomis, who had recently left, had been patrolling the road to
the fort. In early December, the Mohawk man Aaron told Johnson that the "old Men of
the Wiandots Nation" wanted to meet with him, and sent him wampum belts in order to
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ask for peace. 214 On 10 January 1764, Babi returned with Theata and wished Gladwin a
happy new year. Four days later, the two chiefs returned once again along with another
leader identified as "the Doctor's Son." The Hurons discussed the "Beginning of this
Indian War" with Gladwin, almost certainly pointing out their innocence in the
hostilities. 215 Again in late April, Theata and several other Huron leaders met with
Gladwin, and "repented of all the Ill we may have done." Promising to never
contemplate "any bad Thing for the Future," Theata asked Gladwin to communicate their
goodwill and loyalty to General Gage. 216
Gladwin did indeed inform his superiors of the Hurons eagerness to reconcile
with the British, and the Hurons began formal treaty negotiations with the British
(Gladwin had lacked the authority to grant them anything more than a provisional peace).
In early May, William Johnson, in his capacity as the superintendent, sent a Mohawk
named Peter, to discuss the preliminaries of a British-Huron peace. 217 Peter relayed Sir
William's message that he had decided not to "extirpate" the Hurons, if "Sasterredsey"here apparently used as a metonym for the Huron community-"heartily repent[ed] of
what he has done." Responding for the Hurons, Babi admitted that he and other Hurons
had participated in the strike but he now hung his "Ax up in the Air" and refused to fight
against the British any further. 218 These preliminary negotiations led to a formal treaty
summit at Niagara in July. Blaming the Ottawas once again, the Hurons reminded
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Johnson that they had been "Compelled to [fight the British] by your powerful Enemies
the Ottawas" but had nonetheless tried to "Observe our Engagements" and had regularly
communicated with Gladwin during the crisis. 219 Apparently satisfied with their
explanations and convinced of their goodwill, Johnson agreed to a "firm and absolute
peace" with the Hurons and pledged that any "past offenses shall be forgotten." 220
Even before they concluded peace with Johnson in July 1764, the Hurons began
serving as intermediaries for the British and their neighbors in the region. The pro-British
Hurons, who had largely remained around Detroit in the fall and winter of 1763-1764,
began an energetic campaign to reconcile with their fellow Hurons at Sandusky in the
spring. After the pro-British Hurons met with Johnson's representatives in May, Theata
visited Sandusky and told the Hurons there that he had made a preliminary agreement
with the British.Z21 Although the meeting went poorly and the other pro-French Hurons
mocked Theata's faith in the British, a delegation of pro-French Hurons from Sandusky
did arrive at Detroit at the beginning of the following month. They met with Gladwin on
July 4 and surrendered five prisoners and asked for peace with the British. The following
day, these pro-French leaders came to Gladwin again, this time accompanied by "some of
the Hurons of this Village." According to Gladwin, these Hurons had decided to "join
their own Village" once more and hence to abandon their hostility toward the British. By
doing so, the erstwhile rebellious Hurons reported that they hoped to encourage "those of
Sandusky" to do the same. 222 As late as 1766 Theata acknowledged that "there are some
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whose Hearts are not well inclined" and promised to do "every thing in our power to
unite all our nation as far as to Sandusky." 223
In a particularly ironic twist, the Hurons even worked to help some of the Ottawas
reach an accommodation with the British. In May 1764 a portion of the Ottawa village,
presumably the peace faction led by a leader named Manitou, requested "the intercession
of the Hurons" to help them finalize a peace deal with the British?24 Later that month
Manitou and other Ottawa leaders asked the British to send representatives to their
villages on the Maumee River and to "get one or two of the Huron Chiefs to go with
them." This request suggests that they recognized the Hurons' favored status with the
British and hoped to convince their erstwhile allies to mediate a peace between them and
the British. 225 When British officers met with the Ottawas at Detroit the following
September, the Hurons, who had already made peace in July, heralded the move and gave
their consent to the proceedings. 226 By officially condoning the proceedings and daring
to give the Ottawas advice, the Hurons demonstrated their role in the new order.
They played this role again in 1765, when they sought to proctor a peace between
the Shawnees and Delawares, the Hurons' longtime allies, and the British. The Hurons
launched raids against the still defiant Shawnees and Delawares in the winter of 1764 and
1765, but stopped when they learned that those nations had accepted a provisional
truce. 227 The following August, the Hurons met with the Shawnees and others in the
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company of George Croghan and other officials. The Hurons "exhorted the several
Nations to behave themselves" and to make peace with the British. 228 Again in 1767 the
Hurons chided some Saginaw Ottawas for killing Englishmen. They "Spoke to them &
Gave them a Belt to extort them to behave well for the future." 229
The Hurons' newfound authority and precedence was on display at July 1766
meeting between Johnson and those Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis who had yet to
make peace with the British, including Pontiac himself. After Pontiac and the others had
begged for forgiveness and Johnson had agreed to grant them peace, Theata addressed the
assembly. Noting that he and his people had long-since made peace with the British and
had since acted faithfully, he exhorted the Ottawas and others to "behave in the same way
we do." In case Pontiac failed to catch the first warning, Theata repeated that he advised
"all the rest of our Brethn" to follow the Hurons' lead and obey the British. Theata
concluded by noting that he spoke "in the name of all the Nations about Detroit." In a
none-too-subtle way, Theata had reminded Pontiac of the new order of things at Detroit.
Now the Hurons, allied to the British, acted as the elder brothers who advised the junior
Ottawas. Moreover, the Hurons freely spoke for all their neighbors at the post. The
Hurons seemed to be serving at this conference, as they had before, as the trusted allies of
the British.
Their loyalty during the conflict and assistance afterwards garnered the Hurons
what they had always wanted, a place of prestige at Detroit and autonomy from the
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Ottawas. That process had begun with the fall of New France and had been consolidated
by the summer of 1764 when the Hurons became the first of the combatants to conclude a
formal peace with Sir William. In 17 67, George Croghan spoke to the Hurons in the
presence of their neighbors and thanked them for their "Steady and good behavior since
the Peace," as well as the good conduct of their "Young Men." 230 The Ottawas at the
assembly certainly appreciated and likely resented the tremendous inversion that had
taken place since 1760. In what must have been a poignant inversion, Theata and Babi
served as spokesmen and intermediaries for the British, just as the Ottawas Mikinic and
Kinosaki had done for the French in the 1730s into the 1750s. Cheanonvouzon's plans
had been accomplished.

Conclusion

Ironically Pontiac, one of the most acclaimed pan-Indian leaders in history, could
not convince his nearest neighbors, the Hurons, to join his campaign in 1763. This
paradox speaks volumes about what sort of place Detroit was not only in 1763 but also
for decades before then. This story reinforces the interrelated contentions that have run
throughout this study: that the peoples of Detroit remained distinct and autonomous, and
that the interactions among them shaped the region and created the context in which
colonialism operated.
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In 1763, as they had in 1706 and 1738 and other times, the Hurons and Ottawas

demonstrated that neither they nor their neighbors in the region had abandoned their
individual corporate identities. Even though they had been "inseparable companions"
since the fall of Huronia over a century before, had lived at the same place, and had
struggled against the Iroquois, Foxes, English, British, and Flatheads together, they still
remained distinct peoples who prioritized the needs of their peculiar communities over
the needs of their regional allies. When the Hurons saw an opportunity to gain the upper
hand over their neighbors in 1763, many did so, risking their own safety in the process.
The Michilimackinac Ottawas likewise refused to participate in the conflict, and the
Potawatomis and Ojibwas did so only conditionally, willing to defect from Pontiac and
the Detroit Ottawas if it suited their interests. That these peoples not only remained
separate, but carried on a tradition of competition suggests that Detroit and the Great
Lakes Region more generally was inhabited not by orphaned refugees clinging to each
other and to their European foster parents, but by robust and proud peoples. Detroit, and
the surrounding region, was peopled by culturally and ethnically distinct communities
that vied or cooperated with one another to achieve their goals.
The interactions between these peoples in tum shaped Pontiac's War. Although
historians of Pontiac's War have paid close attention to the dynamics of inter-native
relations, they have tended to focus more on those things which united the peoples of the
Great Lakes Region with natives elsewhere, particularly in the Ohio River Valley. 231 As
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a result, these accounts have replicated a very traditional colonial narrative of Pontiac's
War: a pan-Indian coalition, united by their distaste for British conduct and by a shared
religious narrative articulated by Neolin, fought against the British in order to forestall
territorial expansion and to maintain their autonomy.
Yet, as we have seen, Pontiac's War was shaped by a larger set of dynamics
whose roots extended farther back in time than the advent of British rule or Neolin's
vision quest. Without the geo-strategic cooperation and social connections between the
Anishinaabe communities, Pontiac would have scarcely been able to field an army large
enough to threaten the British (or the Hurons). If the Hurons had not maintained a long
relationship with the Iroquois, moreover, the Hurons would not have enjoyed their
newfound status at Detroit and would have been more inclined to join Pontiac's
movement. Had the Hurons and Ottawas not fought for status since at least the 1670s,
they might have acted in concert against the British instead of working at cross-purposes.
The Anglo-Indian conflict, in short, was entangled within and circumscribed by a whole
set of relationships that were only partly related to the larger imperial struggle. Had these
interactions not been present, or had the people of the Great Lakes Region acted as a
single, collective entity, the outcome of the conflict might have different. As it was, they
shaped the contours and limits ofthat movement in consequential ways. Pontiac's War
was much more than an Anglo-Indian struggle over the nature of empire or the place of
Indians in the new regime, it was also a story of Anishinaabe cooperation, HuronIroquois diplomacy, and Huron-Ottawa rivalry, as well as intra-Huron conflict. The war
McConnell presents a more nuanced understanding of the event, finding "a complexity that belies the
notion of a pan-Indian movement to forestall the English at any price." He likewise suggests that those
who did participate did so for quite different reasons (McConnell, "The Search for Security," vii).
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was indeed a "fight over status" as Gregory Dowd maintains, but that fight was more
complicated than Dowd allows?32 The conflict was simultaneously a war about natives'
abstract status in the empire and a very local conflict about status between the Hurons
and the Ottawas. Those two fights cannot be disentangled.
The fact that Pontiac's War, a paradigm of the struggle between invading
colonizers and resistant natives, was situated in a set of relationships among native
peoples demonstrates the extent to which the colonial relationship in general was
embedded in a whole set of relationships. The pattern in which French and British people
interacted with native peoples was constituted by the ways in which native peoples
interacted with one another. Any time the French interacted with the Hurons, for
example, they did so in the context of the complicated lines which connected the Hurons
to their Iroquois and Miamis allies, their Ottawas rivals, and even rival Huron factions.
Indeed, much of the care the French took to keep the Hurons satisfied owed to the
omnipresent possibility that the Hurons would defect from the French alliance and join
the Covenant Chain. In the first years of his administration as governor, the Marquis de
Beauharnois removed Alphone de Tonty from his post at Detroit because the Hurons
demanded it. When the Hurons petitioned for his removal, they ominously threatened to
take their "fire"-meaning their village-"elsewhere," presumably to Seneca territory. 233
Conversely, Onontio could only claim the influence he did in the Detroit region because
of the cultural and kinship connections between the Anishinaabe peoples. As
Beauharnois observed in 1738, New France could not afford a conflict between the
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Hurons and Ottawas because the "hurons are allied with the 5 Iroquois Nations, and the
Outaoi.iais with all those of the pa"is d' en haut. " 234
Conversely their relationship with the French reshaped the patterns of interactions
among native people. Conflict for access to French and British merchandise and
technology intensified rivalry between the Hurons and Ottawas. When Gov. Callieres
ordered that a house be built for Cheanonvouzon the Ottawas demanded the same mark
of French regard. 235 The French decision to anoint the Ottawas as the "elder sons" of the
region both recognized the Ottawas' status among their neighbors and enhanced that
status.
"Euro-Indian" relations therefore cannot be abstracted from a whole set of
relationships which fundamentally shaped and continued to reshape the terms on which
native and European encountered one another. Relationships between native peoples
constrained the ways in which French and British officials could act and defined the
limits of the possible in the region, just as the presence of European technologies,
peoples, and alliances in the region constrained native autonomy and created new
opportunities. Rather than resorting to metaphors about a cultural "middle ground" or an
impenetrable "American woods," we should view intercultural interactions in the Great
Lakes Region in the same way an ecologist views an ecosystem: as a complicated and
integrated system of interlocking processes and mutually constituting relationships. 236
An ecologist knows that no two organisms in an ecosystem interact in a closed system.
234
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Rather each relationship is connected to, and inseparable from, a whole host of others,
and each process is contingent upon a score of other processes. While I do not intend to
equate the native and European peoples of Detroit with non-human organisms, or to
suggest that power relations between groups functioned like a food chain, I nonetheless
believe that the analogy is productive. Only by understanding the totality of these
relationships can we understand how colonial relationships worked.
Yet this story is not only about Detroit, or about the Great Lakes region. It also
has significance for the whole New World and other colonial contexts. Researchers have
shown that events that we have typically seen as the paradigms of colonialism were
actually profoundly shaped by and enmeshed in interactions among native American
peoples. Take, for example, Hernan Cortes's conquest ofTenochtitlan in Mexico in the
1520s. Traditional accounts of the Conquest have ascribed that victory to the superiority
of Spanish arms and technology, as well as to epidemic diseases. But analysis has
suggested that Cortes could never have conquered the city without the aid of the Aztecs'
traditional enemies, particularly the Tlaxcalans and tribute city-states, who provided
support to Cortes and whose warriors outnumbered the Castilian conquistadores by a
factor of ninty-nine to one. As in the Great Lakes, the relationship between the
"colonized" and the "colonizers" was embedded in and inextricable from a whole host of
. peop1es. 237
. h'1ps between native
other re1atwns
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EPILOGUE
Exploring the Detroit River with Tocqueville, 1831
In 1831, a little more than a century after Charlevoix visited Detroit, another

celebrated French traveler, Alexis de Tocqueville, visited the region. Tocqueville
encountered a dramaically changed place. Where Charlevoix had found the palisades of
the native villages surrounded by native fields, Tocqueville saw the houses and barns of
Euro-American inhabitants, which had, he judged, a "French appearance." 1 Referring to
the French practice of building their houses and buildings on the river's edge in 1781, the
Moravian missionary David Zeisberger noted that the riverbank was "thickly settled, and
is built like a village along the river." 2 Where Charlevoix had seen Fort Pontchartrain
proudly flying the white Bourbon banner, Tocqueville arrived at the post just a few years
after the last fortress at Detroit had been dismantled, and the French flag replaced by Old
Glory. 3 Where Charlevoix had encountered a social space connected by the rivers and
lakes, Tocqueville found a river that served as a political divider between the United
States and the British province of Upper Canada. Detroit had, in short, ceased to be a
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Figure 15: [Henri-Louis
BoishebertJ, [Plans des terreins
appurtenant aux franc;ais autor de
Fort de PontchartrainJ, 1731.
Centre des archives d'outre mer,
Aix-en-Province, France.
Tills 1731 map illustrates the
characteristic longlots willch
immigrants from the St. Lawrence
Valley established at Detroit. Tills

native place and had become the province of Euro-Americans and enslaved African
Americans. 4
The transformations that Tocqueville encountered in 1831 had their roots in the
French period. Although Cadillac had envisioned the post as a thriving agricultural space
and a feudal fiefdom, Detroit had fallen far short of his aspirations. 5 In 1708, Aigremont
had noted that few inhabitants of the area bothered to farm in the region and there were
only a few lonely horses and cattle to pull plows. 6 Conditions scarcely improved over the
next thirty years. Vaudreuil, who had always opposed the establishment of Detroit, had
tried to undermine the post through neglect, and his client, Alphonse de Tonty, did very
little to encourage French settlement there. During that period the French population at
Detroit had stagnated and even declined on occasion. 7 As a result, by 1755 Charles
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Stuart counted "But 360 Familys" at the post, while George Croghan dismissed the
habitants as "a lazy, idle" people, "depending chiefly on the savages for their
subsistence." A British officer, Dedrick Brehm, put it bluntly in 1760: "The Settlement
seems very little improved in 60 years." 8
Although Stuart and Croghan may not have been aware of it, the French
population at Detroit had been growing since the mid-1730s. Finally securing
encouragement from the crown, Louis Henry Deschamps, sieur de Boishebert began to
grant more land outside the fort in the mid-1730s. With the Fox threat abated, habitants
could finally start living on their lands, rather than in the safety of Fort Pontchartrain. 9
The French further encouraged this movement in the 1750s, when, after Orontony's
failed coup demonstrated their vulnerability, colonial officials began actively
encouraging migration to the fort. Supplying any volunteers with goods and livestock,
the officials convinced a large convoy of settlers to move to Detroit in 1749. 10 By 1754,
those inhabitants had begun to sell their surplus grain; and a year later the governor could
boast that the post "is a considerable one and well populated." 11 This growth continued
after the British assumed control of the post. Between Boishebert' s tenure in the mid-
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1730s and 1765, the population had grown from around 200 to nearly 900. 12 An English
observer encountered three Canadian families moving from Montreal to Detroit in 1760,
and Lt. Col. John Bradstreet observed in 1764 that the "Colony of Detroit grows fast." 13
Cadillac's vision had finally been realized.
Although the habitants and natives developed close ties, the growth of the
European population had strained that relationship. Cheanonvouzon had long ago
resisted the idea of moving to Detroit because he feared that his young men might kill
French livestock. 14 While that fear might have been unfounded in 1702, it was not by
1760. The Hurons complained to Johnson in 1762 that the "French Inhabitants commit
great Trespass on their. . .lands" and cut wood on their lands while the Hurons were away
hunting. Johnson predicted that such activity "must create uneasiness in i minds of i
Indians and produce misunderstandings." 15 In late April 1764, Theata met with Gladwin
and told him that "Wood & Bark is very unhandy to us at our old Village" and asked for
permission to move elsewhere. 16 In the face ofthis immigration, manyofDetroit's
native peoples began moving to literally greener pastures, such as Sandusky and the
southern reaches of the Detroit River. By 1777 the Hurons had four different settlements
in the Detroit region, and the Potawatomis had moved to the Huron River. 17 Finally, in
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1790 the Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Hurons ceded much of their holdings
around Detroit to the British crown and retained only two small reserves in the area. 18
Yet if Detroit was no longer a predominantly native place in 1831, the natives had
not disappeared. On his way up the Detroit River, Tocqueville saw "two stark naked
savages in a canoe" adorned with "Rings hanging on the nose." He also saw an Indian
village-perhaps the Huron Reserve halfway between Lake Erie and Detroit.
Tocqueville juxtaposed the Hurons' bark houses and naked children with the British fort
on the Windsor shore, marveling at the contrast between "extreme civilisation" and "the

Figure 16: E.H., "A View of Detroit," July 25, 1794. From Burton Historical Collection,
Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan.
This view of Detroit in 1794 portrays the trappings of an expanding Euro-American presence at
Detroit, such as buildings, sailed sloops, as well as evidence of continued native presence in the
canoe filled with native people in the lower left-hand corner.

18

R. Allen Douglas, Uppermost Canada: The Western District and the Detroit Frontier, 1800-1850
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001), 5; Teasdale, "The French of Orchard Country."

330

extreme opposite." 19 Contrary to Anglo-American fantasies about the vanishing Indian
that had inspired the policy of removal, the peoples of Detroit had not vanished, and had
not really gone very far. Nor had these people renounced their identities as separate and
distinct communities. Just two years before Tocqueville's arrival, the Ottawas,
Potawatomis, and Ojibwas laid claim to the Huron Reserve, launching a bitter struggle
between the Hurons and the Anishinaabe claimants, which, in turn launched an internal
debate among the Hurons. 20 Such quarrels had a long lineage. That the Hurons and the
Ottawas, who now only represented small communities in a large sea of Euro-Americans,
continued to squabble over territory in the 1830s tells us much about the nature of that
relationship. Despite the wholesale changes that had transformed Detroit from a native
place to a Euro-American one, despite their movement from the heart of Detroit to its
peripheries, despite the changes in colonial administrations, declarations of
independence, and wars, the Hurons and Ottawas remained separate and sought
advantage over their neighbors, and the Hurons responded to challenges through factional
politics. Much had changed at Detroit. This, at least, had remained the same.
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